Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-65631
Go to dashboardThe erlang-jose library, used by Elixir and Erlang apps, spends about a CPU-second per crafted RSA JSON Web Key when parsing it, because it tries to factor the modulus. An unauthenticated attacker flooding such requests can saturate every scheduler and deny service.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-26 20:50 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Applications that parse untrusted JWKs with erlang-jose's public from_binary or from_map functions are exposed, because the flaw is reached by a single request carrying a crafted RSA key with no CRT parameters. Systems that only handle keys they load from trusted local configuration, or that do not accept JWKs from outside, can skip it.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
mix.lock (Elixir) or rebar.lock (Erlang) and see if it is from 1.7.7 up to but not including 1.11.13.JOSE.JWK.from_binary/1, JOSE.JWK.from_map/1, jose_jwk:from_binary/1 or jose_jwk:from_map/1 on untrusted input.1.11.13 or later.Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity in erlang-jose allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a CPU-exhaustion denial of service by submitting a crafted RSA JSON Web Key.
When an application parses an untrusted JWK through the public jose_jwk:from_binary/1 or jose_jwk:from_map/1 API (or the Elixir wrappers JOSE.JWK.from_binary/1 and JOSE.JWK.from_map/1), an RSA private key that supplies d, e, and n but omits all Chinese Remainder Theorem parameters (p, q, dp, dq, qi) is routed into convert_sfm_to_crt/1, which tries to recover the missing primes by factoring the modulus. The three integers are read straight from the base64url input and are never validated as a real RSA key. When the modulus cannot be split into two factors (for example, when it is itself prime), the search loop convert_sfm_to_crt_find_p/6 performs a modular exponentiation over the attacker-sized modulus on every iteration and never succeeds. A single request of a few hundred bytes forces close to one CPU-second of work before an internal one-second watchdog kills the worker, and a larger modulus raises the cost further. By flooding such requests an attacker can saturate every scheduler and deny service, without credentials, a valid RSA key, or any special configuration.
This issue affects jose: from 1.7.7 before 1.11.13.
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