---
id: "CVE-2026-120560"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-120560"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-120560"]
title: "WordPress WooCommerce table plugin lets anonymous visitors delete media library files"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 6.5
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["package", "self-hosted", "woocommerce", "wordpress"]
not_affected_if: ["plugin-not-installed", "version-above-2.1.5"]
published_at: "2026-11-07T04:17:13+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-07T04:45:47+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-07T04:47:54+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120560", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-07T04:45:47+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# WordPress WooCommerce table plugin lets anonymous visitors delete media library files

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-120560 (this .md is for agents)

The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce plugin exposes an unauthenticated AJAX handler that passes attacker-supplied input into a WordPress filter hook. An attacker can use it to delete any media library attachment and its file by numeric ID, erasing a site's uploaded media.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check whether the plugin is installed and its version in the WordPress admin under Plugins, or in `wp-content/plugins/` (look for the plugin's folder name)
- Confirm whether the installed version is `2.1.5` or lower, the range the description names as vulnerable
- Check the site's media library for attachments that have gone missing

## Timeline

- 2026-11-07T04:45:47+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120560

## From the sources

The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the `get_table_data()` AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via `wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data` — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied `wp_columns_actions` parameter directly to `apply_filters()` alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the `table_id` parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers `wp_delete_attachment()` as a callback on hooks such as `upgrader_scheduled_cleanup` and `importer_scheduled_cleanup`, which `sanitize_key()` does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside `wp-content/uploads` — such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.

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