{"id":"CVE-2026-129341","kind":"vulnerability","aliases":["CVE-2026-129341","GHSA-jr33-w6w7-86vj"],"related":[],"title":"DeleteAttachment lets former writers delete release assets they uploaded","description":"A user who uploaded a release asset while they had Releases write access can still permanently delete that asset after their write access has been revoked or lowered to read. They only need to be able to read the repository's issues or pull requests. The web handler `DeleteAttachment` skips every permission check when the doer is the attachment's uploader, and it is also mounted at `/{owner}/{repo}/issues/attachments/remove` and `/pulls/attachments/remove`, which require only read access. Both the database row and the stored file are removed, so the asset's download link returns 404 for everyone.\n\nIn `routers/web/repo/attachment.go`, the per-link checks (including `CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases)` for release assets) all sit inside `if ctx.Doer.ID != attach.UploaderID`. For the uploader, `ctx.Repo.Permission` is never consulted. The release registration hides this, because `/releases/attachments/remove` sits behind `reqRepoReleaseWriter` and the API route requires `reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeReleases)`. The issue and pull registrations accept any attachment UUID in the repository, though, and the UUID is returned by the release API for every asset.\n\nThe attached reproducer runs on default settings. It has mallory upload `app.bin` to `alice/app` v1.0 as a write collaborator, then has alice remove her. At that point mallory's requests get a 403 from the API and a 404 from the release route. The same form posted to `/alice/app/issues/attachments/remove` returns 200, after which the release lists no assets and the file is gone from `data/attachments/`.\n\nThe reach is limited. It covers only assets that the attacker's own account uploaded, and other accounts get 403. It is delete-only: nothing can be added, replaced or read. A collaborator fully removed from a private repository is locked out, but on a public repository the condition holds as long as the account exists.\n\nThe uploader shortcut dates from 8c909820a9fd (#8426, first released in v1.11.0). fbea2c68e8 (\"Fix delete attachment check\", #36320) added the `RepoID` and per-link checks only in the non-uploader branch, so this is the part of that fix that remained open.\n\n## Details\n\nScanned commit `31626de2a6cdd3e1fe93216e4ac80f511297f1e7`, default configuration. Attacker: a regular signed-in user who\nuploaded a release asset while they had Releases write on a repository, has lost that permission since (removed\ncollaborator, removed team member, team lowered to read) and can still read its issues or pull requests, which on a\npublic repository every account can.\n\nThe web handler `DeleteAttachment` skips all permission checks when the doer is the attachment's uploader, and it is\nmounted on a route that only requires read access. Whoever uploaded a release asset can delete it for good, whatever\ntheir permissions are today.\n\nOn an instance where mallory uploaded `app.bin` to release `v1.0` of the public repository `alice/app` while she was a\nwrite collaborator, and alice has removed her since (mallory's permissions on the repository are `pull` only):\n\n- `DELETE /api/v1/repos/alice/app/releases/1/assets/1` as mallory answers `403`;\n- `POST /alice/app/releases/attachments/remove` with `file=<uuid of app.bin>` in mallory's web session answers `404`;\n- `POST /alice/app/issues/attachments/remove` with the same form in the same session answers\n  `200 {\"uuid\":\"…\"}`. The release then lists no assets and `/alice/app/releases/download/v1.0/app.bin` is `404` for\n  everyone.\n\nThe same request from eve, who never had write access, is `403`.\n\nThe handler looks at what the attachment is linked to only inside the \"not the uploader\" branch:\n\n```go\n// routers/web/repo/attachment.go:95\nif attach.RepoID != ctx.Repo.Repository.ID {\n\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, \"attachment does not belong to this repository\")\n\treturn\n}\n\nif ctx.Doer.ID != attach.UploaderID {\n\tif attach.IssueID > 0 {\n\t\t… CanWriteIssuesOrPulls(issue.IsPull), else 403 …\n\t} else if attach.ReleaseID > 0 {\n\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases) {\n\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t} else {\n\t\t… IsAdmin() or IsOwner(), else 403 …\n\t}\n}\n\nerr = repo_model.DeleteAttachment(ctx, attach, true)\n```\n\n`UploaderID` is written once, when the bytes arrive (`routers/api/v1/repo/release_attachment.go:247` for the API used\nabove, `routers/web/repo/attachment.go:63` for the web upload), and records a past event. `ctx.Repo.Permission` is the\ndoer's current right, and for the uploader it is never consulted. The shortcut fits the poster of an issue or comment\nwho removes a file from their own post, or from the upload box before submitting. A release asset is not the\nuploader's post: it belongs to the repository's release.\n\nThe handler is registered twice. The release registration hides the problem, because the group itself requires the\nwrite permission:\n\n```go\n// routers/web/web.go:1514\n\tm.Post(\"/attachments/remove\", repo.DeleteAttachment)\n}, reqSignIn, context.RepoMustNotBeArchived(), reqRepoReleaseWriter)\n```\n\nThe issue and pull registrations only require read access, and the handler does not care which kind of attachment the\nUUID names:\n\n```go\n// routers/web/web.go:1385 (inside addIssuesPullsUpdateRoutes)\nm.Post(\"/attachments\", repo.UploadIssueAttachment)\nm.Post(\"/attachments/remove\", repo.DeleteAttachment)\n…\n// routers/web/web.go:1399\nm.Group(\"/{type:issues}\", addIssuesPullsUpdateRoutes, context.RequireUnitReader(unit.TypeIssues, unit.TypePullRequests), context.RepoMustNotBeArchived())\nm.Group(\"/{type:pulls}\", addIssuesPullsUpdateRoutes, reqUnitPullsReader, context.RepoMustNotBeArchived())\n}, reqSignIn, context.RepoAssignment, context.RepoMustNotBeArchived())   // :1431\n```\n\nSo the path of mallory's request is: `reqSignIn` → `RepoAssignment` → `RepoMustNotBeArchived` →\n`RequireUnitReader(Issues, PullRequests)` → `DeleteAttachment` → `attach.RepoID` matches → `Doer.ID == UploaderID`, the\nwhole permission block is skipped → `repo_model.DeleteAttachment(ctx, attach, true)`, which deletes the row and, because\nof `remove == true`, the stored file (`models/repo/attachment.go:184-208`). The API twin has no such shortcut; its route\ncarries `reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeReleases)` (`routers/api/v1/api.go:1478`).\n\nThe UUID is not a secret: the uploader received it in the upload response, and the release API returns it in the\n`uuid` field of every asset.\n\nThe uploader shortcut dates from `8c909820a9fd` (\"Enable Uploading/Removing Attachments When Editing an Issue/Comment\n(#8426)\", 2019-10-15), first released in v1.11.0. `fbea2c68e8` (\"Fix delete attachment check (#36320)\") later added the\n`RepoID` check and the per-link permission checks, but only inside the `ctx.Doer.ID != attach.UploaderID` branch, so\nfor the uploader the path is still the one from 2019.\n\nAlso observed on a running instance, beyond what the reproducer shows:\n\n- Private repository in an organization, mallory in a team whose Releases permission is lowered from write to read\n  after her upload: the API and the release route refuse her, the issue route deletes the asset, and the file\n  disappears from `data/attachments/`.\n- `/pulls/attachments/remove` behaves like `/issues/attachments/remove`.\n- With the Issues unit disabled and pull requests enabled, the issue route still deletes; with both units disabled it\n  is `404`.\n- An asset of the same release uploaded by alice is `403` for mallory on the issue route: the reach is limited to\n  assets the attacker uploaded.\n\n## Impact\n\nRevoking or lowering someone's write access does not end their control over the release assets they uploaded. Only\nthe account that uploaded an asset while it held Releases write can do this, and only while that account can still\nread the repository's issues or pull requests and the repository is not archived: on a public repository that holds as\nlong as the account exists, while a collaborator fully removed from a private repository is locked out. Any other\naccount, including one that never had write access, gets `403`. Under those conditions a dismissed maintainer, a\nremoved collaborator or a release-bot account whose access was withdrawn (often the uploader of every binary) can\ndelete those assets from the published releases of the repository with one web request. The database row and the\nstored file are both removed, so downloads break for all users and the owner has to re-upload from their own copy. The attacker cannot add or replace assets, cannot touch assets uploaded by others, and\ngains no read access.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nTwo patches are attached, both to `routers/web/repo/attachment.go` and each with a regression test appended to\n`testDeleteAttachmentPermissions` in `tests/integration/attachment_test.go`. Each, applied to a clean checkout and\nrebuilt, makes the reproducer print `OK`, while the owner can still delete assets through `/releases/attachments/remove`.\nPatch 1 is the complete fix; patch 2 is the minimal one.\n\nAttached patch 2 decides by what the attachment is linked to before considering who uploaded it: an asset linked to a\nrelease always needs `CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases)`. Uploads that are not linked yet (the dropzone of the release form,\nwhere `ReleaseID` is still 0) keep the uploader shortcut, so removing a file before saving the release works as before.\n\n```diff\n--- a/routers/web/repo/attachment.go\n+++ b/routers/web/repo/attachment.go\n@@ -97,7 +97,13 @@ func DeleteAttachment(ctx *context.Context) {\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\tif ctx.Doer.ID != attach.UploaderID {\n+\tif attach.ReleaseID > 0 {\n+\t\t// a release asset belongs to the release, not to its uploader: it always needs the (current) release write permission\n+\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases) {\n+\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\t} else if ctx.Doer.ID != attach.UploaderID {\n \t\tif attach.IssueID > 0 {\n \t\t\tissue, err := issues_model.GetIssueByID(ctx, attach.IssueID)\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n@@ -108,11 +114,6 @@ func DeleteAttachment(ctx *context.Context) {\n \t\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n \t\t\t\treturn\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t} else if attach.ReleaseID > 0 {\n-\t\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases) {\n-\t\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n-\t\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t\t}\n \t\t} else {\n \t\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.IsAdmin() && !ctx.Repo.Permission.IsOwner() {\n \t\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n```\n\nIts regression test (user5 is the read-only user of that test; the attachment is linked to release 1 of `user2/repo1`\ndirectly because the fixture user cannot be given and then stripped of write access in two lines) fails at the first\nnew request (`200` instead of `403`) without the handler change:\n\n```go\n\t// an attachment linked to a release can only be deleted with release write permission, even by its uploader\n\tlinkedReleaseUUID := testCreateIssueAttachment(t, readonlySession, repoURL, \"reader-linked-release.png\", testGeneratePngBytes(), http.StatusOK)\n\trequire.NoError(t, repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID(t.Context(), &repo_model.Attachment{UUID: linkedReleaseUUID, ReleaseID: 1}, \"release_id\"))\n\ttestDeleteIssueAttachment(t, readonlySession, repoURL, linkedReleaseUUID, http.StatusForbidden)\n\ttestDeleteIssueAttachment(t, ownerSession, repoURL, linkedReleaseUUID, http.StatusOK)\n```\n\nNot covered by patch 2: the uploader shortcut still applies to attachments linked to an issue or comment. By the\ncode, a user who added a file to someone else's issue while they had Issues write keeps the right to delete it after\nlosing that permission. This was not exercised here; closing it means also checking that the doer is the poster of the\nissue or comment, not only the uploader of the file.\n\nAttached patch 1 does that: it restructures the whole block so that the check follows what the attachment is linked\nto. A release asset needs Releases write; an issue or comment attachment needs Issues/Pulls write or being the poster\nof that issue or comment (the rule the web comment and issue edit handlers already apply); only unlinked uploads keep\nthe uploader shortcut. It therefore also closes the issue/comment case above. Its test covers a release asset, an\nattachment on another user's issue, one on another user's comment, and one on the uploader's own comment. One\nbehaviour change comes with it: the poster of an issue or comment can remove attachments of their own post through this\nendpoint even when someone else uploaded the file, which grants nothing the poster cannot already do by editing the\npost.\n\n## Suggested patch\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/routers/web/repo/attachment.go b/routers/web/repo/attachment.go\nindex 1fa46b0c18..bb5fc1d6d1 100644\n--- a/routers/web/repo/attachment.go\n+++ b/routers/web/repo/attachment.go\n@@ -97,27 +97,39 @@ func DeleteAttachment(ctx *context.Context) {\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\tif ctx.Doer.ID != attach.UploaderID {\n-\t\tif attach.IssueID > 0 {\n-\t\t\tissue, err := issues_model.GetIssueByID(ctx, attach.IssueID)\n+\t// Being the uploader only matters while the attachment is not linked to anything yet (e.g. removing a file from the\n+\t// dropzone before submitting). Once it is linked to an issue, comment or release, it belongs to that object, so the\n+\t// doer must be allowed to edit the object now, no matter who uploaded the file or what permission they had back then.\n+\tif attach.IssueID > 0 {\n+\t\tissue, err := issues_model.GetIssueByID(ctx, attach.IssueID)\n+\t\tif err != nil {\n+\t\t\tctx.ServerError(\"GetIssueByID\", err)\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tcanEdit := ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWriteIssuesOrPulls(issue.IsPull)\n+\t\tif !canEdit && attach.CommentID > 0 {\n+\t\t\tcomment, err := issues_model.GetCommentByID(ctx, attach.CommentID)\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n-\t\t\t\tctx.ServerError(\"GetIssueByID\", err)\n-\t\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWriteIssuesOrPulls(issue.IsPull) {\n-\t\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n-\t\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t} else if attach.ReleaseID > 0 {\n-\t\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases) {\n-\t\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n-\t\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t} else {\n-\t\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.IsAdmin() && !ctx.Repo.Permission.IsOwner() {\n-\t\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n+\t\t\t\tctx.ServerError(\"GetCommentByID\", err)\n \t\t\t\treturn\n \t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tcanEdit = comment.PosterID == ctx.Doer.ID\n+\t\t} else if !canEdit {\n+\t\t\tcanEdit = issue.IsPoster(ctx.Doer.ID)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif !canEdit {\n+\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\t} else if attach.ReleaseID > 0 {\n+\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases) {\n+\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\t} else if ctx.Doer.ID != attach.UploaderID {\n+\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.IsAdmin() && !ctx.Repo.Permission.IsOwner() {\n+\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n+\t\t\treturn\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \ndiff --git a/tests/integration/attachment_test.go b/tests/integration/attachment_test.go\nindex 155d182e22..4e5b272a82 100644\n--- a/tests/integration/attachment_test.go\n+++ b/tests/integration/attachment_test.go\n@@ -234,6 +234,27 @@ func testDeleteAttachmentPermissions(t *testing.T) {\n \n \t// test deleting release attachment from another repo\n \ttestDeleteReleaseAttachment(t, ownerSession, \"/user2/repo2\", crossRepoUUID, http.StatusBadRequest)\n+\n+\t// once an attachment is linked, being its uploader is not enough: the doer must be able to edit the release, issue or comment\n+\tfor _, tc := range []struct {\n+\t\tname         string\n+\t\tlink         repo_model.Attachment\n+\t\treaderStatus int\n+\t}{\n+\t\t{\"Release\", repo_model.Attachment{ReleaseID: 1}, http.StatusForbidden},\n+\t\t{\"IssueOfOtherPoster\", repo_model.Attachment{IssueID: 1}, http.StatusForbidden},\n+\t\t{\"CommentOfOtherPoster\", repo_model.Attachment{IssueID: 1, CommentID: 2}, http.StatusForbidden},\n+\t\t{\"CommentOfUploader\", repo_model.Attachment{IssueID: 1, CommentID: 3}, http.StatusOK},\n+\t} {\n+\t\tt.Run(\"LinkedByUploader/\"+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n+\t\t\ttc.link.UUID = testCreateIssueAttachment(t, readonlySession, repoURL, \"reader-linked.png\", testGeneratePngBytes(), http.StatusOK)\n+\t\t\trequire.NoError(t, repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID(t.Context(), &tc.link, \"release_id\", \"issue_id\", \"comment_id\"))\n+\t\t\ttestDeleteIssueAttachment(t, readonlySession, repoURL, tc.link.UUID, tc.readerStatus)\n+\t\t\tif tc.readerStatus != http.StatusOK {\n+\t\t\t\ttestDeleteIssueAttachment(t, ownerSession, repoURL, tc.link.UUID, http.StatusOK)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t})\n+\t}\n }\n \n func TestAttachmentTokenScopes(t *testing.T) {\ndiff --git a/routers/web/repo/attachment.go b/routers/web/repo/attachment.go\nindex 1fa46b0c18..94bb76ae9a 100644\n--- a/routers/web/repo/attachment.go\n+++ b/routers/web/repo/attachment.go\n@@ -97,7 +97,13 @@ func DeleteAttachment(ctx *context.Context) {\n \t\treturn\n \t}\n \n-\tif ctx.Doer.ID != attach.UploaderID {\n+\tif attach.ReleaseID > 0 {\n+\t\t// a release asset belongs to the release, not to its uploader: it always needs the (current) release write permission\n+\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases) {\n+\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n+\t\t\treturn\n+\t\t}\n+\t} else if ctx.Doer.ID != attach.UploaderID {\n \t\tif attach.IssueID > 0 {\n \t\t\tissue, err := issues_model.GetIssueByID(ctx, attach.IssueID)\n \t\t\tif err != nil {\n@@ -108,11 +114,6 @@ func DeleteAttachment(ctx *context.Context) {\n \t\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n \t\t\t\treturn\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t} else if attach.ReleaseID > 0 {\n-\t\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWrite(unit.TypeReleases) {\n-\t\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\n-\t\t\t\treturn\n-\t\t\t}\n \t\t} else {\n \t\t\tif !ctx.Repo.Permission.IsAdmin() && !ctx.Repo.Permission.IsOwner() {\n \t\t\t\tctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)\ndiff --git a/tests/integration/attachment_test.go b/tests/integration/attachment_test.go\nindex 155d182e22..e9ac55e7c9 100644\n--- a/tests/integration/attachment_test.go\n+++ b/tests/integration/attachment_test.go\n@@ -234,6 +234,12 @@ func testDeleteAttachmentPermissions(t *testing.T) {\n \n \t// test deleting release attachment from another repo\n \ttestDeleteReleaseAttachment(t, ownerSession, \"/user2/repo2\", crossRepoUUID, http.StatusBadRequest)\n+\n+\t// an attachment linked to a release can only be deleted with release write permission, even by its uploader\n+\tlinkedReleaseUUID := testCreateIssueAttachment(t, readonlySession, repoURL, \"reader-linked-release.png\", testGeneratePngBytes(), http.StatusOK)\n+\trequire.NoError(t, repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID(t.Context(), &repo_model.Attachment{UUID: linkedReleaseUUID, ReleaseID: 1}, \"release_id\"))\n+\ttestDeleteIssueAttachment(t, readonlySession, repoURL, linkedReleaseUUID, http.StatusForbidden)\n+\ttestDeleteIssueAttachment(t, ownerSession, repoURL, linkedReleaseUUID, http.StatusOK)\n }\n \n func TestAttachmentTokenScopes(t *testing.T) {\n\n```\n\n\n_Reported by the Anthropic OSS scanner, finding ANT-2026-WQYTZO7W (scan gitea-20261022-004), commit 31626de2a6cdd3e1fe93216e4ac80f511297f1e7._","summary":"A user who uploaded a release asset while holding Releases write access can still permanently delete it after that access is revoked, using the issue or pull request attachment-removal route. The row and the stored file are both removed, so the download breaks for everyone.","severity":"medium","cvss":null,"epss":null,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[{"name":"gitea.dev","fixed":["28.4.0"],"affected":">= 1.11, <= 28.3.0","ecosystem":"go"}],"ecosystems":["go"],"tags":["cwe-863","gitea","package","releases","self-hosted"],"not_affected_if":["default-config-no-former-writers","gitea-28.4.0-or-later"],"how_to_check":"- Check the Gitea version with `gitea --version` or the footer of the web UI; versions `28.3.0` and earlier, and from `1.11` onward, are in the affected range.\n- Look in the release-attachment history of repositories for assets uploaded by accounts that no longer have write access.","fix":"- Gitea: move to `28.4.0` or later.","status":"open","published_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:15+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-15T21:12:47+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-11-15T21:14:19+00:00","updated_at":"2026-11-15T21:14:19+00:00","category":"package","confidence":0.85,"triage":{"at":"2026-11-15T21:14:19Z","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","output":{"fix":"- Gitea: move to `28.4.0` or later.","reach":"network","title":"Gitea: former release writers can delete their uploaded release assets","impact":"medium","summary":"A user who uploaded a release asset while holding Releases write access can still permanently delete it after that access is revoked, using the issue or pull request attachment-removal route. The row and the stored file are both removed, so the download breaks for everyone.","audience":"businesses","category":"package","nicknames":[],"who_cares":["gitea","self-hosted","releases"],"confidence":0.85,"fix_status":"available","needs_auth":"yes","worst_case":"former uploader deletes release assets and their stored files","analyst_note":"","how_to_check":"- Check the Gitea version with `gitea --version` or the footer of the web UI; versions `28.3.0` and earlier, and from `1.11` onward, are in the affected range.\n- Look in the release-attachment history of repositories for assets uploaded by accounts that no longer have write access.","plain_action":"","product_name":"","needs_analyst":false,"not_affected_if":["default-config-no-former-writers","gitea-28.4.0-or-later"],"who_is_affected":"Self-hosted Gitea instances where a user who once had Releases write on a repository uploaded release assets and still has read access to its issues or pull requests. Public repositories are reachable by any account that still exists. 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'user':31B 'write':40B","search_c":"'/alice/app/issues/attachments/remove':290C,561C '/alice/app/releases/attachments/remove':550C '/alice/app/releases/download/v1.0/app.bin':580C '/api/v1/repos/alice/app/releases/1/assets/1':544C '/issues/attachments/remove':146C '/pulls/attachments/remove':148C '/releases/attachments/remove':206C '0':635C,643C '200':292C,571C '31626de2a6cdd3e1fe93216e4ac80f511297f1e7':410C '36320':380C '403':274C,326C,548C,596C,639C '404':171C,280C,559C,582C '8426':370C '8c909820a9fd':369C '95':616C 'abl':112C 'accept':222C 'access':89C,99C,153C,491C,594C 'account':320C,324C,362C,462C 'add':335C,381C 'alic':263C,529C 'alice/app':255C,521C 'also':141C 'answer':547C,558C,570C 'api':212C,238C,277C 'app.bin':253C,513C 'asset':83C,95C,166C,186C,241C,299C,314C,424C,496C,578C 'attach':135C,224C,243C,378C,477C,603C,622C 'attach.issueid':634C 'attach.releaseid':642C 'attach.repoid':618C 'attach.uploaderid':192C,632C 'attack':317C,413C 'behind':208C 'belong':625C 'branch':395C,613C 'canwrit':182C 'canwriteissuesorpul':636C 'check':129C,180C,379C,388C,471C 'collabor':260C,340C,439C,527C 'commit':409C 'condit':356C 'configur':412C 'consult':199C 'cover':312C 'ctx.doer.id':191C,631C 'ctx.httperror':620C 'ctx.repo.permission':196C 'ctx.repo.permission.canwrite':645C 'ctx.repo.repository.id':619C 'data/attachments':306C 'databas':156C 'date':367C 'default':247C,411C 'delet':93C,330C,377C,498C,543C 'delete-on':329C 'deleteattach':125C,467C 'detail':407C 'doer':132C,474C 'download':168C 'els':638C,640C 'eve':589C 'everi':127C,240C,461C 'everyon':173C,584C 'exist':363C 'fbea2c68e8':375C 'file':161C,302C,552C 'first':371C 'fix':376C,403C 'form':287C,565C 'fulli':341C 'get':272C,325C 'go':614C 'gone':304C 'good':501C 'handler':124C,466C,598C 'hide':203C 'hold':357C 'http.statusbadrequest':621C 'includ':181C 'insid':189C,608C 'instanc':509C 'issu':118C,218C,452C 'issue.ispull':637C 'limit':310C 'link':169C,179C,387C,605C 'list':297C,576C 'lock':348C 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'write':88C,98C,259C,429C,526C,593C","cause_entry":null,"cause_path":null,"disclosures_checked_at":null,"first_public_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:15+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":null,"cvss_by":null,"poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"ghsa-repo","external_id":"GHSA-jr33-w6w7-86vj","url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-jr33-w6w7-86vj","severity":"medium","published_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:15+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:15+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-15T21:12:47+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-15T21:12:47+00:00","note":null},{"source":"nvd","external_id":"CVE-2026-129341","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129341","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-11-15T22:17:19+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-15T22:17:19+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-15T22:40:23+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-15T22:40:23+00:00","note":null}],"documents":[{"id":165566,"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-jr33-w6w7-86vj","title":"Maintainer's advisory: github.com","kind":"vendor","source":"ghsa-repo","publisher":"vendor","text":null,"published_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:15+00:00","relation":"advisory","confidence":null,"note":"Maintainer's advisory: github.com"},{"id":165694,"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.4.0","title":"Release notes: github.com","kind":"release","source":"nvd","publisher":"vendor","text":null,"published_at":null,"relation":"fix","confidence":null,"note":"Release notes: github.com"}],"disclosures":[],"exploit_sources":[],"notice":"Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai"}