---
id: "CVE-2026-57114"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-57114"]
title: "PraisonAI: DNS rebinding bypasses webhook guard, reaching internal networks and metadata"
severity: "high"
cvss: 7.2
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "ai-tooling"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["ai-tooling", "cloud", "praisonai", "python", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["async-jobs-disabled", "patched-4.6.59-or-later"]
published_at: "2026-10-23T13:17:10+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:33+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-25T03:27:42+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57114", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:33+00:00"}]
---

# PraisonAI: DNS rebinding bypasses webhook guard, reaching internal networks and metadata

PraisonAI's Async Jobs API checks webhook URLs when a job is submitted, but the check is not enforced when the webhook is actually sent. An attacker can use a hostname that resolves to a public IP at check time and to loopback, private or cloud metadata addresses at delivery time.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the installed PraisonAI version with `pip show praisonai` and see whether it is in the range 4.5.126 up to but not including 4.6.59.
- Check whether the Async Jobs API is exposed and accepts `webhook_url` in job requests.

## Fix

- Upgrade PraisonAI to `4.6.59` or later.
- Until upgraded, disable or restrict the Async Jobs API and block outbound webhook delivery to internal and metadata addresses at the network layer.

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T21:57:33+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57114

## From the sources

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_