---
id: "CVE-2026-123710"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-123710"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-123710"]
title: "Red Hat Quay: unauthenticated clients can install signing keys and access private images"
severity: "critical"
cvss: 9.8
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "infrastructure"
products: [{"name": "Red Hat Quay", "fixed": [], "affected": "3, 5 (no version ranges published)", "ecosystem": "vendor"}]
ecosystems: []
tags: ["container-registry", "infrastructure", "red-hat-quay", "self-hosted", "unauthenticated"]
not_affected_if: ["managed-hosting"]
published_at: "2026-11-11T15:17:18+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-11T15:27:49+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-11T15:30:59+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123710", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-11T15:27:49+00:00"}, {"source": "analyst", "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-123710", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-11T15:30:59+00:00", "cites": ["https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-123710", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123710", "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-123710"]}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Red Hat Quay: unauthenticated clients can install signing keys and access private images

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-123710 (this .md is for agents)

Red Hat Quay, a container image registry, lets an unauthenticated client obtain an anonymous registry token with an audience it controls and use it on the service key rotation endpoint to install its own signing key with no expiry. Tokens signed with that key are then accepted for any repository, giving read and write access to private images and the ability to replace repository tags.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- vendor:Red Hat Quay affected 3, 5 (no version ranges published) fixed no fixed version listed

## How to check

Check whether /keys on your Quay (service key server) is reachable by untrusted clients, e.g. through your proxy or load balancer. Review audit logs for service_key_rotate and service_key_delete events with a null expiration_date, and for approved service keys you do not recognise.

## Fix

No fixed Quay build is named on Red Hat's page yet (unknown; check the Red Hat CVE page and Bugzilla 2568072). Until then restrict /keys at the proxy or load balancer to trusted internal components. Deleting a rogue key is not durable before a fixed build, since the anonymous request can install a new one.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-11T15:27:49+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123710
- 2026-11-11T15:30:59+00:00 analyst https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-123710 — Red Hat CVE page read: Quay 3 and 5 listed affected on NVD; no fixed version published yet; mitigation is to restrict /keys at proxy. Not exploited per sources; no PoC found.

## Documents

- [advisory] Red Hat CVE-2026-123710 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-123710
- [describes] NVD CVE-2026-123710 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123710
- [mitigation] Red Hat CVE-2026-123710 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-123710

## From the sources

A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. An unauthenticated client can obtain an anonymous registry token with an audience it controls, present that token to the service key rotation endpoint, and install its own approved signing key with no expiry. Registry tokens signed with that key are accepted for any repository, allowing read and write access to private images and replacement of repository tags.

---

_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_