---
id: "CVE-2026-129550"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-129550"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-129550"]
title: "Tensei: anyone can grant themselves administrator roles via user fields"
severity: "critical"
cvss: 9.3
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "@tensei/auth", "fixed": [], "affected": "<= 0.11.5", "ecosystem": "npm"}]
ecosystems: []
tags: ["@tensei/auth", "node", "npm", "package", "privilege-escalation", "self-hosted", "tensei"]
not_affected_if: ["no-tensei-deployment", "roles-field-not-exposed"]
published_at: "2026-11-16T12:17:53+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T12:40:57+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-16T12:43:54+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129550", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T12:40:57+00:00"}, {"source": "analyst", "url": "https://github.com/tenseijs/tensei/issues/398", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T12:43:54+00:00", "cites": ["https://github.com/tenseijs/tensei/issues/398"]}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Tensei: anyone can grant themselves administrator roles via user fields

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-129550 (this .md is for agents)

Tensei's @tensei/auth package exposes the User Roles field, so a registering or logged-in user can send a roles array and make their own account an administrator. An attacker who gets administrator permissions can read and change the data the Tensei app manages.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- npm:@tensei/auth affected <= 0.11.5 fixed no fixed version listed

## How to check

- Run npm ls @tensei/auth, or look in package-lock.json, yarn.lock or pnpm-lock.yaml. Any version up to 0.11.5 is affected, and 0.11.5 is the latest published.
- Check that auth() from @tensei/auth is in your tensei().plugins([...]).
- On a test instance, register or PATCH your own user with a roles array in the body. If the response or database shows the roles were set, you are exposed.
- Look for accounts that have admin roles and that you did not grant.

## Fix

No fixed version is published. The reporter's issue #398 (opened 2026-11-15) is still open with no maintainer reply, and npm lists @tensei/auth 0.11.5 as the latest release. Until a fix ships, do not expose the Roles field to self-service routes. Strip or ignore roles in request bodies on registration, POST /users and self-PATCH, for example in a server-side middleware, and set explicit canUpdate/canCreate rules.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T12:40:57+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129550
- 2026-11-16T12:43:54+00:00 analyst https://github.com/tenseijs/tensei/issues/398 — Sources are the VulnCheck advisory and GitHub issue #398, which the researcher opened publicly. There is no maintainer response and no fix, and 0.11.5 is the latest. Nothing is verified because there is no vendor page. The same issue also reports unauthenticated media upload, default JWT secrets, a CSRF bypass, operator injection and an open redirect, which may get their own CVEs. No PoC is public and no exploitation is known. The fix and mitigation need rechecking when the maintainers reply.

## Documents

- [advisory] Third-party advisory: www.vulncheck.com https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/tensei-through-0.11.5-privilege-escalation-via-self-assigned-roles-in-tensei-auth
- [describes] tenseijs/tensei #398: Multiple high-severity vulnerabilities (open, reporter Ikram-4) https://github.com/tenseijs/tensei/issues/398

## From the sources

Tensei through 0.11.5 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in @tensei/auth that allows unauthenticated or authenticated users to assign themselves arbitrary roles via the exposed User Roles field. Attackers can supply a roles array during registration, a POST to the users route, or a PATCH to their own record to gain administrator permissions.

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