---
id: "CVE-2026-61840"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-61840"]
title: "Quest Bot: DNS rebinding lets Discord members probe internal HTTPS hosts"
severity: "low"
cvss: 2.3
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["discord", "package", "quest-bot", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["developer-only-gate-enabled", "version-1.1.9-or-later"]
published_at: "2026-10-30T19:18:28+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-30T19:25:29+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-30T19:27:51+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61840", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-30T19:25:29+00:00"}]
---

# Quest Bot: DNS rebinding lets Discord members probe internal HTTPS hosts

Quest Bot, an open-source Discord bot, checks a hostname's IP address but then connects by name, so a second DNS lookup can point it at an internal address. Members of a server with the bot can use the image-to-GIF command to probe internal HTTPS endpoints and retrieve image responses from them.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the installed Quest Bot version; versions below `1.1.9` are affected.
- Look for the `image to GIF` command in your bot deployment and confirm whether the developer-only gate is enabled.

## Fix

- Quest Bot: upgrade to `1.1.9`.

## Timeline

- 2026-10-30T19:25:29+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61840

## From the sources

Quest Bot is an opensource Discord Bot. Prior to 1.1.9, the `image to GIF` command uses a request helper that validates a hostname's public IP addresses but then sends the actual request by hostname, causing a `second DNS lookup`. An attacker controlling a domain can return a public address during validation and an internal address during the connection, bypassing the internal-address protection through `DNS rebinding`. The command takes its address directly from user input and its developer-only gate is disabled in normal deployments, so any member of a server with the bot can trigger the flaw without special permissions. Requests are restricted to `HTTPS on port 443`, and content is returned only when the response is a `genuine image`. The impact is therefore mostly blind internal probing with limited retrieval of image responses from loopback or internal endpoints, not arbitrary internal-data disclosure. Common cloud metadata services using plain HTTP on another port are not reachable through this path. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.9.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_