Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-118769
Botan's C API function botan_block_cipher_block_size converts a size_t to int without a bounds check, so a large Lion cipher block size is truncated. An attacker who can pick the cipher through external parameter strings in an app using raw ECB mode can cause the caller to under-allocate and corrupt memory.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-29 18:26 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Only applications that use the Botan C API, specifically the FFI raw ECB mode, and that accept external algorithm parameter strings so an attacker can select the Lion cipher. The C++ API and normal C API modes such as CBC and CTR are not affected according to the description. Teams that use Botan only through the C++ API or standard modes can skip it.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
botan version or the package manager lockfile.botan_block_cipher_*) using raw ECB mode.3.13.0.Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Botan is a C++ cryptography library. From 2.1.0 until 3.13.0, the Botan C API function botan_block_cipher_block_size converted a size_t block size to int without a bounds check. In an application that accepts external algorithm parameter strings and uses the FFI raw ECB mode, an attacker can select the variable-block-size Lion cipher so that the reported size is truncated, the caller allocates insufficient memory, and later block processing causes memory corruption. The C++ API and normally used C API modes such as CBC and CTR are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.
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