Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-65627
Go to dashboardThe jose Erlang library decompresses the zip DEF payload of a JWE token without any output size or ratio limit, so a few-kilobyte token can inflate to gigabytes during decryption. An attacker only needs the recipient's public key to craft one, and a single token can crash the BEAM node and deny service to all users.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-26 20:50 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Applications that decrypt JWE tokens with the jose library and accept them from untrusted parties, since the attacker only needs the recipient's public key with RSA-OAEP or ECDH-ES. Services that never decrypt JWE input, or that only handle tokens from trusted sources, are much less exposed.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
jose (erlang-jose, or JOSE.JWE in Elixir) in rebar.lock, mix.lock or deps and see whether it is below 1.11.13jose_jwe:block_decrypt, JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt) to see whether the app accepts tokens from outside1.11.13 or laterzip: DEF header before decryptionEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token.
The jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.
Decompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.
This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-65627")
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