---
id: "CVE-2026-62334"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-62334"]
title: "OpenVM Solidity verifier accepts forged zero-knowledge proofs through selector collision"
severity: "high"
cvss: 8.7
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["ethereum", "openvm", "package", "smart-contracts", "solidity", "zkvm"]
not_affected_if: ["no-solidity-wrapper", "pinned-fixed-version"]
published_at: "2026-10-30T20:17:12+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-30T20:25:38+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-30T20:26:15+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62334", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-30T20:25:38+00:00"}]
---

# OpenVM Solidity verifier accepts forged zero-knowledge proofs through selector collision

OpenVM's generated Halo2 Solidity verifier wrapper can be tricked into treating a crafted proof as valid when the first four proof bytes match another exposed function selector. An attacker who submits such proof data can get arbitrary app commitments and public values accepted by applications that rely on the wrapper.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check whether the project depends on the OpenVM Solidity wrapper or the generated `OpenVmHalo2Verifier` contract.
- Check the OpenVM version in use; affected versions are before `1.7.0` in the 1.x line and the `2.0` and `2.1` prereleases.

## Fix

- OpenVM 1.x: upgrade to `1.7.0`
- OpenVM 2.0 prerelease: upgrade to `2.0.0-rc.3`
- OpenVM 2.1 prerelease: upgrade to `2.1.0-preview`

## Timeline

- 2026-10-30T20:25:38+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62334

## From the sources

OpenVM is a performant and modular zkVM framework built for customization and extensibility. Before 1.7.0 in the 1.x line and in affected 2.0 and 2.1 prereleases, `OpenVmHalo2Verifier.verify` constructs raw proof calldata from user-controlled `proofData`, performs a `staticcall` to `address(this)`, and treats a successful call as proof acceptance. If the first four proof bytes match another external selector exposed by the wrapper, dispatch can invoke a successful non-verifier function instead of the generated Halo2 fallback verifier. Applications using the generated Solidity wrapper can consequently accept arbitrary app commitments and public values without checking the proof suffix, accumulator, app commitments or public values. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.0, 2.0.0-rc.3 and 2.1.0-preview.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_