---
id: "CVE-2026-65820"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-65820"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-65820"]
title: "aeon: GitHub Actions workflow runs fork pull request code with write token"
severity: "high"
cvss: 8.7
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["aeon", "github-actions", "package", "python"]
not_affected_if: ["library-only-use", "version-1.5.0-or-later"]
published_at: "2026-11-11T18:19:47+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-11T18:28:43+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-11T18:29:20+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65820", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-11T18:28:43+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# aeon: GitHub Actions workflow runs fork pull request code with write token

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-65820 (this .md is for agents)

The aeon Python library's pre-commit GitHub Actions workflow ran code from forked pull requests in a privileged context. A malicious fork pull request could expose elevated credentials and push commits to the repository.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the version of aeon in your dependencies, for example `pip show aeon`
- Look for a `.github/workflows` file in the aeon repository that uses `pull_request_target` for pre-commit checks, if you maintain a fork or copy of the project

## Fix

- aeon: upgrade to `1.5.0` or later

## Timeline

- 2026-11-11T18:28:43+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65820

## Documents

- [advisory] Vendor advisory: github.com https://github.com/aeon-toolkit/aeon/security/advisories/GHSA-mhg2-mc45-wrjr
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/aeon-toolkit/aeon/commit/99261e1355c89a316bf0824bb03f855c6aadae8f

## From the sources

aeon is a scikit-learn compatible Python library for learning from time series. Prior to version 1.5.0, a GitHub Actions workflow used pull_request_target for pre-commit checks on pull requests from forks. In this configuration, fork-controlled code could be checked out and executed in a privileged context. The vulnerable workflow also generated/used elevated credentials and could automatically commit or push fixes back to pull request branches. This created a potential token exposure and repository write path if an attacker submitted a malicious fork pull request designed to execute during the privileged workflow run. This issue has been patched in version 1.5.0.

---

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