---
id: "CVE-2026-67541"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-67541"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-67541"]
title: "Heym: any team member can grant attackers access to shared credentials"
severity: "high"
cvss: 8.1
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "ai-tooling"
products: [{"name": "Heym", "fixed": [], "affected": "", "ecosystem": "vendor"}]
ecosystems: ["vendor"]
tags: ["ai-agents", "ai-tooling", "heym", "self-hosted", "team-credentials"]
not_affected_if: ["no-team-shared-credentials", "version-0.0.70-or-later"]
published_at: "2026-11-11T22:17:28+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-11T22:29:34+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-11T22:31:48+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67541", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-11T22:29:34+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Heym: any team member can grant attackers access to shared credentials

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-67541 (this .md is for agents)

Heym lets any non-creator team member add, remove or change team members, because the check looks only at team membership and there is no role field. An attacker who joins a team can then decrypt every credential shared into it, including provider API keys and OAuth tokens.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- vendor:Heym affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed

## How to check

- Check the installed Heym version; anything below `0.0.70` is affected.
- Review team membership and who holds team access, since any member of an affected team can exploit this.

## Fix

- Heym: upgrade to `0.0.70` or later, which the sources say patches this issue.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-11T22:29:34+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67541

## Documents

- [advisory] Vendor advisory: github.com https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-vxpw-x7j7-8723
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/863e2702fca9a584246da9a51cca6b12828cebcf
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/a9fc3d864e87fa2449b235798189db9cd39367c4
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/def26b5cf77dad4a9c5b5ff11c9863a0bc144ac8
- [fix] Release notes: github.com https://github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/0.0.70

## From the sources

Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, team-member management (add / remove / update) is gated only on team membership, not on the team creator/admin role — and TeamMember has no role column. Any non-creator member can seat an attacker account into the team; because credential team-shares are scoped only by TeamMember.user_id, the newly-added attacker can then decrypt every credential shared into that team (provider API keys, OAuth tokens. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.

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