---
id: "CVE-2026-54532"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-54532"]
title: "CloudPirates Helm charts: CI cache poisoning can steal release tokens"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 6.9
epss: 0.00187
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "infrastructure"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["ci-cd", "github-actions", "helm", "infrastructure", "kubernetes"]
not_affected_if: ["default-config"]
published_at: "2026-10-22T18:17:29+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:31+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-25T03:38:54+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54532", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:31+00:00"}, {"source": "epss", "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-54532", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-24T07:15:51+00:00"}]
---

# CloudPirates Helm charts: CI cache poisoning can steal release tokens

The CI workflows in the CloudPirates Open Source Helm Charts repository ran fork pull request code with access to base repository secrets and wrote to a shared Actions cache. A later release workflow restored that cache, so a poisoned entry could run during a release and expose OIDC tokens.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check whether your fork of the CloudPirates Helm charts repository includes commit `271d415` or later
- Review any `pull_request_target` workflows for checkout of `github.event.pull_request.head.sha` or `.head.ref` followed by cache writes

## Fix

- Update to a commit at or after `271d415`, which the sources say patches the issue
- unknown whether a released chart version contains the fix

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T21:57:31+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54532
- 2026-10-24T07:15:51+00:00 epss https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-54532

## From the sources

CloudPirates Open Source Helm Charts is a collection of Helm charts. Prior to commit 271d415, pull_request_target workflow is vulnerable to cache poisoning and OIDC token theft. A pull_request_target workflow checks out fork code using github.event.pull_request.head.sha or .head.ref. This gives attacker-controlled code access to base repository secrets and tokens. A pull_request_target workflow writes to a shared Actions cache. A subsequent release or publish workflow restores from the same cache scope, allowing a poisoned cache entry to execute during release. This issue has been patched via commit 271d415.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_