---
id: "CVE-2026-129235"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-129235"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-129235", "GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5"]
title: "Kubeshark: MCP `download_file` writes fetched bytes to an unvalidated destination path"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 5.3
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "ai-tooling"
products: [{"name": "Kubeshark", "fixed": [], "affected": "", "ecosystem": "vendor"}, {"name": "github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark", "fixed": ["0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75"], "affected": ">= 0.0.2-0.20260304171723-eb7dc42b6ea0, < 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75", "ecosystem": "go"}]
ecosystems: ["go", "vendor"]
tags: ["ai-agents", "ai-tooling", "cwe-22", "cwe-88", "go", "kubernetes", "kubeshark", "mcp"]
not_affected_if: ["default-config-not-applicable", "mcp-not-used", "version-outside-range"]
published_at: "2026-11-16T17:17:31+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T17:37:55+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-16T22:23:56+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129235", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T17:37:55+00:00"}, {"source": "ghsa", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T22:22:36+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Kubeshark: MCP `download_file` writes fetched bytes to an unvalidated destination path

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-129235 (this .md is for agents)

The Kubeshark MCP tool download_file writes Hub API responses to a caller-chosen destination path with no validation, and its path argument can reach any Hub endpoint. An attacker who injects instructions into content an AI agent driving kubeshark mcp reads can overwrite user-writable files such as ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and read captured traffic from an unauthenticated default Hub.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- vendor:Kubeshark affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- go:github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark affected >= 0.0.2-0.20260304171723-eb7dc42b6ea0, < 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75 fixed 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75

## How to check

- Run `kubeshark version` or check the Go module version of `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` and compare with the affected range (>= v53.1.0, < v53.4.0).
- Check whether `kubeshark mcp` is used by any AI agent on the machine or in CI.
- Check whether the Hub API auth is disabled (default community/dev install), which leaves captured traffic readable.

## Fix

- Kubeshark: move to `v53.4.0` (fixed by commit a76a1920, PR #1957).
- Go module `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark`: fixed in `0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75`.
- Hub auth enforcement is not part of this fix; the advisory lists enabling `AUTH_ENABLED=true` as a workaround.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T17:37:55+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129235
- 2026-11-16T22:22:36+00:00 ghsa https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5

## Documents

- [advisory] Vendor advisory: github.com https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/security/advisories/GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5
- [advisory] Maintainer's advisory: api.github.com https://api.github.com/repos/kubeshark/kubeshark/security-advisories/GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214
- [fix] Release notes: github.com https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/tag/v53.4.0
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957

## From the sources

**Ecosystem / package:** Go — `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`
CLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)
**Affected component:** `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `download_file`
**Affected versions:** `>= v53.1.0`, `< v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the
tool's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)
**Patched version:** `v53.4.0`
**Credit:** novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.

## Summary
The `download_file` MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied `path` from the Kubeshark
Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied `dest` on the local
filesystem with no validation of `dest`. An attacker who can influence the MCP
tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving
`kubeshark mcp` — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path
writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`,
`~/.kube/config`, `~/.bashrc`), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints.
`download_file` is registered unconditionally (available in the default,
non-`--allow-destructive` posture).

## Introduced in
Commit `eb7dc42b` — "Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)",
2026-03-04 — first released in **v53.1.0** (`v53.1.0~1`). An earlier attempt
(`dbfd17d9`) was reverted (`a46f05c4`) before any release, so no tag before
v53.1.0 is affected.

## Details
In `callDownloadFile` (`cmd/mcpRunner.go`), both `path` and `dest` come straight
from the tool arguments:
- `dest` was passed directly to `os.Create(dest)` with no confinement — no
  `filepath.Clean`, no base-directory containment, no rejection of absolute
  paths or `../` traversal. Any path the process can write is reachable.
- `path` was concatenated onto the Hub API base URL with no allowlist, so any
  Hub endpoint (including captured-traffic exports) is reachable.

## Auth context (CWE-306 / CWE-200)
The tool originally issued the fetch with no authentication. The authentication
gap was addressed by the gated-Hub authentication refactor: the download now
forwards the operator's Hub credentials (ServiceAccount token / License-Key) and
rejects auth-required responses instead of writing a login page to disk. **But**
the Hub ships auth-disabled by default (community/dev), so on a default
`kubeshark tap` the Hub API answers without authentication and captured traffic
(credentials/tokens/PII) can still be read and exfiltrated end-to-end. Enforcing
Hub auth by default is tracked separately (gated-auth workstream) and is **not**
part of this advisory's fix.

## Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)
Following the tool's documented workflow on a default community install:
`export_snapshot_pcap` → obtain a relative path → `download_file` with that
`path` and an attacker-chosen `dest`. The reporter retrieved a captured-traffic
PCAP and recovered a planted canary `Authorization: Bearer …` credential from
it, and demonstrated writing the fetched bytes to an arbitrary local path.

## Impact
- **Integrity (local):** arbitrary file write on the machine running
  `kubeshark mcp`, as that user.
- **Confidentiality:** read of Hub API endpoints, incl. captured network traffic
  (credentials, tokens, PII) on a default (auth-disabled) install.
- Reliable RCE is not demonstrated (script endpoints are JSON-wrapped).

## Severity rationale
Kubeshark scores this **5.3 Medium**, down from the reporter's 7.1, on two metrics:

- **`AV:N` → `AV:L`.** The vulnerable component has no network listener the
  attacker reaches. `kubeshark mcp` is a local stdio MCP server; the attacker's
  input arrives as content an agent running on that host ingests and then
  replays into a local tool call. The delivery of the poisoned content may cross
  a network, but the attack surface being exploited is local to the machine.
- **`I:H` → `I:L`.** The write is confined to paths writable by the user running
  `kubeshark mcp` (normally unprivileged) — no system-file or other-user
  modification. The attacker also controls *where* the bytes land, not *what*
  they are: the body comes from a Hub API response, so the content is
  constrained to what the Hub will emit. Reliable RCE was not demonstrated.
- **`A:L` → `A:N`.** Nothing in the issue degrades availability of the CLI, the
  Hub, or the host; the original `A:L` is unsupported.

Kubeshark kept **`C:H`**: on a default community install the Hub API answers
unauthenticated, so captured traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) is genuinely
readable end-to-end. Kubeshark kept **`AC:H`** (the attacker must land an injection in
content the agent ingests and know the deployment layout), **`PR:N`**
(`download_file` is registered unconditionally — no `--allow-destructive`
needed), **`UI:R`** (an operator must be driving an agent against
`kubeshark mcp`), and **`S:U`** (the impact stays within the local user's
authorization scope).

## Patches
Fixed in **v53.4.0** by commit
[`a76a1920`](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214)
(PR [#1957](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957)).

Changes in `cmd/mcpRunner.go`:
- `dest` is resolved through `secureDownloadDest` and confined to a base
  directory (the CWD by default, relocatable via `KUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR`);
  a `dest` that resolves outside the base (via `../` or an absolute path) is
  rejected.
- `path` is rejected if it contains `..` segments.
- Containment is re-checked after resolving symlinks, so a symlinked
  subdirectory inside the base (or a `dest` that is itself a symlink) cannot
  redirect the write outside it; the file is opened with `O_NOFOLLOW` where the
  platform provides it.
- Credential forwarding + auth-required detection on the fetch (shipped in the
  gated-auth refactor).

## Workarounds
- Run `kubeshark mcp` as an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory.
- Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
- Enable Hub authentication (`AUTH_ENABLED=true` + an IdP/license) to close the
  unauthenticated read path.

## Follow-ups (not blocking this advisory)
- Strict prefix allowlist for the Hub `path` (current fix only rejects `..`).
- Hub-side default auth enforcement (gated-auth workstream).

---

_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_
