---
id: "CVE-2026-122312"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-122312"]
title: "Kyverno: namespaced policies can read cluster-scoped resources outside their namespace"
severity: "high"
cvss: 8.3
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "infrastructure"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["infrastructure", "kubernetes", "kyverno", "platform-team"]
not_affected_if: ["admin-only-policy-creation", "kyverno-not-used", "no-apicall-policies"]
published_at: "2026-11-05T03:17:23+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-05T03:31:41+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-05T03:33:19+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-122312", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-05T03:31:41+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Kyverno: namespaced policies can read cluster-scoped resources outside their namespace

Kyverno's APICall feature fails to separate namespaces when a policy URL path contains a query string, so a user who can create namespaced policies can make requests the namespace check should block. The result is that such a user can read Kubernetes resources outside their own namespace.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the Kyverno version with `kubectl get deployment -n kyverno kyverno-admission-controller -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}'`
- Look for policies that use `apiCall` with a `urlPath` in your cluster, and check who can create policies in namespaces

## Fix

- Kyverno: move to `1.19.2` (fixed version in the product range from 1.19.1)

## Timeline

- 2026-11-05T03:31:41+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-122312

## Documents

- [advisory] Vendor advisory: github.com https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-pcx2-xcq4-65vf
- [advisory] Third-party advisory: www.vulncheck.com https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/kyverno-1.19.1-before-1.19.2-namespace-isolation-bypass-via-apicall-urlpath-query-string
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/commit/f67231def576eb0ad153dd8cbfc836908ab14c14

## From the sources

Kyverno from 1.19.1 before 1.19.2 contains a namespace isolation bypass in APICall Fetch() in pkg/engine/apicall/apiCall.go because path.Clean treats '?' as a path character, letting the namespace regex match segments inside the query string. Users who can create namespaced policies can supply a URLPath like /api/v1/nodes?x=/namespaces/default/ that passes validation while client-go requests the cluster-scoped endpoint, reading resources outside their namespace.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_