Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-77412
Go to dashboardThe amqp091-go Go client for RabbitMQ crashes its whole process when a broker sends a byte-array field with a length of 0xFFFFFFFF, because the length is read as a signed int32 and passed to make. An attacker who controls or compromises the broker can therefore take down any application using the client.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:13 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go | go | < 1.13.0 | 1.13.0 |
go list -m github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go
grep amqp091-go go.mod
Any version below 1.13.0 is affected.
Upgrade github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go to 1.13.0 or later, then rebuild and redeploy.
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
RabbitMQ amqp091-go is a Go AMQP 0.9.1 client. Prior to 1.13.0, readField in read.go reads the length of an AMQP byte-array field with type tag x into a signed int32 and passes the value directly to make when allocating the field buffer. A malicious or compromised broker can encode a value such as 0xFFFFFFFF, which becomes -1 and causes a len out of range runtime panic. The panic escapes the network reader goroutine and terminates the client process, including during connection.start server properties or message header table parsing. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-77412")
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