---
id: "CVE-2026-119731"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-119731"]
title: "Munshi by Petpooja: forged payment webhook grants paid subscription access without paying"
severity: "high"
cvss: 8.7
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "other"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["munshi", "other", "petpooja", "subscriptions", "webhooks"]
not_affected_if: ["fixed-build"]
published_at: "2026-11-02T19:18:01+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-02T19:24:39+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-02T19:26:37+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119731", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-02T19:24:39+00:00"}]
---

# Munshi by Petpooja: forged payment webhook grants paid subscription access without paying

Munshi, a restaurant software product by Petpooja, has a subscription payment webhook that does not verify where its notifications come from. An unauthenticated attacker can send a fake payment-success message and get paid access without paying.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Look for the route `POST /api/payment/order/webhook` in the Munshi backend
- Check whether the webhook verifies a payment provider signature before marking an order paid

## Fix

- Versions before `2026-06-30` are affected; move to a build dated `2026-06-30` or later

## Timeline

- 2026-11-02T19:24:39+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119731

## Documents

- [advisory] Third-party advisory: www.vulncheck.com https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/munshi-payment-bypass-via-unauthenticated-webhook-endpoint

## From the sources

Munshi (by Petpooja) before 2026-06-30 contained a payment bypass vulnerability in its subscription payment webhook at POST /api/payment/order/webhook, which lacks webhook authentication, cryptographic signature verification, source validation, and independent server-side confirmation with the payment provider. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can submit a forged payment-success notification referencing an order obtained from the payment-status redirect URL, causing the backend to mark the subscription as paid/active and granting paid access without an actual successful payment.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_