---
id: "CVE-2026-120013"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-120013"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-120013"]
title: "agent_memory: tenant parameter allows path traversal into other tenants' secrets"
severity: "high"
cvss: 7.5
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["agent_memory", "multi-tenant", "package", "python"]
not_affected_if: ["single-tenant", "tenant-hardcoded"]
published_at: "2026-11-10T09:17:22+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-10T09:21:08+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-10T09:21:23+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120013", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-10T09:21:08+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# agent_memory: tenant parameter allows path traversal into other tenants' secrets

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-120013 (this .md is for agents)

The agent_memory module's create_client function takes a tenant value and builds a file path from it without validation. A crafted value with path traversal sequences lets a caller read another tenant's mounted OAuth client IDs and secrets.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the installed agent_memory version, for example with `pip show agent_memory` (package name assumed; confirm in your environment)
- Look for calls to `create_client(tenant=...)` where the tenant value comes from user input or a request
- Check whether secrets are mounted under `/etc/secrets/appfnd/hana-agent-memory/<tenant>/` on shared hosts

## Fix

- Move to a version at or above `0.50.0`, which the sources say is the fixed release

## Timeline

- 2026-11-10T09:21:08+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120013

## Documents

- [advisory] Vendor advisory: github.com https://github.com/SAP/cloud-sdk-python/security/advisories/GHSA-28c8-457r-4cf6

## From the sources

The agent_memory module accepts a caller-supplied tenant parameter in create_client(tenant=...). Prior to version 0.50.0, the tenant parameter was not validated before being used to construct filesystem paths for secret resolution. A value containing path traversal sequences (for example, attacker-corp/../victim-corp) could cause the resolved path to escape the intended directory and access another tenant's secrets under:Plain Text/etc/secrets/appfnd/hana-agent-memory/<tenant>/Successful exploitation could allow unauthorized access to another tenant's mounted credentials, including OAuth client IDs and client secrets. This vulnerability could enable cross-tenant access to sensitive credentials.

---

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