---
id: "CVE-2026-61728"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-61728"]
title: "SOCFortress CoPilot: stored XSS in alert comments steals login tokens"
severity: "critical"
cvss: 9.9
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["customer-portal", "package", "security-operations", "socfortress-copilot", "vue"]
not_affected_if: ["patched-0.1.76"]
published_at: "2026-10-30T15:16:52+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-30T15:31:11+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-30T15:33:00+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61728", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-30T15:31:11+00:00"}]
---

# SOCFortress CoPilot: stored XSS in alert comments steals login tokens

SOCFortress CoPilot renders user-submitted alert comments and SOC case fields as raw HTML without sanitizing them, and stores login tokens where scripts can read them. A portal user can plant a script that runs in an analyst's or administrator's browser, stealing tokens and taking over the account.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the CoPilot customer portal version and compare it against the fixed releases listed below.
- Look for `customer-portal/src/components/alerts/AlertDetails/AlertComment.vue` in the deployed source and confirm whether `commentHtml` is passed to `v-html` without sanitizing.
- Review stored alert comments and SOC case notes for embedded HTML or script tags.

## Fix

- SOCFortress CoPilot `0.1.70` contains the health-check sink repair.
- SOCFortress CoPilot `0.1.76` contains the comment and other SOC sink repairs; the sources describe it as the provisional first release with all observed repairs.

## Timeline

- 2026-10-30T15:31:11+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61728

## From the sources

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. In affected snapshots preceding the respective 0.1.70 and 0.1.76 sink repairs, portal users, including `customer_user`, can submit stored markup through `POST /api/incidents/db_operations/alert/comment`. In `customer-portal/src/components/alerts/AlertDetails/AlertComment.vue`, `commentHtml` replaces newlines in `comment.comment` but passes the result to `v-html` without escaping or sanitizing HTML. When another user views the poisoned alert, stored script executes on the application origin; the same unsanitized rendering pattern affects server-stored SOC case, asset and health-check fields in `SocCaseNote.vue`, `SocCaseItem.vue`, `SocCaseAssetsItem.vue`, `SocAlertAssetsItem.vue` and `HealthcheckItem.vue`. The authentication store in `customer-portal/src/stores/auth.ts` persists both access and refresh tokens in JavaScript-readable storage, and `customer-portal/src/api/httpClient.ts` uses bearer headers rather than HttpOnly cookies. An injected script can steal both tokens, impersonate the viewer and obtain fresh tokens through `/auth/refresh`. If an analyst or administrator views the poisoned alert or case, this enables persistent privileged account takeover, cross-tenant data access, incident modification or deletion, and detection/response subversion. The health-check sink repair is first contained in version 0.1.70, while the comment and other SOC sink repairs are first contained in version 0.1.76. Version 0.1.76 is the provisional first release containing all observed repairs; grouped versus split CVE scope requires curator adjudication.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_