Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-61546
Go to dashboardAnkiMCP is an Anki addon that runs an MCP server on 127.0.0.1:3141 by default, and before 0.21.0 it disabled DNS-rebinding protection. A malicious web page a victim visits while Anki runs can rebind browser requests to loopback and read the local collection or create and update notes and decks through MCP tools.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-28 22:35 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Anyone running the AnkiMCP addon below 0.21.0 with the default HTTP listener enabled while Anki is open. A victim's browser visiting an attacker-controlled page can reach the loopback MCP server; no LAN position or local process is needed. Users who do not have the addon installed, or who run a patched version, are not exposed.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
0.21.0 are affected.anki_mcp_server/config.py for http_enabled set to true on 127.0.0.1:3141, which is the default.anki_mcp_server/mcp_server.py for enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False.0.21.0 or later.Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
AnkiMCP is an Anki addon that implements an MCP server, enabling AI assistants to interact with the Anki flashcard application. Prior to version 0.21.0, anki_mcp_server/mcp_server.py globally disables FastMCP DNS-rebinding protection through TransportSecuritySettings with enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False, including for the default local Streamable HTTP listener. The defaults in anki_mcp_server/config.py enable http_enabled on 127.0.0.1:3141, with an empty http_path selecting the root endpoint. No bearer token, API key, session secret, strict Host allowlist or strict Origin allowlist is enforced before initialize, tools/list and tools/call reach MCP dispatch. A victim who visits a malicious web page while Anki and the listener are running can have browser requests rebound to loopback, allowing the attacker to initialize MCP, enumerate tools, read the local collection, and perform enabled non-destructive note/deck creation or updates. The attacker needs neither LAN position nor a local process. Available operations depend on enabled tool filters; destructive tools are hidden unless enabled_destructive_tools is opted into, limiting deletion-level impact but not the exposed read/write operations. The reported harness confirms real MCP tool dispatch with substituted Anki bridge responses rather than demonstrating destructive changes to a real collection. Disabling protection for tunnels/proxies also disables it for the normal loopback configuration. This issue is fixed in version 0.21.0.
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