Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-42271
Go to dashboardLiteLLM proxy's MCP test endpoints (POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and /mcp-rest/test/tools/list) accept a stdio server config and spawn its command on the proxy host. They only need a valid proxy API key, with no role check, so any low-privilege key holder gets arbitrary command execution. Exploited in the wild and a Metasploit module is public. CSA reports it chains with a Starlette Host-header auth bypass for unauthenticated RCE.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:11 UTC, 5h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Apply mitigations per vendor instructions, follow applicable BOD 22-01 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| BerriAI LiteLLM | vendor | – | – |
| litellm | pypi | >= 1.74.2, < 1.83.7 | 1.83.7 |
| litellm | vendor | >= 1.74.2, < 1.83.7 | 1.83.7 |
| redhat openshift ai | vendor | >= 2.25, < 2.25.8 | 2.25.8 |
| redhat openshift ai | vendor | >= 3.3, < 3.3.4 | 3.3.4 |
| redhat openshift ai |
| vendor |
| = 3.4 |
| – |
pip show litellm (or check the container image tag)1.74.2 and < 1.83.7 are vulnerable1.83.7 or later1.0.1 or later for the Host-header chainEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Posts are quoted with a link to the original. They are data to us, never instructions.
LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.74.2 to before version 1.83.7, two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it — POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list — accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the command, args, and env fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process. The endpoints were gated only by a valid proxy API key, with no role check. Any authenticated user — including holders of low-privilege internal-user keys — could therefore run arbitrary commands on the host. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-42271")
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