{"id":"CVE-2026-120991","kind":"vulnerability","aliases":["CVE-2026-120991","GHSA-q8pg-ggp9-rm9m"],"related":[],"title":"Over-quota container blob upload deletes other owners' package blobs","description":"On a Gitea instance with a package size quota configured, a regular user can delete the stored content of another owner's package file or container layer by pushing a copy of its bytes as a container blob to their own namespace while over quota. The push is refused with `403`, but the object is still removed from the package content store. That store keys objects by SHA-256 alone and shares them across all owners and package types. Afterwards the victim's package is still listed, but downloads fail with `500` (generic registry) or `404 BLOB_UNKNOWN` (container registry) until someone uploads identical bytes again.\n\nThe bug is in the error path of `saveAsPackageBlobInternal` in `routers/api/packages/container/blob.go`. On failure it deletes the blob's content store object unless `exists` is true. `exists` starts as `false` and is only set by `GetOrSavePackageBlob`. However, `CheckSizeQuotaExceeded` runs first inside the same `db.WithTx` closure, so a quota refusal reaches the rollback with `exists` still false and deletes an object this request never created. Both `POST /v2/{owner}/{image}/blobs/uploads?digest=…` and `PUT …/blobs/uploads/{uuid}?digest=…` reach this path.\n\nThe attacker needs:\n\n- a non-admin account;\n- an instance with `[packages] LIMIT_TOTAL_OWNER_SIZE` or `LIMIT_SIZE_CONTAINER` set (both default to unlimited, so a default instance is not affected);\n- the complete bytes of the target object.\n\nThat last condition covers public packages, packages the attacker can read, and content known from elsewhere, such as public base-image layers sitting in a private organisation's image. No content is disclosed or substituted. The behaviour became reachable when `bf999e406994` (\"Add Debian package registry (#24426)\", first released in v1.20.0-rc0) moved the quota check inside the transaction.\n\nThe attached reproducer shows the effect end to end. Mallory fills their own quota, then pushes the bytes of alice's public generic file as a container blob and gets `403`. Alice's download then returns `500` and the object is gone from disk. As a control, the same over-quota upload through the generic registry leaves the object intact.\n\n## Details\n\nScanned commit `31626de2a6cdd3e1fe93216e4ac80f511297f1e7`. Attacker: any regular user, writing only to their own namespace.\nRequired configuration: a package quota the attacker's upload can exceed, `[packages] LIMIT_TOTAL_OWNER_SIZE` or\n`LIMIT_SIZE_CONTAINER`. Both default to `-1` (unlimited), so a default instance is not affected.\n\nWhen a container blob upload is refused for quota, the error path of `saveAsPackageBlobInternal` deletes the object with the\nuploaded content's SHA-256 from the package content store, even when that object existed before the request and belongs to\nother owners' packages:\n\n```go\n// routers/api/packages/container/blob.go:38-66\nfunc saveAsPackageBlobInternal(…, pb *packages_model.PackageBlob) (*packages_model.PackageBlob, error) {\n\texists := false\n\t…\n\terr = db.WithTx(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) error {\n\t\tif err := packages_service.CheckSizeQuotaExceeded(ctx, pci.Creator, pci.Owner, packages_model.TypeContainer, hsr.Size()); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err                          // exists is still false, pb is still the caller's non-nil argument\n\t\t}\n\t\tpb, exists, err = packages_service.GetOrSavePackageBlob(ctx, contentStore, pb, hsr)\n\t\t…\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tif !exists && pb != nil { // pb can be nil if GetOrInsertBlob failed\n\t\t\tif err := contentStore.Delete(packages_module.BlobHash256Key(pb.HashSHA256)); err != nil {\n```\n\n`exists` means \"the blob was already there, do not remove it\", but it starts as `false` and is only assigned at line 52. The\nquota check at line 49 returns before that, so the rollback at line 59 sees `!exists` and a non-nil `pb` and deletes. `pb` is\n`NewPackageBlob(hsr)` from `saveAsPackageBlob` (`blob.go:29`), so `pb.HashSHA256` is the hash of whatever the client sent.\n\nThe `exists := false` rollback dates from the original package registry, but it became reachable when the quota check moved\ninside the transaction in `bf999e406994` (\"Add Debian package registry (#24426)\", 2023-05-02), first released in\n`v1.20.0-rc0`; before that the check ran in front of `db.WithTx` and returned without reaching the rollback.\n\nThe content store is one flat namespace keyed by that hash, with no owner or package type in the key\n(`modules/packages/content_store.go:64-71`, `aa/bb/<sha256>`). A generic file, a Maven artifact and a container layer with the\nsame bytes are one object. The delete removes only the object; the `package_blob` and `package_file` rows stay, so the package\nis still listed and every download of it fails.\n\n### Path from the request\n\nBoth ways of completing a blob upload call `saveAsPackageBlob` after verifying that the `digest` parameter matches the body:\n\n- `POST /v2/{owner}/{image}/blobs/uploads?digest=…` → `PostBlobsUploads` (`routers/api/packages/container/container.go:283`)\n- `PUT /v2/{owner}/{image}/blobs/uploads/{uuid}?digest=…` → `PutBlobsUpload` (`container.go:432`)\n\nThe guards in front are the `/v2` group's `ReqContainerAccess`, `UserAssignmentWeb`, `PackageAssignment` and\n`reqPackageAccess(perm.AccessModeRead)` (`routers/api/packages/api.go:584`) and the routes' own\n`reqPackageAccess(perm.AccessModeWrite)` (`api.go:566`, `569`). All of them are about the owner named in the URL, and a user\npasses them for `/v2/<own name>/…`. Nothing relates the uploaded content to the owners of existing blobs, which is correct for\na deduplicating store and is why the rollback must not touch an object it did not create.\n`CheckSizeQuotaExceeded` (`services/packages/packages.go:390`) skips site admins, so the doer has to be a non-admin.\n\n### Example\n\n`LIMIT_TOTAL_OWNER_SIZE = 1 MiB`. Alice has published `tool.sh` in the generic registry; the object is\n`data/packages/ee/fd/eefd3d…c39d`.\n\n1. Mallory downloads `/api/packages/alice/generic/tool/1.0/tool.sh` (public, no credentials needed).\n2. Mallory uploads a filler file of 1 MiB − 1 byte to `/api/packages/mallory/generic/filler/1.0/filler.bin` → `201`. Any\n   further upload by mallory now exceeds the owner quota.\n3. Mallory sends `POST /v2/mallory/scratch/blobs/uploads?digest=sha256:eefd3d…c39d` with the downloaded bytes as body → `403`.\n\nAfter step 3 `data/packages/ee/fd/eefd3d…c39d` no longer exists and\n`GET /api/packages/alice/generic/tool/1.0/tool.sh` answers `500` (the server log shows `open …/eefd3d…c39d: no such file or\ndirectory`).\n\nAlso observed on this build:\n\n- The same request sequence finishing with `PUT /v2/mallory/scratch/blobs/uploads/{uuid}?digest=…` has the same effect.\n- When the victim object is a container layer, `GET /v2/alice/img/blobs/sha256:…` answers `404 BLOB_UNKNOWN` afterwards\n  and `HEAD` answers `404`.\n- With `LIMIT_SIZE_CONTAINER = 1000` and no owner quota, no filler is needed: pushing a copy of a 5000-byte generic file\n  of alice's as a container blob is refused with `403` and removes it.\n- The package is still returned by `GET /api/v1/packages/alice`.\n\nRead from the source and not triggered: any other error that makes `db.WithTx` return before line 52 takes the same branch\nwith no quota configured, for example a failing `sess.Begin()` in `txWithNoCheck` (`models/db/context.go:167`) or an error\nfrom `CalculateFileSize` inside the quota check. These are not in the attacker's hands: the session is created without the\nrequest context, so a client disconnect does not make `Begin` fail; it would take a real database outage. With default\nsettings the requests above return `201` and delete nothing.\n\n### The sibling rollbacks get this right\n\nThe other places that roll back a content store write use a flag that starts on the safe side and is set only when this call\ncreated the blob: `createPackageAndAddFile` deletes `if blobCreated && removeBlob` (`services/packages/packages.go:105-123`),\n`addFileToPackageWrapper` sets `removeBlob = blobCreated` (`packages.go:231-249`), and `handleCreateManifestResult` deletes\n`if txRet.created && txRet.pb != nil` (`routers/api/packages/container/manifest.go:84`). Accordingly, the same over-quota\nupload of alice's bytes through the generic registry is refused with `403` and leaves the object in place.\n\n## Impact\n\nOn an instance that limits package storage per owner or per container upload, a regular user can remove the stored content of\nany package file, container layer or manifest whose complete bytes they hold: the body is hashed and checked against the\n`digest` before the save path, and a body that does not match is answered `400` and deletes nothing. That covers\neverything in public packages, everything in packages they have read access to, and content that is known from\nelsewhere, such as public base-image layers that other users have pushed; this also reaches a layer in a private\norganisation's image that the attacker cannot read through Gitea. It takes one refused request per object and no\npermission on the victim's namespace. The package stays\nlisted while its downloads fail (`500` from the generic registry, `404 BLOB_UNKNOWN` from the container registry).\n\nThe data is not lost permanently if someone still has the bytes: any upload of identical content, by any user and through\nany registry, stores the object again (`GetOrSavePackageBlob` re-saves when the object is missing,\n`services/packages/packages.go:284-297`); a repeated `PUT` of the same file by alice is answered `409` and the file is\ndownloadable again. If the victim no longer holds the bytes, the loss is permanent from their side, since only the\nattacker is guaranteed to have a copy. The attacker can repeat the request to remove it again. There is no disclosure and no way to\nsubstitute different content, since the key is the hash of the stored bytes.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nThe attached patch makes the rollback in `saveAsPackageBlobInternal` (`routers/api/packages/container/blob.go`) track\nwhat this call created, as the sibling functions do, so that an error before the blob lookup leaves the store alone:\n\n```diff\n--- a/routers/api/packages/container/blob.go\n+++ b/routers/api/packages/container/blob.go\n@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@\n func saveAsPackageBlobInternal(ctx context.Context, hsr packages_module.HashedSizeReader, pci *packages_service.PackageCreationInfo, pb *packages_model.PackageBlob) (*packages_model.PackageBlob, error) {\n-\texists := false\n+\tblobCreated := false\n \n \tcontentStore := packages_module.NewContentStore()\n \n@@ -49,14 +49,17 @@\n \t\tif err := packages_service.CheckSizeQuotaExceeded(ctx, pci.Creator, pci.Owner, packages_model.TypeContainer, hsr.Size()); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n+\t\tvar exists bool\n \t\tpb, exists, err = packages_service.GetOrSavePackageBlob(ctx, contentStore, pb, hsr)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n+\t\tblobCreated = !exists\n \t\treturn createFileForBlob(ctx, uploadVersion, pb)\n \t})\n \tif err != nil {\n-\t\tif !exists && pb != nil { // pb can be nil if GetOrInsertBlob failed\n+\t\t// only roll back a blob created by this call, the content store is shared by all owners and package types\n+\t\tif blobCreated {\n \t\t\tif err := contentStore.Delete(packages_module.BlobHash256Key(pb.HashSHA256)); err != nil {\n```\n\n`blobCreated` is only true after `GetOrSavePackageBlob` has returned a non-nil `pb`, so the `pb != nil` test is no longer\nneeded. A blob genuinely created by the failing call is still cleaned up; a refused or failed upload no longer removes an\nobject another upload had stored. The rollbacks in `services/packages/packages.go` and `container/manifest.go` already\nuse this pattern and need no change. Moving the quota check in front of `db.WithTx` instead would close the quota path\nbut leave the rollback wrong for any other early error, such as a failing `Begin`.\n\nThe patch also adds a regression test, appended to the `Container` subtest of `TestPackageQuota` in\n`tests/integration/api_packages_test.go` (blob `\"2\"` was stored by the admin upload earlier in the subtest):\n\n```go\n\t\t// a rejected upload must not remove an already existing blob from the content store\n\t\tsetting.Packages.LimitTotalOwnerSize = 0\n\t\tuploadBlob(user, \"2\", http.StatusForbidden)\n\t\tsetting.Packages.LimitTotalOwnerSize = limitTotalOwnerSize\n\t\treq := NewRequest(t, \"GET\", fmt.Sprintf(\"/v2/%s/quota-test/blobs/sha256:%x\", user.Name, sha256.Sum256([]byte(\"2\")))).\n\t\t\tAddBasicAuth(admin.Name)\n\t\tresp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)\n\t\tassert.Equal(t, \"2\", resp.Body.String())\n```\n\nWithout the change to `blob.go` the test fails with `404 BLOB_UNKNOWN`; with it the test passes, and `repro` against the\nrebuilt binary prints `OK` while the upload is still refused with `403`.\n\n## Suggested patch\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/routers/api/packages/container/blob.go b/routers/api/packages/container/blob.go\nindex cb93e5c2f1..99ff8f8f4b 100644\n--- a/routers/api/packages/container/blob.go\n+++ b/routers/api/packages/container/blob.go\n@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ func saveAsPackageBlob(ctx context.Context, hsr packages_module.HashedSizeReader\n }\n \n func saveAsPackageBlobInternal(ctx context.Context, hsr packages_module.HashedSizeReader, pci *packages_service.PackageCreationInfo, pb *packages_model.PackageBlob) (*packages_model.PackageBlob, error) {\n-\texists := false\n+\tblobCreated := false\n \n \tcontentStore := packages_module.NewContentStore()\n \n@@ -49,14 +49,17 @@ func saveAsPackageBlobInternal(ctx context.Context, hsr packages_module.HashedSi\n \t\tif err := packages_service.CheckSizeQuotaExceeded(ctx, pci.Creator, pci.Owner, packages_model.TypeContainer, hsr.Size()); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n+\t\tvar exists bool\n \t\tpb, exists, err = packages_service.GetOrSavePackageBlob(ctx, contentStore, pb, hsr)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn err\n \t\t}\n+\t\tblobCreated = !exists\n \t\treturn createFileForBlob(ctx, uploadVersion, pb)\n \t})\n \tif err != nil {\n-\t\tif !exists && pb != nil { // pb can be nil if GetOrInsertBlob failed\n+\t\t// only roll back a blob created by this call, the content store is shared by all owners and package types\n+\t\tif blobCreated {\n \t\t\tif err := contentStore.Delete(packages_module.BlobHash256Key(pb.HashSHA256)); err != nil {\n \t\t\t\tlog.Error(\"Error deleting package blob from content store: %v\", err)\n \t\t\t}\ndiff --git a/tests/integration/api_packages_test.go b/tests/integration/api_packages_test.go\nindex 5585ff0cb5..56d35892fd 100644\n--- a/tests/integration/api_packages_test.go\n+++ b/tests/integration/api_packages_test.go\n@@ -569,6 +569,15 @@ func TestPackageQuota(t *testing.T) {\n \t\tuploadBlob(user, \"3\", http.StatusForbidden)\n \t\tuploadBlob(admin, \"3\", http.StatusCreated)\n \t\tsetting.Packages.LimitSizeContainer = limitSizeContainer\n+\n+\t\t// a rejected upload must not remove an already existing blob from the content store\n+\t\tsetting.Packages.LimitTotalOwnerSize = 0\n+\t\tuploadBlob(user, \"2\", http.StatusForbidden)\n+\t\tsetting.Packages.LimitTotalOwnerSize = limitTotalOwnerSize\n+\t\treq := NewRequest(t, \"GET\", fmt.Sprintf(\"/v2/%s/quota-test/blobs/sha256:%x\", user.Name, sha256.Sum256([]byte(\"2\")))).\n+\t\t\tAddBasicAuth(admin.Name)\n+\t\tresp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)\n+\t\tassert.Equal(t, \"2\", resp.Body.String())\n \t})\n }\n \n\n```\n\n\n_Reported by the Anthropic OSS scanner, finding ANT-2026-G4V1CJJ3 (scan gitea-20261022-004), commit 31626de2a6cdd3e1fe93216e4ac80f511297f1e7._","summary":"When a package size quota is set, a regular user whose container blob upload is refused for quota still has the stored object with the same SHA-256 deleted, even if another owner's package uses it. The victim's package stays listed but its downloads fail until identical bytes are uploaded again.","severity":"medium","cvss":null,"epss":null,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[{"name":"gitea.dev","fixed":["28.4.0"],"affected":">= 1.20, <= 28.3.0","ecosystem":"go"}],"ecosystems":["go"],"tags":["container-registry","cwe-460","gitea","package","package-registry","self-hosted"],"not_affected_if":["default-config","no-package-quota"],"how_to_check":"- Check the Gitea version with `gitea --version` and whether `[packages]` sets `LIMIT_TOTAL_OWNER_SIZE` or `LIMIT_SIZE_CONTAINER` in app.ini; the flaw needs one of them set.\n- Confirm the affected range: go:gitea.dev `>= 1.20, <= 28.3.0`.","fix":"- gitea.dev (Go module): upgrade to `28.4.0`.","status":"open","published_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:16+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-15T21:12:46+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-11-15T21:14:18+00:00","updated_at":"2026-11-15T21:14:18+00:00","category":"package","confidence":0.9,"triage":{"at":"2026-11-15T21:14:18Z","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","output":{"fix":"- gitea.dev (Go module): upgrade to `28.4.0`.","reach":"network","title":"Gitea: over-quota container upload deletes other owners' shared package blobs","impact":"medium","summary":"When a package size quota is set, a regular user whose container blob upload is refused for quota still has the stored object with the same SHA-256 deleted, even if another owner's package uses it. The victim's package stays listed but its downloads fail until identical bytes are uploaded again.","audience":"businesses","category":"package","nicknames":[],"who_cares":["gitea","self-hosted","package-registry","container-registry"],"confidence":0.9,"fix_status":"available","needs_auth":"yes","worst_case":"other owners' package files and container layers are deleted from storage","analyst_note":"","how_to_check":"- Check the Gitea version with `gitea --version` and whether `[packages]` sets `LIMIT_TOTAL_OWNER_SIZE` or `LIMIT_SIZE_CONTAINER` in app.ini; the flaw needs one of them set.\n- Confirm the affected range: go:gitea.dev `>= 1.20, <= 28.3.0`.","plain_action":"","product_name":"","needs_analyst":false,"not_affected_if":["default-config","no-package-quota"],"who_is_affected":"Only Gitea instances that set a package storage quota (LIMIT_TOTAL_OWNER_SIZE or LIMIT_SIZE_CONTAINER) are exposed; the default unlimited setting is not affected. A non-admin account is needed to trigger it, and the attacker must hold the complete bytes of the target object, which public packages and public base-image layers make easy to get.","user_interaction":"no","product_ecosystem":"","needs_special_setup":"yes","severity_if_unknown":"medium"},"cost_usd":0.001225,"input_tokens":9092,"output_tokens":631,"severity_before":"medium"},"analyst_status":null,"analyst_note":null,"search":"'-1':468C '-120991':14A,22A '-2026':13A,21A '-256':64B,157C,500C '-460':28B '-66':523C '/blobs/uploads':263C,267C '/v2':260C '24426':358C '31626de2a6cdd3e1fe93216e4ac80f511297f1e7':434C '38':522C '403':139C,400C '404':184C '49':623C '500':180C,406C '52':617C '59':632C 'account':280C 'across':162C 'add':354C 'admin':279C 'affect':304C,476C 'afterward':168C 'alic':389C,401C 'alon':158C 'alreadi':600C 'anoth':68B,108C 'argument':564C 'assign':614C 'attach':371C 'attack':274C,320C,435C,451C 'b':670C 'base':332C 'base-imag':331C 'becam':350C 'behaviour':349C 'belong':515C 'bf999e406994':353C 'blob':5A,11A,49B,126C,185C,211C,397C,480C,598C 'blob.go:29':649C 'bug':196C 'byte':86B,122C,193C,307C,387C 'caller':559C 'check':366C,620C 'checksizequotaexceed':231C 'client':658C 'closur':238C 'commit':433C 'complet':306C 'condit':314C 'configur':98C,446C 'contain':4A,25B,48B,114C,125C,187C,292C,396C,464C,479C 'container-registri':24B 'content':106C,149C,213C,324C,343C,497C,504C 'contentstor':570C 'contentstore.delete':589C 'context.context':537C 'control':416C 'copi':119C 'cover':315C 'creat':257C 'ctx':534C,536C,542C,569C 'cve':12A,20A 'cwe':27B 'date':664C 'db.withtx':237C,533C 'debian':355C 'default':295C,300C,466C,472C 'delet':7A,65B,103C,209C,251C,491C,642C 'detail':431C 'digest':264C,269C 'disclos':345C 'disk':413C 'download':82B,177C,403C 'effect':375C 'elsewher':327C 'end':376C,378C 'err':532C,540C,547C,550C,567C,574C,588C,593C 'error':200C,487C,529C,538C 'even':66B,506C 'exceed':455C 'exist':217C,220C,247C,510C,530C,551C,566C,577C,595C,634C,661C 'fail':83B,178C,586C 'failur':207C 'fals':223C,249C,531C,554C,610C,662C 'file':112C,393C 'fill':380C 'first':233C,359C 'func':524C,535C 'generic':181C,392C,425C 'get':399C 'getorinsertblob':585C 'getorsavepackageblob':229C 'ggp9':18A 'ghsa':16A 'ghsa-q8pg-ggp9-rm9m':15A 'gitea':29B,91C 'gitea.dev':23A 'go':520C 'gone':411C 'hash':654C 'host':36B 'howev':230C 'hsr':572C,646C 'hsr.size':546C 'ident':85B,192C 'imag':262C,333C,341C 'insid':234C,367C 'instanc':92C,282C,301C,473C 'intact':430C 'key':153C 'known':325C 'last':313C 'layer':115C,334C 'leav':427C 'limit':285C,290C,457C,462C 'line':616C,622C,631C 'list':79B,175C 'mallori':379C 'mean':596C 'module.blobhash256key':591C 'move':363C 'namespac':130C,444C 'need':275C 'never':256C 'newpackageblob':645C 'nil':548C,563C,575C,579C,583C,594C,639C 'non':278C,562C,638C 'non-admin':277C 'non-nil':561C,637C 'object':59B,142C,154C,215C,253C,311C,409C,429C,493C,509C 'organis':339C 'origin':667C 'over-quota':1A,419C 'owner':9A,69B,109C,164C,261C,287C,459C,518C 'packag':10A,30B,32B,39B,71B,77B,95C,111C,148C,166C,172C,284C,317C,318C,356C,448C,456C,503C,519C,590C,668C 'package-registri':31B 'packages_model.packageblob':527C,528C 'packages_model.typecontainer':545C 'packages_service.checksizequotaexceeded':541C 'packages_service.getorsavepackageblob':568C 'path':201C,272C,488C 'pb':526C,555C,565C,571C,578C,580C,640C,643C 'pb.hashsha256':592C,651C 'pci.creator':543C 'pci.owner':544C 'post':259C 'privat':338C 'public':316C,330C,391C 'push':117C,135C,385C 'put':266C 'q8pg':17A 'quota':3A,41B,54B,97C,133C,241C,365C,383C,421C,449C,485C,619C 'reach':243C,270C 'reachabl':351C 'read':322C 'refus':52B,137C,242C,483C 'registri':26B,33B,182C,188C,357C,426C,669C 'regular':45B,100C,437C 'releas':360C 'remov':145C,604C 'reproduc':372C 'request':255C,513C 'requir':445C 'return':405C,549C,624C 'rm9m':19A 'rollback':245C,629C,663C 'routers/api/packages/container/blob.go':205C,521C 'run':232C 'saveaspackageblob':648C 'saveaspackageblobintern':203C,490C,525C 'scan':432C 'see':633C 'self':35B 'self-host':34B 'sent':659C 'set':43B,227C,293C 'sha':63B,156C,499C 'share':160C 'show':373C 'sit':335C 'size':40B,96C,288C,291C,460C,463C 'someon':190C 'start':221C,608C 'stay':78B 'still':55B,144C,174C,248C,553C,557C 'store':58B,105C,150C,152C,214C,505C 'substitut':347C 'target':310C 'total':286C,458C 'transact':369C 'true':219C 'type':167C 'unknown':186C 'unless':216C 'unlimit':297C,469C 'upload':6A,50B,88B,191C,422C,453C,481C,496C 'use':72B 'user':46B,101C,438C 'uuid':268C 'v1.20.0-rc0':362C 'victim':75B,170C 'whatev':656C 'whose':47B 'write':439C","nicknames":[],"mitigations":[],"who_affected":"Only Gitea instances that set a package storage quota (LIMIT_TOTAL_OWNER_SIZE or LIMIT_SIZE_CONTAINER) are exposed; the default unlimited setting is not affected. A non-admin account is needed to trigger it, and the attacker must hold the complete bytes of the target object, which public packages and public base-image layers make easy to get.","tier":"C","verified":{},"analyst_revisit_at":null,"fix_status":"available","audience":"businesses","plain_action":null,"pkeys":["giteadev"],"ptokens":["dev","gitea"],"labels":["containerregistry","cwe460","gitea","go","medium","package","packageregistry","selfhosted"],"campaign_type":null,"search_a":"'-120991':14A,22A '-2026':13A,21A 'blob':5A,11A 'contain':4A 'cve':12A,20A 'delet':7A 'ggp9':18A 'ghsa':16A 'ghsa-q8pg-ggp9-rm9m':15A 'gitea.dev':23A 'over-quota':1A 'owner':9A 'packag':10A 'q8pg':17A 'quota':3A 'rm9m':19A 'upload':6A","search_b":"'-256':64B '-460':28B 'anoth':68B 'blob':49B 'byte':86B 'contain':25B,48B 'container-registri':24B 'cwe':27B 'delet':65B 'download':82B 'even':66B 'fail':83B 'gitea':29B 'host':36B 'ident':85B 'list':79B 'object':59B 'owner':69B 'packag':30B,32B,39B,71B,77B 'package-registri':31B 'quota':41B,54B 'refus':52B 'registri':26B,33B 'regular':45B 'self':35B 'self-host':34B 'set':43B 'sha':63B 'size':40B 'stay':78B 'still':55B 'store':58B 'upload':50B,88B 'use':72B 'user':46B 'victim':75B 'whose':47B","search_c":"'-1':468C '-256':157C,500C '-66':523C '/blobs/uploads':263C,267C '/v2':260C '24426':358C '31626de2a6cdd3e1fe93216e4ac80f511297f1e7':434C '38':522C '403':139C,400C '404':184C '49':623C '500':180C,406C '52':617C '59':632C 'account':280C 'across':162C 'add':354C 'admin':279C 'affect':304C,476C 'afterward':168C 'alic':389C,401C 'alon':158C 'alreadi':600C 'anoth':108C 'argument':564C 'assign':614C 'attach':371C 'attack':274C,320C,435C,451C 'b':670C 'base':332C 'base-imag':331C 'becam':350C 'behaviour':349C 'belong':515C 'bf999e406994':353C 'blob':126C,185C,211C,397C,480C,598C 'blob.go:29':649C 'bug':196C 'byte':122C,193C,307C,387C 'caller':559C 'check':366C,620C 'checksizequotaexceed':231C 'client':658C 'closur':238C 'commit':433C 'complet':306C 'condit':314C 'configur':98C,446C 'contain':114C,125C,187C,292C,396C,464C,479C 'content':106C,149C,213C,324C,343C,497C,504C 'contentstor':570C 'contentstore.delete':589C 'context.context':537C 'control':416C 'copi':119C 'cover':315C 'creat':257C 'ctx':534C,536C,542C,569C 'date':664C 'db.withtx':237C,533C 'debian':355C 'default':295C,300C,466C,472C 'delet':103C,209C,251C,491C,642C 'detail':431C 'digest':264C,269C 'disclos':345C 'disk':413C 'download':177C,403C 'effect':375C 'elsewher':327C 'end':376C,378C 'err':532C,540C,547C,550C,567C,574C,588C,593C 'error':200C,487C,529C,538C 'even':506C 'exceed':455C 'exist':217C,220C,247C,510C,530C,551C,566C,577C,595C,634C,661C 'fail':178C,586C 'failur':207C 'fals':223C,249C,531C,554C,610C,662C 'file':112C,393C 'fill':380C 'first':233C,359C 'func':524C,535C 'generic':181C,392C,425C 'get':399C 'getorinsertblob':585C 'getorsavepackageblob':229C 'gitea':91C 'go':520C 'gone':411C 'hash':654C 'howev':230C 'hsr':572C,646C 'hsr.size':546C 'ident':192C 'imag':262C,333C,341C 'insid':234C,367C 'instanc':92C,282C,301C,473C 'intact':430C 'key':153C 'known':325C 'last':313C 'layer':115C,334C 'leav':427C 'limit':285C,290C,457C,462C 'line':616C,622C,631C 'list':175C 'mallori':379C 'mean':596C 'module.blobhash256key':591C 'move':363C 'namespac':130C,444C 'need':275C 'never':256C 'newpackageblob':645C 'nil':548C,563C,575C,579C,583C,594C,639C 'non':278C,562C,638C 'non-admin':277C 'non-nil':561C,637C 'object':142C,154C,215C,253C,311C,409C,429C,493C,509C 'organis':339C 'origin':667C 'over-quota':419C 'owner':109C,164C,261C,287C,459C,518C 'packag':95C,111C,148C,166C,172C,284C,317C,318C,356C,448C,456C,503C,519C,590C,668C 'packages_model.packageblob':527C,528C 'packages_model.typecontainer':545C 'packages_service.checksizequotaexceeded':541C 'packages_service.getorsavepackageblob':568C 'path':201C,272C,488C 'pb':526C,555C,565C,571C,578C,580C,640C,643C 'pb.hashsha256':592C,651C 'pci.creator':543C 'pci.owner':544C 'post':259C 'privat':338C 'public':316C,330C,391C 'push':117C,135C,385C 'put':266C 'quota':97C,133C,241C,365C,383C,421C,449C,485C,619C 'reach':243C,270C 'reachabl':351C 'read':322C 'refus':137C,242C,483C 'registri':182C,188C,357C,426C,669C 'regular':100C,437C 'releas':360C 'remov':145C,604C 'reproduc':372C 'request':255C,513C 'requir':445C 'return':405C,549C,624C 'rollback':245C,629C,663C 'routers/api/packages/container/blob.go':205C,521C 'run':232C 'saveaspackageblob':648C 'saveaspackageblobintern':203C,490C,525C 'scan':432C 'see':633C 'sent':659C 'set':227C,293C 'sha':156C,499C 'share':160C 'show':373C 'sit':335C 'size':96C,288C,291C,460C,463C 'someon':190C 'start':221C,608C 'still':144C,174C,248C,553C,557C 'store':105C,150C,152C,214C,505C 'substitut':347C 'target':310C 'total':286C,458C 'transact':369C 'true':219C 'type':167C 'unknown':186C 'unless':216C 'unlimit':297C,469C 'upload':191C,422C,453C,481C,496C 'user':101C,438C 'uuid':268C 'v1.20.0-rc0':362C 'victim':170C 'whatev':656C 'write':439C","cause_entry":null,"cause_path":null,"disclosures_checked_at":null,"first_public_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:16+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":null,"cvss_by":null,"poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"ghsa-repo","external_id":"GHSA-q8pg-ggp9-rm9m","url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-q8pg-ggp9-rm9m","severity":"medium","published_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:16+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:16+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-15T21:12:46+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-15T21:12:46+00:00","note":null},{"source":"nvd","external_id":"CVE-2026-120991","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120991","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-11-15T22:17:17+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-15T22:17:18+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-15T22:40:23+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-15T22:40:23+00:00","note":null}],"documents":[{"id":165565,"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-q8pg-ggp9-rm9m","title":"Maintainer's advisory: github.com","kind":"vendor","source":"ghsa-repo","publisher":"vendor","text":null,"published_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:16+00:00","relation":"advisory","confidence":null,"note":"Maintainer's advisory: github.com"},{"id":165694,"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.4.0","title":"Release notes: github.com","kind":"release","source":"nvd","publisher":"vendor","text":null,"published_at":null,"relation":"fix","confidence":null,"note":"Release notes: github.com"}],"disclosures":[],"exploit_sources":[],"notice":"Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai"}