GITEA.DEV · CVE-2026-129525 · Package
FIX → 28.4.0
Gitea's /issues/{index} API handlers load pull requests without checking the repository unit, so a private-repo member with Issues access but no Pull Requests access can read pull request comment bodies and other metadata. An attacker needs to be an authenticated repository member with access through another unit; attachment contents, pull request bodies and inline review comments were not exposed in the report.
first public Nov 15, 2026 · 2 sources
Check it with your coding agent
It reads this page and tells you if your code or app is affected.
Teams that self-host Gitea 28.3.0 or earlier with private repositories where some members have Issues access but not Pull Requests access can have pull request comments exposed to those members. Instances on 28.4.0 or later, or with no such split permissions, are not exposed. Managed or hosted Gitea offerings are only affected if they run a vulnerable version.
Not affected if gitea-28.4.0-or-later, no-split-unit-permissions, public-repos-only
Who cares gitea, private-repos, self-hosted
gitea --version or the footer of the web UI; versions 28.3.0 and earlier are affected.Upgrade to 28.4.0
28.4.0.Reproduced on Gitea v1.27.1 and on main at commit
298d73cde6bcb36de6cc24dc436074fb0c8b1a39.
Official gitea/gitea:1.27.1 Linux container with SQLite. INSTALL_LOCK, the database path,
and a loopback ROOT_URL were set only to automate installation. No security-relevant default
was changed.
Several /issues/{index} API handlers load an issue or pull request from Gitea's shared index
namespace without checking which repository unit it belongs to. In a private repository, a
member with Issues access but no Pull Requests access can therefore read pull request data.
The clearest example is the timeline endpoint: for the same token and pull request,
GET /issues/{index}/timeline returns comment bodies while the guarded sibling
GET /issues/{index}/comments returns 404.
The route group is guarded by ( and ), which allows callers who can read either unit. After resolving , these handlers do not call :
Are you affected?
Ask from here. InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in your inbox.
InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in Slack, with the evidence and the fix.
InfraStack checks it against your stack and answers on your report, with the evidence and the fix.
/issuesmustEnableIssuesOrPullsrouters/api/v1/api.go:769:1568-1668{index}CanReadIssuesOrPulls(issue.IsPull)ListIssueCommentsAndTimeline — routers/api/v1/repo/issue_comment.go:123GetIssueAttachment and ListIssueAttachments —
routers/api/v1/repo/issue_attachment.go:25 and :74ListIssueLabels — routers/api/v1/repo/issue_label.go:21setIssueSubscription, CheckIssueSubscription, and GetIssueSubscribers —
routers/api/v1/repo/issue_subscription.go:106, :157, and :215The adjacent ListIssueComments handler performs the missing check at
routers/api/v1/repo/issue_comment.go:76.
An Issues-only member can read pull request comment bodies. The other confirmed effects are limited to attachment metadata, label associations, subscriber identities, subscription state, and setting or clearing watch state. Attachment contents, the pull request body, and inline review comments were not exposed. Content-writing endpoints remained denied.
The attacker must already be an authenticated repository member with access through another unit.
After resolving {index}, call CanReadIssuesOrPulls(issue.IsPull) in each handler. A shared
authorized loader for issue and pull request indices would make the check harder to omit.
CVE-2026-27783 (GHSA-3fwp-p5rj-2pxf, fixed in v1.26.2) covered missing repository-unit route
guards on the issue-template API. This report affects different handlers: the route admits
Issues-or-Pull Requests users, but the resolved object's unit is never checked.
I used an LLM to help identify candidate authorization gaps. I reproduced the behavior manually against local Gitea instances and checked the report against the source at the tested commit.
The same missing CanReadIssuesOrPulls(issue.IsPull) check was reported in later advisories, which were closed as duplicates of this one. The fix must cover these too:
POST / DELETE /repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/reactions (changeIssueReaction): a user who can read only one of the Issues / Pull Requests units can add or remove reactions on an object of the other unit.GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/times (ListTrackedTimes): returns the tracked times of a pull request to an Issues-only user.GET /{owner}/{repo}/issues/search?type=pulls: returns pull request titles and bodies to an Issues-only member. The type / isPull filter has to be limited to the units the user can read, as the API's ListIssues already does. This route is not under the API /issues/{index} group, so it needs its own fix.NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.