{"id":"CVE-2026-120725","kind":"vulnerability","aliases":["CVE-2026-120725","GHSA-8pmc-9g44-v9gw"],"related":[],"title":"Anonymous Git LFS downloads bypass REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW","description":"On an instance with `[service] REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true`, the Git LFS routes still serve objects to clients with no account. Anyone who knows a non-private repository's `owner/repo` path and a file's SHA-256 can download that LFS object with `GET /{owner}/{repo}.git/info/lfs/objects/{oid}`. The web UI, the API and `git clone` all refuse the same client. The attached reproducer sets up alice's non-private repository `alice/firmware` with one LFS file, shows the anonymous API request getting 403 and `info/refs` getting 401, and then shows the anonymous LFS GET returning 200 with exactly the bytes alice downloads with her own credentials.\n\nThe cause is `authenticate()` in `services/lfs/server.go`, reached with `requireSigned = false` from the download, batch, upload and verify handlers. It returns early when the anonymous doer's permission allows reading. The permission model grants `AccessModeRead` to a nil user on any non-private repository of a public owner, and it only consults `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW` for restricted users. The LFS routes are registered with `optSignInFromAnyOrigin`, which carries no `SignInRequired`, so nothing on the LFS path checks the setting. The other read paths (web, API, git smart HTTP, SSH, packages) each check it at their own entry point.\n\nThe batch route with `\"operation\": \"download\"` also tells an anonymous client whether a given OID is stored in a repository, even without the correct size, since a wrong size returns 422. The attacker cannot discover paths or hashes from the instance; they must come from outside, for example LFS pointer files in a leaked or mirrored checkout or a published checksum. Private repositories and repositories of limited or private owners are not reachable, and write and lock operations still return 401.\n\nWith `LFS_ALLOW_PURE_SSH = true`, a restricted user or a deploy key of another repository can reach the same objects through `git-lfs-transfer`. This is a second route to the same anonymous read, closed by the same one-line fix. The early return dates from `bbad9b6178` (#5912, 2019). This is the LFS counterpart of the gaps already closed for packages (#20873) and the container registry (#28877).\n\n## Details\n\nThe Git LFS routes do not honour `[service] REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true`. A client without any credential downloads LFS\nobjects from non-private repositories of an instance that otherwise refuses every anonymous read.\n\n- Commit: `31626de2a6cdd3e1fe93216e4ac80f511297f1e7`.\n- Attacker: unauthenticated HTTP client that knows `owner/repo` and the SHA-256 (OID) of the object.\n- Configuration: `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true` (default `false`; it is the setting being bypassed) and\n  `LFS_START_SERVER = true` (code default `false`; the web installer writes `true`, `routers/install/install.go:332`).\n- Entry points: `GET /{owner}/{repo}.git/info/lfs/objects/{oid}` and `POST /{owner}/{repo}.git/info/lfs/objects/batch`.\n\nOn such an instance, for the non-private repository `alice/firmware` and with no `Authorization` header or cookie:\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/repos/alice/firmware                               -> 403\nGET /alice/firmware.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack      -> 401\nGET /alice/firmware.git/info/lfs/objects/<sha256 of the file>  -> 200, the file\n```\n\nEvery other read path enforces the setting at its own entry point: the web routes through `optSignIn`\n(`SignInRequired: setting.Service.RequireSignInViewStrict`, `routers/web/web.go:348`), the API through\n`verifyAuthWithOptionsAPI` (`routers/api/v1/api.go:1022`), packages in `determineAccessMode`\n(`services/context/package.go:113`), SSH in `ServCommand` (`routers/private/serv.go:245`), and git smart HTTP with\n\n```go\n// routers/web/repo/githttp.go:129\n\t// Only public pulls don't need auth: repo must exist, not require-sign-in\n\tcanAnonymousPull := false\n\tif isPull && repoExist && !setting.Service.RequireSignInViewStrict {\n```\n\nThe LFS routes have no counterpart. They are registered with `optSignInFromAnyOrigin`, whose `VerifyOptions` carry no\n`SignInRequired`, because LFS authenticates inside its handlers:\n\n```go\n// routers/web/web.go:325\nvar optSignInFromAnyOrigin = verifyAuthWithOptionsWeb(&common.VerifyOptions{DisableCrossOriginProtection: true})\n// routers/web/web.go:1764\n\tcommon.AddOwnerRepoGitLFSRoutes(m, lfsServerEnabled, webAuth.AllowBasic, webAuth.AllowDeployToken, repo.CorsHandler(), optSignInFromAnyOrigin)\n```\n\nThe handlers reach `authenticate` through `getAuthenticatedRepository`, which passes `requireSigned = false`\n(`services/lfs/server.go:470`) for the download, batch, upload and verify routes. `authenticate` returns early on the\npermission of the anonymous doer:\n\n```go\n// services/lfs/server.go:550\n\t// it works for both anonymous request and signed-in user, then perm.CanAccess will do the permission check\n\tperm, err := access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repository, ctx.Doer)   // ctx.Doer == nil\n\t…\n\tcanAccess := perm.CanAccess(accessMode, unit.TypeCode)\n\t// if it doesn't require sign-in and anonymous user has access, return true\n\t…\n\tif canAccess && (!requireSigned || ctx.IsSigned) {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n```\n\nThe comment assumes the permission check covers the anonymous case, but the permission model does not know about the\nsetting for a nil doer: `GetIndividualUserRepoPermission` returns `AccessModeRead` for `user == nil` on any non-private\nrepository whose owner is public (`models/perm/access/repo_permission.go:465-468`). The setting is only consulted there\nfor restricted users (`models/perm/access/access.go:52`). So with no credentials `canAccess` is true for a read,\n`requireSigned` is false, and the bearer-token check below is never reached. This early return is long-standing, not a\nrecent regression: it dates from `bbad9b6178` (\"Fix bug when read public repo lfs file\", #5912, 2019-01-31).\n\n`DownloadHandler` (`services/lfs/server.go:117`) then streams the object. `BatchHandler` (`:192`) with\n`\"operation\": \"download\"` answers per OID: a `download` action for an object the repository has, `\"error\": {\"code\": 404}`\nfor one it does not have, which lets the same client test whether a given file is stored in a given repository. The\nsize need not be known for this: a wrong size for a stored object is answered with `422` \"Object <oid> is not N bytes\"\n(`services/lfs/server.go:254`), which also confirms presence. The\nroutes that need write access (`batch` with `upload`, `PUT`, `verify`) and the lock routes (`requireSigned = true`,\n`services/lfs/locks.go:67`) answer 401 to the anonymous client.\n\nPresenting credentials can reduce access on the same URL: a restricted user (`gitea admin user create --restricted`)\nwho sends Basic auth gets 401 for the GET above, because the restricted user's permission honours the setting; without\nthe header the answer is 200.\n\nThe same shortcut is reachable over pure-SSH LFS (`LFS_ALLOW_PURE_SSH = true`, default `false`). The internal LFS\nroutes build a web context that never has a doer (`routers/private/internal.go:105-108`), and `GiteaBackend.Download`\nrequests whatever `{owner}/{repo}.git/info/lfs/…` path the client put into the `id` argument\n(`modules/lfstransfer/backend/backend.go:185`). This was exercised against the built-in SSH server, separately from the\nshipped reproducer: a restricted user, and a read-only deploy key of `bob/tool`, are both refused\n`git-lfs-transfer alice/pub.git download` (\"has no \"read\" permission for alice/pub\"), but inside a\n`git-lfs-transfer` session on their own repository the packets `get-object <oid>` /\n`id=base64({\"download\":{\"href\":\"http://x/alice/pub.git/info/lfs/objects/<oid>\"}})` return `status 200` and the file of\n`alice/pub`. The session's LFS token is bound to the other repository and is never examined. This is a second route to\nthe same anonymous read, not an additional capability: the same person can send the anonymous HTTP request above. The\nsame fix closes both.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker needs no account, but must already know the repository path and the exact SHA-256 of each file to be\nread, and the instance reveals neither to an anonymous client. The hash comes from outside: a pointer file in a leaked\nor mirrored checkout or source archive, a published checksum, or a candidate file whose presence is being tested\nthrough the batch route. Only non-private repositories of public owners are reachable (private repositories and\nrepositories of limited or private owners are not), the access is read-only, and it requires the non-default\n`REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true`, which is the setting being bypassed.\n\nWithin those limits: operators set `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW` to make an instance internal, so non-private repositories are\nmeant for every account holder, not for everyone who can reach the HTTP port. LFS objects of those repositories\n(typically the binaries: firmware images, models, datasets, installers) remain downloadable without an account, while\nthe web pages, the API and git clone refuse the same client. With pure-SSH LFS enabled, restricted users and deploy\nkeys of other repositories reach the same objects through `git-lfs-transfer`, which gives them nothing beyond the\nanonymous HTTP request.\n\nThis is the LFS counterpart of gaps already closed for packages (`0a9a86b943`, \"Respect `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW` for\npackages\", #20873) and the container registry (`caad931385`, #28877); unlike those, reading an object here requires\nknowing its SHA-256.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nThe attached patch treats sign-in as required in `authenticate` (`services/lfs/server.go:555-560`) whenever the\ninstance requires it, the same idiom as `routers/api/packages/container/container.go:124`. Requests that carry Basic\nauth, a session or a deploy token already have `ctx.IsSigned` set by the web auth middleware\n(`routers/web/web.go:166`); requests with an LFS bearer token fall through to `parseToken` as before. Because every LFS\nroute, including the internal ones used by pure-SSH LFS, goes through this function, the pure-SSH path is covered too.\nThe lock routes already pass `requireSigned = true` and are unaffected.\n\n```diff\n--- a/services/lfs/server.go\n+++ b/services/lfs/server.go\n@@ -555,6 +555,8 @@ func authenticate(ctx *context.Context, repository *repo_model.Repository, autho\n \t}\n \n \tcanAccess := perm.CanAccess(accessMode, unit.TypeCode)\n+\t// the permission model doesn't know \"require sign-in to view\", so the anonymous access must be rejected here (the same as git http)\n+\trequireSigned = requireSigned || setting.Service.RequireSignInViewStrict\n \t// if it doesn't require sign-in and anonymous user has access, return true\n \t// if the user is already signed in (for example: by session auth method), and the doer can access, return true\n \tif canAccess && (!requireSigned || ctx.IsSigned) {\n```\n\nThe patch also adds a regression test, a sub-test of `TestAuthenticate` in `services/lfs/server_test.go` (imports\n`modules/setting` and `modules/test`):\n\n```go\n\tt.Run(\"authenticate respects require sign-in view\", func(t *testing.T) {\n\t\tauthenticateAnonymous := func(authorization string) bool {\n\t\t\tctx, _ := contexttest.MockContext(t, \"/\")\n\t\t\treturn authenticate(ctx, repo1, authorization, false, false)\n\t\t}\n\t\tassert.True(t, authenticateAnonymous(\"\")) // public repository\n\n\t\tdefer test.MockVariableValue(&setting.Service.RequireSignInViewStrict, true)()\n\t\tassert.False(t, authenticateAnonymous(\"\"))\n\t\tassert.True(t, authenticateAnonymous(\"Bearer \"+getUserToken(\"download\", 2, repo1)))\n\t})\n```\n\nThe sub-test fails without the `server.go` change and `go test ./services/lfs/` passes with it. With the patch the\nreproducer prints `OK`, a regular user's Basic-auth download still returns 200, the two SSH cases above return\n`status 401`, and the repository owner's `batch` + `get-object` over `git-lfs-transfer` still return the file.\n\nIndependently, and not part of the attached patch, `GiteaBackend.Download`, `Upload` and `Verify` (`modules/lfstransfer/backend/backend.go:185`, `:239`,\n`:286`) could build the internal URL from `g.server` (the repository the SSH session was authorized for) and the OID\ninstead of taking the repository path from the client's `id` argument.\n\n## Suggested patch\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/services/lfs/server.go b/services/lfs/server.go\nindex 6d5df20b12..6395db57e3 100644\n--- a/services/lfs/server.go\n+++ b/services/lfs/server.go\n@@ -555,6 +555,8 @@ func authenticate(ctx *context.Context, repository *repo_model.Repository, autho\n \t}\n \n \tcanAccess := perm.CanAccess(accessMode, unit.TypeCode)\n+\t// the permission model doesn't know \"require sign-in to view\", so the anonymous access must be rejected here (the same as git http)\n+\trequireSigned = requireSigned || setting.Service.RequireSignInViewStrict\n \t// if it doesn't require sign-in and anonymous user has access, return true\n \t// if the user is already signed in (for example: by session auth method), and the doer can access, return true\n \tif canAccess && (!requireSigned || ctx.IsSigned) {\ndiff --git a/services/lfs/server_test.go b/services/lfs/server_test.go\nindex 8ccf777caf..88b0b4792d 100644\n--- a/services/lfs/server_test.go\n+++ b/services/lfs/server_test.go\n@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ import (\n \trepo_model \"gitea.dev/models/repo\"\n \t\"gitea.dev/models/unittest\"\n \tuser_model \"gitea.dev/models/user\"\n+\t\"gitea.dev/modules/setting\"\n+\t\"gitea.dev/modules/test\"\n \t\"gitea.dev/services/contexttest\"\n \n \t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert\"\n@@ -57,6 +59,18 @@ func TestAuthenticate(t *testing.T) {\n \t\tassert.True(t, authenticate(ctx, repo1, prefixBearer+token, true, false))\n \t})\n \n+\tt.Run(\"authenticate respects require sign-in view\", func(t *testing.T) {\n+\t\tauthenticateAnonymous := func(authorization string) bool {\n+\t\t\tctx, _ := contexttest.MockContext(t, \"/\")\n+\t\t\treturn authenticate(ctx, repo1, authorization, false, false)\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tassert.True(t, authenticateAnonymous(\"\")) // public repository\n+\n+\t\tdefer test.MockVariableValue(&setting.Service.RequireSignInViewStrict, true)()\n+\t\tassert.False(t, authenticateAnonymous(\"\"))\n+\t\tassert.True(t, authenticateAnonymous(\"Bearer \"+getUserToken(\"download\", 2, repo1)))\n+\t})\n+\n \thandleLFSTokenTestPerm := func(op string, userID int64, repo *repo_model.Repository, accessMode perm_model.AccessMode) error {\n \t\ttoken := getUserToken(op, userID, repo)\n \t\tu, err := handleLFSToken(ctx, token, repo, accessMode)\n\n```\n\n\n_Reported by the Anthropic OSS scanner, finding ANT-2026-1XWM1MVI (scan gitea-20261022-004), commit 31626de2a6cdd3e1fe93216e4ac80f511297f1e7._","summary":"On Gitea instances with REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW enabled, the Git LFS routes still serve objects from non-private repositories to clients with no account. An attacker who knows the owner/repo path and an object's SHA-256 can download that file anonymously.","severity":"low","cvss":null,"epss":null,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[{"name":"gitea.dev","fixed":["28.4.0"],"affected":"<= 28.3.0","ecosystem":"go"}],"ecosystems":["go"],"tags":["cwe-306","git-lfs","gitea","package","self-hosted"],"not_affected_if":["default-config","lfs-disabled","private-repos-only"],"how_to_check":"- Check the `[service]` section of `app.ini` for `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true` and `LFS_START_SERVER = true`.\n- Check the Gitea version with `gitea --version`; versions `<= 28.3.0` are affected.\n- If `LFS_ALLOW_PURE_SSH = true`, the SSH LFS path is also affected.","fix":"- Gitea `28.4.0`","status":"open","published_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:20+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-15T21:12:46+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-11-15T21:14:15+00:00","updated_at":"2026-11-15T21:14:15+00:00","category":"package","confidence":0.8,"triage":{"at":"2026-11-15T21:14:15Z","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","output":{"fix":"- Gitea `28.4.0`","reach":"internet","title":"Gitea: anonymous Git LFS downloads bypass the require-sign-in setting","impact":"low","summary":"On Gitea instances with REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW enabled, the Git LFS routes still serve objects from non-private repositories to clients with no account. An attacker who knows the owner/repo path and an object's SHA-256 can download that file anonymously.","audience":"businesses","category":"package","nicknames":[],"who_cares":["gitea","self-hosted","git-lfs"],"confidence":0.8,"fix_status":"available","needs_auth":"no","worst_case":"anonymous users read LFS objects from non-private repositories","analyst_note":"","how_to_check":"- Check the `[service]` section of `app.ini` for `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true` and `LFS_START_SERVER = true`.\n- Check the Gitea version with `gitea --version`; versions `<= 28.3.0` are affected.\n- If `LFS_ALLOW_PURE_SSH = true`, the SSH LFS path is also affected.","plain_action":"","product_name":"","needs_analyst":false,"not_affected_if":["default-config","lfs-disabled","private-repos-only"],"who_is_affected":"Instances that set REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW to true and serve Git LFS objects from non-private repositories of public owners. Instances without that setting, or with LFS disabled, are not exposed. Private repositories and those of limited or private owners are not reachable.","user_interaction":"no","product_ecosystem":"","needs_special_setup":"yes","severity_if_unknown":"unknown"},"cost_usd":0.001201,"input_tokens":9083,"output_tokens":586,"severity_before":"low"},"analyst_status":null,"analyst_note":null,"search":"'-120725':11A,19A '-2026':10A,18A '-256':68B,111C,477C '-306':22B '/alice/firmware.git/info/lfs/objects':552C '/alice/firmware.git/info/refs':544C '/api/v1/repos/alice/firmware':541C '1022':582C '113':587C '129':600C '200':171C,553C '2019':411C '20873':424C '245':592C '28877':429C '31626de2a6cdd3e1fe93216e4ac80f511297f1e7':466C '332':509C '348':576C '401':162C,359C,550C '403':158C,542C '422':309C '5912':410C '8pmc':14A '9g44':15A 'accessmoderead':215C 'account':55B,94C 'alic':141C,176C 'alice/firmware':147C,532C 'allow':209C,362C 'alreadi':420C 'also':285C 'anonym':1A,73B,154C,167C,205C,288C,394C,463C 'anoth':374C 'anyon':95C 'api':127C,155C,265C,578C 'attach':137C 'attack':57B,311C,467C 'auth':607C 'authent':185C 'author':536C 'batch':195C,280C 'bbad9b6178':409C 'bypass':5A,494C 'byte':175C 'cananonymouspul':616C 'cannot':312C 'carri':248C 'caus':183C 'check':257C,272C 'checkout':335C 'checksum':339C 'client':52B,91C,135C,289C,444C,470C 'clone':130C 'close':396C,421C 'code':500C 'come':322C 'commit':465C 'configur':482C 'consult':233C 'contain':427C 'cooki':539C 'correct':302C 'counterpart':416C,627C 'credenti':181C,447C 'cve':9A,17A 'cwe':21B 'date':407C 'default':487C,501C 'deploy':371C 'detail':430C 'determineaccessmod':585C 'discov':313C 'doer':206C 'download':4A,70B,113C,177C,194C,284C,448C 'earli':202C,405C 'enabl':38B 'enforc':560C 'entri':277C,510C,566C 'even':299C 'everi':462C,556C 'exact':173C 'exampl':326C 'exist':610C 'fals':191C,488C,502C,617C 'file':72B,108C,151C,329C,555C 'fix':403C 'gap':419C 'get':118C,157C,161C,169C,512C,540C,543C,551C 'ghsa':13A 'ghsa-8pmc-9g44-v9gw':12A 'git':2A,24B,40B,84C,129C,266C,383C,432C,547C,594C 'git-lf':23B 'git-lfs-transf':382C 'git-upload-pack':546C 'git/info/lfs/objects':121C,515C 'git/info/lfs/objects/batch':521C 'gitea':26B,32B 'gitea.dev':20A 'given':292C 'go':598C 'grant':214C 'handler':199C 'hash':316C 'header':537C 'honour':437C 'host':30B 'http':268C,469C,596C 'info/refs':160C 'instal':505C 'instanc':33B,76C,319C,458C,525C 'ispul':619C 'key':372C 'know':59B,97C,472C 'leak':332C 'lfs':3A,25B,41B,85C,115C,150C,168C,241C,255C,327C,361C,384C,415C,433C,449C,496C,623C 'limit':345C 'line':402C 'lock':355C 'mirror':334C 'model':213C 'must':321C,609C 'need':606C 'nil':218C 'non':48B,100C,144C,223C,453C,529C 'non-priv':47B,99C,143C,222C,452C,528C 'noth':252C 'object':45B,65B,89C,116C,380C,450C,481C 'oid':122C,293C,478C,516C 'one':149C,401C 'one-lin':400C 'oper':283C,356C 'optsignin':572C 'optsigninfromanyorigin':246C,632C 'otherwis':460C 'outsid':324C 'owner':119C,229C,348C,513C,519C 'owner/repo':61B,104C,473C 'pack':549C 'packag':27B,270C,423C,583C 'path':62B,105C,256C,263C,314C,559C 'permiss':208C,212C 'point':278C,511C,567C 'pointer':328C 'post':518C 'privat':49B,101C,145C,224C,340C,347C,454C,530C 'public':228C,602C 'publish':338C 'pull':603C 'pure':363C 'reach':188C,377C 'reachabl':351C 'read':210C,262C,395C,464C,558C 'refus':132C,461C 'regist':244C,630C 'registri':428C 'repo':120C,514C,520C,608C 'repoexist':620C 'repositori':50B,102C,146C,225C,298C,341C,343C,375C,455C,531C 'reproduc':138C 'request':156C 'requir':6A,35B,79C,234C,439C,483C,613C 'require-sign-in':612C 'requiresign':190C 'restrict':238C,367C 'return':170C,201C,308C,358C,406C 'rout':42B,86C,242C,281C,390C,434C,570C,624C 'routers/api/v1/api.go':581C 'routers/install/install.go':508C 'routers/private/serv.go':591C 'routers/web/repo/githttp.go':599C 'routers/web/web.go':575C 'second':389C 'self':29B 'self-host':28B 'serv':44B,88C 'servcommand':590C 'server':498C 'servic':78C,438C,545C 'services/context/package.go':586C 'services/lfs/server.go':187C 'set':139C,259C,492C,562C 'setting.service.requiresigninviewstrict':574C,621C 'sha':67B,110C,476C 'show':152C,165C 'sign':614C 'signin':7A,36B,80C,235C,440C,484C 'signinrequir':250C,573C 'sinc':304C 'size':303C,307C 'smart':267C,595C 'ssh':269C,364C,588C 'start':497C 'still':43B,87C,357C 'store':295C 'tell':286C 'transfer':385C 'true':82C,365C,442C,486C,499C,507C 'ui':125C 'unauthent':468C 'upload':196C,548C 'user':219C,239C,368C 'v9gw':16A 'verifi':198C 'verifyauthwithoptionsapi':580C 'verifyopti':634C 'view':8A,37B,81C,236C,441C,485C 'web':124C,264C,504C,569C 'whether':290C 'whose':633C 'without':300C,445C 'write':353C,506C 'wrong':306C","nicknames":[],"mitigations":[],"who_affected":"Instances that set REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW to true and serve Git LFS objects from non-private repositories of public owners. Instances without that setting, or with LFS disabled, are not exposed. Private repositories and those of limited or private owners are not reachable.","tier":"C","verified":{},"analyst_revisit_at":null,"fix_status":"available","audience":"businesses","plain_action":null,"pkeys":["giteadev"],"ptokens":["dev","gitea"],"labels":["cwe306","gitea","gitlfs","go","low","package","selfhosted"],"campaign_type":null,"search_a":"'-120725':11A,19A '-2026':10A,18A '8pmc':14A '9g44':15A 'anonym':1A 'bypass':5A 'cve':9A,17A 'download':4A 'ghsa':13A 'ghsa-8pmc-9g44-v9gw':12A 'git':2A 'gitea.dev':20A 'lfs':3A 'requir':6A 'signin':7A 'v9gw':16A 'view':8A","search_b":"'-256':68B '-306':22B 'account':55B 'anonym':73B 'attack':57B 'client':52B 'cwe':21B 'download':70B 'enabl':38B 'file':72B 'git':24B,40B 'git-lf':23B 'gitea':26B,32B 'host':30B 'instanc':33B 'know':59B 'lfs':25B,41B 'non':48B 'non-priv':47B 'object':45B,65B 'owner/repo':61B 'packag':27B 'path':62B 'privat':49B 'repositori':50B 'requir':35B 'rout':42B 'self':29B 'self-host':28B 'serv':44B 'sha':67B 'signin':36B 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'contain':427C 'cooki':539C 'correct':302C 'counterpart':416C,627C 'credenti':181C,447C 'date':407C 'default':487C,501C 'deploy':371C 'detail':430C 'determineaccessmod':585C 'discov':313C 'doer':206C 'download':113C,177C,194C,284C,448C 'earli':202C,405C 'enforc':560C 'entri':277C,510C,566C 'even':299C 'everi':462C,556C 'exact':173C 'exampl':326C 'exist':610C 'fals':191C,488C,502C,617C 'file':108C,151C,329C,555C 'fix':403C 'gap':419C 'get':118C,157C,161C,169C,512C,540C,543C,551C 'git':84C,129C,266C,383C,432C,547C,594C 'git-lfs-transf':382C 'git-upload-pack':546C 'git/info/lfs/objects':121C,515C 'git/info/lfs/objects/batch':521C 'given':292C 'go':598C 'grant':214C 'handler':199C 'hash':316C 'header':537C 'honour':437C 'http':268C,469C,596C 'info/refs':160C 'instal':505C 'instanc':76C,319C,458C,525C 'ispul':619C 'key':372C 'know':97C,472C 'leak':332C 'lfs':85C,115C,150C,168C,241C,255C,327C,361C,384C,415C,433C,449C,496C,623C 'limit':345C 'line':402C 'lock':355C 'mirror':334C 'model':213C 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'wrong':306C","cause_entry":null,"cause_path":null,"disclosures_checked_at":null,"first_public_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:20+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":null,"cvss_by":null,"poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"ghsa-repo","external_id":"GHSA-8pmc-9g44-v9gw","url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-8pmc-9g44-v9gw","severity":"low","published_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:20+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:20+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-15T21:12:46+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-15T21:12:46+00:00","note":null},{"source":"nvd","external_id":"CVE-2026-120725","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120725","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-11-15T22:17:17+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-15T22:17:17+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-15T22:40:23+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-15T22:40:24+00:00","note":null}],"documents":[{"id":165561,"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-8pmc-9g44-v9gw","title":"Maintainer's advisory: github.com","kind":"vendor","source":"ghsa-repo","publisher":"vendor","text":null,"published_at":"2026-11-15T21:03:20+00:00","relation":"advisory","confidence":null,"note":"Maintainer's advisory: github.com"},{"id":165694,"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.4.0","title":"Release notes: github.com","kind":"release","source":"nvd","publisher":"vendor","text":null,"published_at":null,"relation":"fix","confidence":null,"note":"Release notes: github.com"}],"disclosures":[],"exploit_sources":[],"notice":"Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai"}