PRAISONAI · CVE-2026-39305 · AI agents & MCP
FIX → 4.5.113
PraisonAI's Action Orchestrator joins a user-supplied target path onto the workspace without checking it stays inside, so `../` segments escape the directory. An attacker or a manipulated agent can overwrite or create arbitrary files on the host, such as SSH keys or shell startup files, which can lead to code execution.
first public Apr 5, 2026 · 2 sources
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Teams that run PraisonAI's Action Orchestrator to apply file create or file edit steps, especially when plans are generated by a model or by untrusted input. Installations that do not use the Action Orchestrator feature are not exposed through this path, and the attack needs the orchestrator to apply steps.
Not affected if orchestrator-not-used, version-4.5.113-or-later
Who cares ai-agents, praisonai, pypi, python, self-hosted
pip show praisonai and compare it with the affected range (4.5.112 and below).action_orchestrator.py under praisonai/cli/features/ and check whether _apply_step validates that the resolved target stays inside the workspace.The Action Orchestrator feature contains a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker (or compromised agent) to write to arbitrary files outside of the configured workspace directory. By supplying relative path segments (../) in the target path, malicious actions can overwrite sensitive system files or drop executable payloads on the host.
Location: src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/action_orchestrator.py (Lines 402, 409, 423)
Vulnerable Code snippet:
target = workspace / step.target
In the _apply_step method, paths are constructed by concatenating the workspace path with a user-supplied step.target string: target = workspace / step.target. The code fails to resolve and validate that the final absolute path remains within the bounds of the workspace directory. When processing FILE_CREATE or FILE_EDIT actions, this flaw permits arbitrary file modification.
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Upgrade to 4.5.113
praisonai (PyPI): upgrade to 4.5.113.Construct a malicious ActionStep payload with path traversal characters:
from praisonai.cli.features.action_orchestrator import ActionStep, ActionType, ActionStatus
# Payload targeting a file outside the workspace
step = ActionStep(
id="test_traversal",
action_type=ActionType.FILE_CREATE,
description="Malicious file write",
target="../../../../../../../tmp/orchestrator_pwned.txt",
params={"content": "pwned"},
status=ActionStatus.APPROVED
)
# When the orchestrator applies this step, it writes to the traversed path
# _apply_step(step)
This is an Arbitrary File Write vulnerability. Anyone running the Action Orchestrator to apply modifications is vulnerable. A malicious prompt could trick the agent into generating a plan that overwrites critical files (e.g., ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, .bashrc) leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) or system corruption.
This page as .md · .json · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
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