SOCFortress CoPilot: forged token can suppress security detections platform-wide

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, the Velociraptor Sigma exclusion-management endpoints in backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py omit role and tenant authorization, and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma/exclusion does not validate credentials. Its return_username_for_logging dependency in backend/app/auth/utils.py calls decode_token, which returns ordinary Invalid token or Expired signature strings on failure, and the dependency passes these strings through instead of rejecting the request. A Bearer header is required, but an arbitrary invalid, expired or forged value can create a suppression rule without a valid account. The collection GET at /create/velo-sigma/exclusion lists exclusions; the read, update and delete routes under /create/velo-sigma/exclusion/{exclusion_id}, and the /velo-sigma/exclusion/{exclusion_id}/toggle route, use get_current_user without role checks, permitting any authenticated customer_user to manage every exclusion. In backend/app/incidents/services/velo_sigma.py, process_sigma_alert calls check_exclusions and drops matching enabled alerts before incident creation. A null customer_code applies a rule across all tenants. Attackers can suppress detections platform-wide through channel, title or field matching, while low-privilege accounts can enumerate detection-tuning data and modify, disable or delete legitimate exclusions. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.77.