Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-55235
Go to dashboardA run or cron created with a relative webhook target gets delivered through an in-process loopback that the authentication middleware treats as internal and does not check. An attacker can thereby reach thread and run routes without the auth that applies to external requests, possibly creating runs on or changing another user's thread.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-28 21:12 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Teams running the LangGraph Server runtime (langgraph-api, including the LangGraph Platform Helm chart) that allow runs or crons to specify webhook targets and rely on per-user authorization to separate threads and runs. Deployments that do not use webhooks or do not scope threads by owner are less exposed; the sources do not say more.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| langgraph-api | pypi | < 0.10.0 | 0.10.0 |
pip show langgraph-api, and treat anything below 0.10.0 as affected.langgraph.json or LANGGRAPH_WEBHOOKS sets webhooks.url.disable_loopback: false, which re-enables the risky loopback delivery.langgraph-api to 0.10.0 or later.webhooks.url.disable_loopback at its default (enabled) unless loopback delivery is required.Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
In affected versions of langgraph-api (the LangGraph Server runtime), a run or cron could be created with a relative webhook target. When the server later delivers such a webhook, it routes the request back into the same application through an in-process loopback transport that the authentication middleware treats as internal and does not authenticate. As a result, a relative webhook target could reach the server's own routes that operate on threads and runs without the authentication context that applies to ordinary external requests.
In deployments that scope threads and runs by owner, this could allow a request associated with one user to reach routes operating on another user's thread, resulting in creation of a run on (or modification of the state of) a thread owned by another user, even where the corresponding direct external requests were correctly denied. Limited metadata from the targeted thread may be incorporated into the created run record.
We have no evidence of this behavior occurring in the wild.
You may be affected if you:
langgraph-api (the LangGraph Server / Agent Server runtime, including via the LangGraph Platform Helm chart),The webhook URL policy now denies loopback delivery by default: the webhooks.url.disable_loopback policy defaults to enabled. This covers relative webhook targets routed through the in-process transport, as well as localhost-style hostnames, loopback address ranges, and hostnames that resolve into the loopback range. Deployments that legitimately deliver webhooks to a route hosted on the same process can opt back in by setting webhooks.url.disable_loopback: false in langgraph.json (or the equivalent LANGGRAPH_WEBHOOKS configuration); do so only when you control the routes those webhooks reach, as they are delivered without authentication. Fixed in langgraph-api 0.10.0.
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