Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-56837
Go to dashboardPraisonAI's LinearBot listens on all interfaces and skips Linear signature checks when LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is unset. An unauthenticated caller can send forged AgentSession events that run the bot's agent and post its replies to Linear using the configured bot token.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
4.6.56 up to but not including 4.6.59 are affected4.6.59 or laterEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.6.56 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's LinearBot starts a public webhook listener on 0.0.0.0 and treats LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET as optional. When the secret is absent, startup only logs a warning and _handle_webhook() skips Linear-Signature verification entirely. An unauthenticated network caller who can reach the webhook endpoint can submit a forged Linear-Event: AgentSession request. The forged request is parsed, scheduled for background processing, dispatched to _handle_agent_session(), and passed into BotSessionManager.chat(). The bot then attempts to post the agent response back to Linear under the configured bot token. The PoV is offline and deterministic. It does not contact Linear. It calls the webhook handler directly, monkey-patches the outbound Linear comment path, and proves both sides of the boundary. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.
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