---
id: "CVE-2026-76654"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-76654"]
title: "Kubernetes kubelet on Windows leaks NTLM hashes via symlinked subPath"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 5.8
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "infrastructure"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["domain-joined", "infrastructure", "kubelet", "kubernetes", "windows"]
not_affected_if: ["linux-only-nodes", "no-untrusted-workloads"]
published_at: "2026-10-26T23:17:09+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T23:25:48+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T23:25:59+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76654", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T23:25:48+00:00"}]
---

# Kubernetes kubelet on Windows leaks NTLM hashes via symlinked subPath

On Windows nodes, a pod's volumeMounts subPath that is a symlink to a UNC network share makes the kubelet authenticate to that share over NTLM. An attacker who controls the share receives the NetNTLMv2 hash of the account running the kubelet, which can be cracked or relayed to impersonate the node.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the Kubernetes version on Windows nodes with `kubelet --version`
- Look for pods on Windows nodes whose volumeMounts use a subPath, and check whether that path can be made a symlink by untrusted users
- unknown

## Fix

- Upgrade the kubelet on Windows nodes to a patched release; the fixed version is unknown from the sources
- unknown

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T23:25:48+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76654

## From the sources

An NTLM coercion vulnerability exists on Windows nodes when the subPath supplied in a pod's volumeMounts is set to a symbolic link that points to an attacker-controlled network share. When a kubelet resolves symlinks, it does not reject a target that resolves to a UNC path. As a result, the kubelet will transparently attempt to authenticate to the share using NTLM. This allows an attacker to obtain the NetNTLMv2 hash of the account under which the kubelet is running. An attacker could then attempt to crack the hash to retrieve the corresponding password or relay it to impersonate the node, if the node is domain-joined.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_