---
id: "CVE-2026-119096"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-119096"]
title: "WordPress Uncanny Toolkit for LearnDash: login check bypass lets suspended accounts in"
severity: "critical"
cvss: 9.8
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["learndash", "package", "self-hosted", "uncanny-learndash-toolkit", "wordpress"]
not_affected_if: ["newer-version", "plugin-not-installed"]
published_at: "2026-10-31T08:16:49+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-31T08:34:28+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-31T08:35:00+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119096", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-31T08:34:28+00:00"}]
---

# WordPress Uncanny Toolkit for LearnDash: login check bypass lets suspended accounts in

The Uncanny Toolkit for LearnDash plugin for WordPress, up to and including 3.8.2, has a flaw in its login handler that skips its account-approval check. An attacker who holds the password of an unverified or suspended account can log in as that user and get a valid session cookie.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Look for the plugin in the WordPress admin under Plugins, or run `wp plugin get uncanny-learndash-toolkit --field=version` (plugin slug assumed; confirm it)
- Check whether the installed version is `3.8.2` or lower

## Fix

- Uncanny Toolkit for LearnDash: move to a version newer than `3.8.2` (the fixed version is not named in the sources)

## Timeline

- 2026-10-31T08:34:28+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119096

## From the sources

The Uncanny Toolkit for LearnDash plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in versions up to, and including, 3.8.2 via the `email` parameter of the `uo_login_action()` function. This is due to a parser-differential flaw in which the plugin's account-verification gate resolves the submitted `email` value using the raw, unsanitized string passed to `get_user_by()`, while the subsequent `wp_signon()` call relies on WordPress core's internal `sanitize_user()` to strip appended junk characters — causing the gate lookup to fail and be skipped entirely while the real account is still resolved and authenticated. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in to unverified or administrator-suspended accounts whose credentials they already possess, obtaining a valid `wordpress_logged_in` session cookie and defeating the plugin's account-approval and account-suspension controls. The nonce required to reach the handler is freely obtainable in the same request from the unauthenticated `ult-refresh-nonce` endpoint, making exploitation trivial for any attacker with network access to the site and knowledge of a target account's credentials.

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