---
id: "CVE-2026-118988"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-118988"]
title: "CallBackery Perl: unauthenticated path traversal reads arbitrary server files"
severity: "unknown"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["callbackery", "package", "perl", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["version-0.60.1-or-later"]
published_at: "2026-10-30T13:18:31+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-30T13:30:27+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-30T13:32:29+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118988", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-30T13:30:27+00:00"}]
---

# CallBackery Perl: unauthenticated path traversal reads arbitrary server files

CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients use the /doc route to read files via path traversal. An attacker can read any file the server process can read, such as configuration or secrets, when those files contain POD text.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the installed CallBackery version; the sources say versions before `0.60.1` are affected.
- Confirm whether the application exposes the `/doc` route (documentation plugin mounted ahead of session checks).

## Fix

- Move CallBackery to version `0.60.1` or later.

## Timeline

- 2026-10-30T13:30:27+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118988

## From the sources

CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route.

Every CallBackery application mounts its documentation plugin at /doc, ahead of any session check. The route passes the requested name to Pod::Simple::Search->find without validation. find splits the name on "::" and joins the parts into a file path, so a name such as "..::..::..::etc::motd" escapes @INC.

Any file the server process can read is reachable. Only POD is rendered, but a file with a POD directive and no "=cut" is POD to the end of the file.

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