CVE-2026-123592 · Package
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
The hickory-net Rust crate in Hickory DNS 0.26.0-beta.1 mishandles its validation cache key, so names that differ only in dot positions can collide. An attacker controlling an unsigned delegation can make forged answers for a signed target skip signature verification.
first public Sep 3, 2026 · 1 source
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Teams that build or run software on the hickory-net crate in a DNSSEC-validating resolver. Systems that use Hickory DNS only as a stub or non-validating client, or that do not use the 0.26.0-beta.1 line, are less exposed. The sources do not give more detail on the exact deployment conditions.
Not affected if not-validating-resolver
Who cares dns-resolver, dnssec, hickory-dns, rust
hickory-net version in Cargo.lock or Cargo.toml; versions below 0.26.2 in the 0.26 line are affected.hickory-net 0.26.2 or later (per the NVD description, fixed before 0.26.2)The hickory-net crate in Hickory DNS 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 allows DNSSEC validation bypass because Name's Hash ignores label lengths and ValidationCacheKey compares only that hash. An attacker controlling an unsigned delegation whose name differs from a signed target only in dot positions can prime an Insecure verdict, causing forged answers for the target to skip signature verification instead of returning SERVFAIL.
This page as .md · .json · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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