---
id: "CVE-2026-122008"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-122008"]
title: "Oqtane Framework: authenticated users can make server fetch internal URLs"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 5.3
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "runtime"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["dotnet", "oqtane", "runtime", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["auth-required", "no-registered-users", "version-10.3.0-or-later"]
published_at: "2026-11-04T15:17:43+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-04T15:27:31+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-04T15:28:27+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-122008", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-04T15:27:31+00:00"}]
---

# Oqtane Framework: authenticated users can make server fetch internal URLs

Oqtane Framework's file upload endpoint fetches any URL a logged-in user supplies without checking the address. An attacker can use the server to read internal resources such as cloud metadata or localhost services and download the result.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the installed Oqtane version in the project's package references, for example `Oqtane.Framework` in the `.csproj` file
- Confirm whether `FileController.cs` is present and whether the UploadFile endpoint is reachable by registered users

## Fix

- Oqtane Framework: move to `10.3.0` or later

## Timeline

- 2026-11-04T15:27:31+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-122008

## Documents

- [advisory] Third-party advisory: www.vulncheck.com https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/oqtane-framework-before-ssrf-via-file-upload-from-url
- [fix] Release notes: github.com https://github.com/oqtane/oqtane.framework/releases/tag/v10.3.0

## From the sources

Oqtane Framework before 10.3.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the UploadFile endpoint of FileController.cs that allows authenticated registered users to make the server fetch arbitrary URLs by supplying a caller-controlled url parameter to HttpClient.GetStreamAsync without validating the scheme, host, or IP address. Attackers can request internal resources such as cloud instance metadata services or localhost-bound management interfaces, save the fetched response as a file in their own user folder, and retrieve it via the download endpoint to exfiltrate sensitive internal data or enumerate internal network hosts and ports.

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