---
id: "CVE-2026-129706"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-129706"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-129706"]
title: "vulnerability-lookup: sessions survive password changes, stay valid indefinitely"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 5.3
epss: 0.0027
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "other"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["flask", "other", "self-hosted", "vulnerability-lookup"]
not_affected_if: ["no-stolen-sessions", "no-web-app"]
published_at: "2026-11-16T09:17:13+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T10:12:13+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-16T18:53:18+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129706", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T10:12:13+00:00"}, {"source": "epss", "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-129706", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T18:53:18+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: [{"type": "epss", "score": 0.0027, "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-129706"}]
---

# vulnerability-lookup: sessions survive password changes, stay valid indefinitely

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-129706 (this .md is for agents)

The vulnerability-lookup web app used a bare numeric user ID as its Flask-Login session identifier, so the session was not tied to the user's credential. A stolen session cookie keeps working after the user changes their password, resets it, or recovers the account.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check whether your deployment runs the vulnerability-lookup web application and which version it is on.
- Review the session handling in `website/models/user.py` (`User.get_id()`) and `website/web/views/session_mgmt.py` (`load_user`) to see whether the session ID is still the bare user ID.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T10:12:13+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129706
- 2026-11-16T18:53:18+00:00 epss https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-129706

## Documents

- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/d762810fb3b9d1ee34938a71cd8cbee544c1527d

## From the sources

In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the Flask-Login session identifier was set to the bare numeric user ID (User.get_id() returned self.id). Because the session ID contained no component derived from the user's credential, it remained valid indefinitely regardless of any subsequent password change, account recovery, or administrator-initiated password reset. An attacker who had obtained a valid session for a user account (for example through cross-site scripting, session hijacking, or a previously exposed feed or API key) could continue to access that user's account after the user changed their password, because the session cookie still carried the same static user ID and the user_loader accepted it without any credential-bound validation.

The affected component is the session management layer of the vulnerability-lookup Flask application, specifically the User.get_id() method in website/models/user.py and the load_user callback in website/web/views/session_mgmt.py. The vulnerability required that an attacker already possessed a valid session for the target user; no additional authentication or special deployment configuration was needed beyond a standard deployment of the application.

The security impact is that a user cannot effectively revoke an attacker's access by changing their password, performing an account recovery, or having an administrator reset the credential. The attacker retains full authenticated access to the user's profile, subscriptions, and any role-gated functionality for the lifetime of the session cookie. Additionally, sessions that were opened via a feed key or API key before a prior fix (commit 3605d5b6) also persisted indefinitely.

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