CVE-2026-120984 · Other
NO FIX YET
When a Keycloak client is created or imported with authorization services enabled, an internal session attribute is not cleared, which lets a user with client management rights upload a malicious JavaScript policy. That policy runs on the server when an authorization request is made, so an attacker can run arbitrary code on the server.
first public Nov 7, 2026 · 2 sources
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Self-hosted Keycloak, Red Hat Build of Keycloak and Red Hat Single Sign-On 7 (Red Hat lists these as affected, no version ranges yet). Exposure needs an account with delegated client management roles, and clients created or imported with authorization services enabled. Teams where only trusted full admins hold those rights, and managed hosting users, face little risk.
Not affected if managed-hosting, no-client-management-rights
Who cares identity, keycloak, red-hat-sso, rhbk, self-hosted
No fix yet, per the sources.
A flaw was found in the Keycloak server's client management component. When a client is created or imported with authorization services enabled, the system fails to properly clear an internal session attribute used during the setup process. This allows an authenticated attacker with client management permissions to bypass security controls and upload a malicious JavaScript policy, which is then executed on the server when an authorization request is made. Successful exploitation could allow the attacker to run arbitrary code on the server, potentially compromising the entire system.
This page as .md · .json · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.
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