Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-77366
Go to dashboardobsidian-tc is an MCP server for Obsidian vaults. Any valid token can read, write, or delete any configured vault by passing a different vault name in the request, which breaks tenant isolation.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:11 UTC, 5h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| obsidian-tc | npm | < 1.3.1 | 1.3.1 |
npm ls obsidian-tc to find the installed version; anything below 1.3.1 is affected1.3.1 or laterEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Tool dispatch did not check the caller-supplied input.vault against the caller's bound vault (ctx.vaultId); the folder ACL was a single global instance and the JWT carried no vault claim. As a result, any valid token could read, write, or delete any configured vault by passing input.vault, defeating multi-tenant isolation across ~90 tool sites. (resources/read was the only surface that already guarded this.)
Fixed in 1.3.1 (the fix was developed on the v1.3.0 tag, which never published to npm; 1.3.1 is the first published release with the fix). Upgrade to >= 1.3.1.
Run a single vault per server process, or isolate each tenant on a separate process/credential.
A central input.vault === ctx.vaultId guard was added in dispatch before the scope check.
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