---
id: "CVE-2026-120699"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-120699"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-120699"]
title: "CubeSandbox: authenticated tenants can bind-mount arbitrary host paths into sandboxes"
severity: "critical"
cvss: 9.4
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "ai-tooling"
products: [{"name": "CubeSandbox", "fixed": [], "affected": "", "ecosystem": "vendor"}]
ecosystems: ["vendor"]
tags: ["ai-agents", "ai-tooling", "cubesandbox", "multi-tenant", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["single-tenant", "version-0.5.1-or-later"]
published_at: "2026-11-16T21:17:20+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T21:38:58+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-16T21:39:55+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120699", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T21:38:58+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# CubeSandbox: authenticated tenants can bind-mount arbitrary host paths into sandboxes

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-120699 (this .md is for agents)

CubeSandbox is a sandbox for running AI agents. Before 0.5.1, any authenticated tenant could pass an arbitrary host path through the sandbox creation API, and the host subtree was bind-mounted read-write into their microVM, letting them read and modify host files and run code as root on the host.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- vendor:CubeSandbox affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed

## How to check

- Check the CubeSandbox version in use; affected versions are those before `0.5.1`.
- Review whether any tenant can call `POST /sandboxes` with `metadata["host-mount"]` set.

## Fix

- Upgrade CubeSandbox to `0.5.1`.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T21:38:58+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120699

## Documents

- [advisory] Vendor advisory: github.com https://github.com/TencentCloud/CubeSandbox/security/advisories/GHSA-8frp-jfpv-5vhv
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/TencentCloud/CubeSandbox/commit/5c7025f3a393c30e723dd7f071ef1c28d7a2e52e
- [fix] Release notes: github.com https://github.com/TencentCloud/CubeSandbox/releases/tag/v0.5.1

## From the sources

CubeSandbox is an instant, concurrent, secure, and lightweight sandbox for AI agents. Prior to 0.5.1, any authenticated tenant permitted to call POST /sandboxes can supply metadata["host-mount"] with an arbitrary existing host path because the control plane performs no authorization check or allowed-prefix validation for the path. injectHostDirMounts forwards the path to prepareHostDirVolume, where Cubelet uses mount --rbind through the function to perform a recursive bind mount as root and exposes the host subtree to the tenant's MicroVM through virtio-fs, read-write by default. This allows host-root file access and modification, host code execution, access to the container runtime, and compromise of co-resident tenants without a kernel or virtual-machine-monitor flaw. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.1.

---

_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_
