Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-56832
Go to dashboardPraisonAI's Discord approval backend approves a pending high-risk tool call when any non-bot user in the approval channel posts an approval word such as yes. An attacker who can post in that channel can authorize actions the operator meant to gate.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
Check whether the PraisonAI version is between 4.5.2 and 4.6.58 (pip show praisonai) and whether the Discord approval backend (praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval) is in use.
4.6.59 or laterEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.2 to before version 4.6.59, praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval approves a pending dangerous tool call when it sees any later non-bot message in the configured Discord channel whose text is classified as approval, such as yes. As a result, any user who can post in the configured approval channel can approve a pending high-risk tool call by sending yes after the approval message appears. the same PoV also shows that the Slack and Telegram messaging approval backends have no explicit approver allowlist parameter, but the primary report-grade issue is the Discord backend's unthreaded channel cross-talk: the approving message does not need to be a reply or otherwise request-bound. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-56832")
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