OPEN-WEBUI · CVE-2026-44551 · AI agents & MCP
FIX → 0.9.0
Open WebUI's LDAP login accepts an empty password and sends it to the LDAP server as a simple bind, which many servers accept as a successful login. An attacker who knows a valid LDAP username can get a full session token for that account without the password.
first public May 5, 2026 · 2 sources
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Only instances with LDAP authentication enabled (ENABLE_LDAP=True, off by default) are exposed, and only when the LDAP server accepts unauthenticated simple binds, as OpenLDAP does by default and some Active Directory setups do. Deployments that use local accounts or other login methods, or that run with LDAP off, can skip it. The sources say the attack needs only a valid LDAP username and no prior login.
Not affected if default-config, ldap-disabled, ldap-server-rejects-empty-password
Who cares ldap, open-webui, python, self-hosted
ENABLE_LDAP set to True in the Open WebUI environment (it is disabled by default)pip show open-webui; versions <= 0.8.12 are affectedLDAP authentication endpoint:
backend/open_webui/routers/auths.py (lines 468-477, user bind with empty password)backend/open_webui/models/auths.py (lines 58-60, LdapForm model)Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with LDAP authentication support.
The LDAP authentication endpoint does not validate that the submitted password is non-empty before performing a Simple Bind against the LDAP server. Per RFC 4513 Section 5.1.2, a Simple Bind with a valid DN and an empty password constitutes an "unauthenticated simple authentication" — many LDAP servers (including OpenLDAP in default configuration and some Active Directory setups) return success (resultCode 0) for this operation.
The LdapForm Pydantic model accepts password: str with no minimum length constraint, so an empty string passes validation. The subsequent Connection.bind() call succeeds on vulnerable LDAP servers, and the application issues a full session token for the target user.
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Upgrade to 0.9.0
open-webui (PyPI): move to 0.9.0# models/auths.py:58-60 — no min_length on password
class LdapForm(BaseModel):
user: str
password: str
# auths.py:469-477 — empty password reaches LDAP bind
connection_user = Connection(
server,
user_dn,
form_data.password, # can be ""
auto_bind='NONE',
authentication='SIMPLE',
)
if not await asyncio.to_thread(connection_user.bind):
raise HTTPException(400, 'Authentication failed.')
# If bind succeeds (which it does with empty password on many servers),
# execution continues and a full session token is issued
| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via the LDAP login endpoint |
| Attack Complexity | Low (L) | Single request with an empty password field |
| Privileges Required | None (N) | No prior authentication needed |
| User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required |
| Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact within the application's authentication boundary |
| Confidentiality | High (H) | Full access to victim's account data — chats, files, API keys, settings |
| Integrity | High (H) | Can modify victim's data, settings, send messages as victim |
| Availability | None (N) | No direct denial of service |
POST /api/v1/auths/ldap
{"user": "admin_username", "password": ""}
authenticate_user_by_email (line 507) issues a full session token for the target user.ENABLE_LDAP=True, disabled by default)This page as .md · .json · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
GitHub Advisory Database, CC-BY 4.0 · NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.