{"id":"CVE-2026-59001","kind":"vulnerability","aliases":["CVE-2026-59001"],"related":[],"title":"Android: telephony provider permission check lets a local app read data","description":"In checkQueryPermission of TelephonyProvider.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.","summary":"A logic error in the Android telephony provider's query permission check lets an app bypass access control. An attacker gets local information disclosure without extra privileges and without user interaction.","severity":"unknown","cvss":null,"epss":null,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[],"ecosystems":[],"tags":["android","infrastructure","mobile"],"not_affected_if":[],"how_to_check":null,"fix":null,"status":"open","published_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:55+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-02T20:35:36+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-11-02T20:37:05+00:00","updated_at":"2026-11-02T20:37:05+00:00","category":"infrastructure","confidence":0.5,"triage":{"at":"2026-11-02T20:37:05Z","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","output":{"fix":"unknown","reach":"local","title":"Android: telephony provider permission check lets a local app read data","impact":"low","summary":"A logic error in the Android telephony provider's query permission check lets an app bypass access control. An attacker gets local information disclosure without extra privileges and without user interaction.","audience":"everyone","category":"infrastructure","nicknames":[],"who_cares":["android","mobile"],"confidence":0.5,"fix_status":"unknown","needs_auth":"no","worst_case":"a local app reads telephony data it should not see","analyst_note":"Confirm affected Android versions and the patch level that fixes it from the Android security bulletin; the NVD entry alone gives no versions.","how_to_check":"unknown","plain_action":"","needs_analyst":true,"not_affected_if":[],"who_is_affected":"Android devices with the affected telephony provider code; the sources do not name the affected Android versions or patch level. Installing the vendor's security updates when they are available is the only step the sources point to.","user_interaction":"no","needs_special_setup":"unknown","severity_if_unknown":"low"},"cost_usd":0.000601,"input_tokens":4098,"output_tokens":382,"severity_before":"unknown"},"analyst_status":null,"analyst_note":null,"search":"'-2026':13A,16A '-59001':14A,17A 'access':37B 'addit':79C 'android':1A,18B,26B 'app':9A,35B 'attack':40B 'bypass':36B,61C 'check':5A,32B 'checkquerypermiss':53C 'code':69C 'control':38B 'could':71C 'cve':12A,15A 'data':11A 'disclosur':44B,76C 'due':62C 'error':23B,66C 'execut':80C 'exploit':89C 'extra':46B 'get':41B 'inform':43B,75C 'infrastructur':19B 'interact':51B,84C 'lead':72C 'let':6A,33B 'local':8A,42B,74C 'logic':22B,65C 'mobil':20B 'need':82C,87C 'permiss':4A,31B,60C 'possibl':59C 'privileg':47B,81C 'provid':3A,28B 'queri':30B 'read':10A 'telephoni':2A,27B 'telephonyprovider.java':55C 'user':50B,83C 'without':45B,49B","nicknames":[],"mitigations":[],"who_affected":"Android devices with the affected telephony provider code; the sources do not name the affected Android versions or patch level. Installing the vendor's security updates when they are available is the only step the sources point to.","tier":"C","verified":{},"analyst_revisit_at":null,"fix_status":"none","audience":"everyone","plain_action":null,"pkeys":[],"ptokens":[],"labels":["android","infrastructure","mobile","unknown"],"first_public_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:55+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":null,"cvss_by":null,"poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"nvd","external_id":"CVE-2026-59001","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59001","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:55+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:55+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-02T20:35:36+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-02T20:35:36+00:00","note":null}],"documents":[],"notice":"Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai"}