Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-77564
Go to dashboardThe talosctl support command writes private registry auth settings into the generated support bundle without redacting them. Anyone who gets a bundle and has not been given it encrypted can read those registry credentials.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-26 14:42 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Teams running Talos Linux clusters that configure private registry credentials through a resource. The exposure is only when a support bundle is created and then shared with someone outside the trust boundary. Talos 1.14 and later encrypt support bundles to age recipients by default, which lowers the risk.
RegistryAuthConfig| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/siderolabs/talos | go | < 1.14.0-alpha.0.0.20260513110206-76080416beee | 1.14.0-alpha.0.0.20260513110206-76080416beee |
talosctl version and compare against the fixed build listed in the advisory.RegistryAuthConfig resource, which the advisory says triggers the leak.auth fields in resources/registryconfigs.cri.talos.dev.yaml and etcfilespecs.files.talos.dev.yaml.1.14.0-alpha.0.0.20260513110206-76080416beee (the fixed Go module version).Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
When generating a support bundle with talosctl support the credentials entered for private registries are included in the bundle.
Within the generated support bundle, inside resources/registryconfigs.cri.talos.dev.yaml the auth field of the spec is retained.
The same, potentially sensitive information is present within etcfilespecs.files.talos.dev.yaml.
Simply run talosctl -n [...] support on a cluster with a RegistryAuthConfig resource
The problem itself is minor, however, anyone who has ever uploaded a support.zip bundle on a github issue, slack thread or public forum could have potentially leaked their internal authentication parameters for a private registry.
In most situations, if the network and credentials are set correctly, this should not be a problem. On the other hand, if the affected registry is publicly accessible, and the provided credentials have write access to it, this could lead to possibly serious consequences, from denial of service, to data loss and possibly existing tag hijacking leading to supply chain compromise, for the affected parties which were under the impression that the support bundle is redacted of sensitive information and thus can be shared publicly.
Talos 1.14+ by default encrypts the support bundle to the age recipients specified (defaulting to siderolabs GitHub org members), so the impact is even lower.
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