CVE-2026-123560 · Package
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
Zebra, a Zcash node implementation, leaves rejected block hashes in its sent-hash set when it receives a forged checkpoint block body. The node then stops requesting blocks, so an unauthenticated peer can stall initial sync until the node is restarted.
first public Oct 22, 2026 · 1 source
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Teams running a Zebra node before 7.0.0 that performs initial sync from untrusted peers are exposed; a node that is already synced and only handles known peers is less likely to be hit during sync. The sources do not say how much a stalled sync harms services that depend on the node beyond delayed availability.
Not affected if already-synced-node, version-7-or-later
Who cares self-hosted, zcash, zebra
zebrad --version) and compare it with the fixed version below.7.0.0 or later.Zebra before 7.0.0 contains an incomplete cleanup vulnerability that allows unauthenticated peers to stall initial sync by serving a forged checkpoint block body. Attackers can supply a body with forged authorizing data near the final checkpoint, leaving rejected hashes in the sent-hash set so the node stops requesting blocks until restart.
This page as .md · .json · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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