---
id: "CVE-2026-128047"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-128047"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-128047"]
title: "OpenMage magento-lts: predictable reset and confirmation tokens allow account takeover"
severity: "critical"
cvss: 9.2
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["magento", "magento-lts", "openmage", "package", "php", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["other-platform", "patched-version"]
published_at: "2026-11-13T10:18:10+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-13T10:47:32+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-13T10:48:28+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-128047", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-13T10:47:32+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# OpenMage magento-lts: predictable reset and confirmation tokens allow account takeover

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-128047 (this .md is for agents)

OpenMage generates customer email-confirmation keys and password-reset tokens with weak, non-cryptographic functions, so the keys can be guessed. An unauthenticated attacker can brute-force a pending customer's confirmation key to log in, or predict an administrator's reset token.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the installed magento-lts or OpenMage version in composer.json or composer.lock against the fixed versions below.
- Look for `uniqid()` and `uniqHash()` in the customer confirmation and password-reset code paths.
- Confirm whether the confirmAction endpoint is rate-limited.

## Fix

- magento-lts: move to `20.18.2` or later.
- 21.0.0-beta pre-releases: move to `21.0.0-beta3` or later.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-13T10:47:32+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-128047

## Documents

- [advisory] Vendor advisory: github.com https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/security/advisories/GHSA-7j66-6mw7-rgfx
- [advisory] Third-party advisory: www.vulncheck.com https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openmage-magento-lts-before-20.18.2-account-takeover-via-predictable-confirmation-key
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/commit/4a8d91c692524de4a07e70af5367b6cb67a9516d
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/commit/9f5a1c3cf63f5cf6ac9f90b041a97a474cea04c2

## From the sources

OpenMage magento-lts before 20.18.2 and 21.0.0-beta pre-releases before 21.0.0-beta3 generate customer email-confirmation keys with md5(uniqid()) and customer and administrator password-reset tokens with the non-cryptographic uniqHash(). Unauthenticated attackers can brute-force the roughly 20-bit confirmation key via the unrate-limited confirmAction endpoint to log in as pending customers, or predict administrator reset tokens after recovering generator state.

---

_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_