PRAISONAI · CVE-2026-44336 · AI agents & MCP
FIX → 4.6.34
PraisonAI's MCP server registers file tools that join unvalidated path arguments onto a directory, so an MCP client or prompt-injected LLM can write files outside it. Writing a Python .pth file into user site-packages makes any later Python process run attacker code.
first public May 3, 2026 · 2 sources
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Teams running the PraisonAI MCP server (praisonai mcp serve) or any MCP client wired to it, such as Claude Desktop, Cursor or Claude Code. The HTTP-stream transport with no API key is reachable from local processes and browsers. Installations that do not run the MCP server are not described as affected.
Not affected if api-key-set-on-http-stream, no-mcp-server
Who cares claude-code, cursor, mcp, praisonai, python
pip show praisonai and compare the version to 4.6.34.praisonai mcp serve is running, especially with --transport http-stream and no .PraisonAI's MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (praisonai mcp serve) registers four file-handling tools by default — praisonai.rules.create, praisonai.rules.show, praisonai.rules.delete, and praisonai.workflow.show. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP tools/call arguments and joins it onto ~/.praison/rules/ (or, for workflow.show, accepts an absolute path) with no containment check. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes params["arguments"] blind to each handler via **kwargs without validating against the advertised input schema.
By setting rule_name="../../<some-path>" an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python .pth file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to — the next CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user's REPL, or any background Python service. The same primitive is reachable from:
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--api-keyUpgrade to 4.6.34
praisonai (PyPI): upgrade to 4.6.34.praisonaipythonpraisonai mcp serve --transport http-stream with no --api-key (default), reachable from any local process / DNS-rebound browser tab / container neighbour sharing loopback.No operator misconfiguration is required. No env var, flag, or config switch disables the vulnerable handlers.
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/server.py:281-298:
async def _handle_tools_call(self, params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Handle tools/call request."""
tool_name = params.get("name")
arguments = params.get("arguments", {})
if not tool_name:
raise ValueError("Tool name required")
tool = self._tool_registry.get(tool_name)
if tool is None:
raise ValueError(f"Tool not found: {tool_name}")
# Execute tool
try:
if asyncio.iscoroutinefunction(tool.handler):
result = await tool.handler(**arguments) # ← no schema enforcement
else:
result = tool.handler(**arguments)
tool.input_schema is built reflectively from the handler signature in registry.py:320-376 and surfaced in tools/list responses — but it is never enforced before dispatch. Whatever JSON shape the MCP client (or an LLM under prompt injection) sends becomes a **kwargs call.
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py:
# line 116-128 — rules.create — primary write primitive
@register_tool("praisonai.rules.create")
def rules_create(rule_name: str, content: str) -> str:
"""Create a new rule."""
try:
import os
rules_dir = os.path.expanduser("~/.praison/rules")
os.makedirs(rules_dir, exist_ok=True)
rule_path = os.path.join(rules_dir, rule_name) # ← no realpath/containment
with open(rule_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(content)
return f"Rule created: {rule_name}"
except Exception as e:
return f"Error: {e}"
# line 102-114 — rules.show — read primitive (f-string interpolation, same vuln class)
@register_tool("praisonai.rules.show")
def rules_show(rule_name: str) -> str:
"""Show a specific rule."""
try:
import os
rule_path = os.path.expanduser(f"~/.praison/rules/{rule_name}") # ← `..` works
if not os.path.exists(rule_path):
return f"Rule not found: {rule_name}"
with open(rule_path, 'r') as f:
content = f.read()
return content
except Exception as e:
return f"Error: {e}"
# line 130-141 — rules.delete — delete primitive
@register_tool("praisonai.rules.delete")
def rules_delete(rule_name: str) -> str:
"""Delete a rule."""
try:
import os
rule_path = os.path.expanduser(f"~/.praison/rules/{rule_name}") # ← same pattern
if not os.path.exists(rule_path):
return f"Rule not found: {rule_name}"
os.remove(rule_path)
return f"Rule deleted: {rule_name}"
except Exception as e:
return f"Error: {e}"
# line 63-73 — workflow.show — absolute-path read primitive (no traversal needed)
@register_tool("praisonai.workflow.show")
def workflow_show(file_path: str) -> str:
"""Show workflow configuration."""
try:
with open(file_path, 'r') as f: # ← absolute path, no validation
content = f.read()
return content
except FileNotFoundError:
return f"File not found: {file_path}"
except Exception as e:
return f"Error: {e}"
os.path.join(rules_dir, "../../somewhere") and os.path.expanduser(f"~/.praison/rules/../../somewhere") both resolve .. segments at open() time, so the on-disk effect escapes the rules directory. workflow.show does not need traversal at all — it open()s an absolute path the LLM supplied.
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py:216-219 (cmd_serve):
from .adapters import register_all
register_all()
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/__init__.py:33-39:
def _register_all():
register_all_tools()
register_extended_capability_tools()
register_cli_tools() # ← rules.create / rules.show / rules.delete / workflow.show
register_mcp_resources()
register_mcp_prompts()
There is no flag, env var, or config switch that disables the file primitives. praisonai mcp serve registers them on every startup.
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py:184:
parser.add_argument("--api-key", default=None)
The auth check at mcp_server/transports/http_stream.py:191-198 is wrapped in if self.api_key: — None skips the entire block. Default config: praisonai mcp serve --transport http-stream binds 127.0.0.1:8080/mcp unauthenticated.
.pthCPython's Lib/site.py (addsitedir / addpackage) imports lines starting with import from every .pth file present in site.getsitepackages() and site.getusersitepackages() at every interpreter startup. The user site-packages directory is always writable without elevation. A single .pth file containing import os; os.system("...") turns the path-traversal write primitive into RCE on the next Python interpreter the user starts — including the user's own python REPL, the next praisonai CLI command, IDE script launchers, and any background Python service.
Containment in every cli_tools handler. Replace bare os.path.join / f-string interpolation with explicit prefix validation:
import re
from pathlib import Path
if not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9._-]+", rule_name):
return "Error: invalid rule name"
rules_dir = Path(os.path.expanduser("~/.praison/rules")).resolve()
rule_path = (rules_dir / rule_name).resolve()
if not str(rule_path).startswith(str(rules_dir) + os.sep):
return "Error: rule_name escapes rules directory"
Apply identically to praisonai.rules.create, rules.show, rules.delete, workflow.validate. For workflow.show, restrict file_path to a designated workflow directory and reject absolute paths or any value containing ...
Schema enforcement in the dispatcher. Validate params["arguments"] against tool.input_schema (a JSON-Schema validator such as jsonschema) before tool.handler(**arguments). Reject unknown properties, type mismatches, missing required fields. Return JSO
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